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Introduction and overview 
 
Policymakers and economists have long been engaged in the debate about the 
evaluation of public debt, its impact on economic activity and growth, and 
whether and when it is necessary to curb it. As emerges from the initial quote 
about Alexander Hamilton, the idea that public debt can be excessive and that 
it could have positive as well as negative consequences has a long tradition. 
The large fiscal imbalances created worldwide by the Great Recession of 2008 
revived general interest in the issue and focused the attention on the developed 
countries. Indeed, early in 2010, at the Toronto summit, leading governments 
decided to implement a set of restrictive fiscal policies, whose aim was to reduce 
public budget deficits and, eventually, outstanding debts that were considered 
no longer sustainable and a burden on the future growth of the economies. 
The epicentre of the implementation of these policies, commonly known as 
austerity measures, were the countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
where the financial and the economic crisis was followed, between 2010 and 
2012, by acute public debt crises. Consequently, many countries embittered, or 
were forced to embitter, also in compliance with the Eurozone fiscal rules, 
restrictive fiscal policies aiming at reducing quickly and consistently their 
public deficits and their public debts. As Chapter 3 will show, this was the case 
of those peripheral Eurozone countries that were heavily involved in the debt 
crisis (notably Greece, Portugal, and Ireland), and that suffered most the 
negative consequences of the austerity policies.  
The idea that public debt may represent a burden for the economic system as 
a whole has distant origins and focuses on who and how should pay for debt, 
and with what consequences on the economy. Nevertheless, particularly 
influential both for academic research and the implementation of the fiscal 
corrective policies was the empirical paper proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff in 
2010 at the dawn of the crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), in a large panel of 
countries, identified a critical threshold of 90% of the debt-to-GDP ratio beyond 
which debt is harmful to growth. Several countries in the world were fast 
approaching that threshold or already were well beyond it. 
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Though Reinhart and Rogoff’s work was affected by many flaws, it has spurred 
buoyant empirical research in search of the general debt thresholds above which 
growth is jeopardised by public debt. Further works have supported the 
existence of critical debt-to-GDP ratios under various time and space 
observational fields, but results of these researches are inconclusive or 
controversial, as discussed in Chapter 2. Country-specific characteristics and 
contingencies play in fact a prominent role, thus prompting a branch of 
literature that attempts to comprehensively understand the debt-growth 
relationship and its determinants (see for instance Panizza and Presbitero, 
2014; Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015). 
In contrast with the findings of the broad threshold literature and of many 
theoretical models, the idea that public debt is always harmful to economic 
growth has partially been reconsidered in the last few years. Nevertheless, the 
existence of a linkage between debt and growth has not been rejected: the long-
run relationship between such macroeconomic variables is inevitably and 
broadly affected by heterogeneous factors. 
However, in retrospect and as emerges in Chapter 1, one may say that the 
empirical pursuit of the debt-to-GDP threshold harmful to growth lacks deeper 
foundational work: why should we expect a negative public debt-growth 
relationship? In addition, if such a relationship exists, why should it take the 
specific form of a threshold of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and why should we expect 
this threshold to be equally valid across time and space?  
These questions are the starting point of this Doctoral Thesis, which is 
organised as follows. Chapter 1 surveys the theoretical literature concerning 
public debt and economic growth, aiming at finding a theoretical foundation for 
the debt-threshold literature. Overall, there is no clear and straightforward 
answer to the questions of why we should expect a negative public debt-growth 
relationship in the first place, why it should take the specific form of a threshold 
of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and why we should expect this threshold to be equally 
valid across time and space. Or, from another perspective, there are many 
possible answers and many elements affecting them, thus reflecting the 
complexity of the argument, as well as the variety of the empirical situations. 
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In particular, the literature that I examine, on the one hand offers a rich variety 
of explanations and insights to researchers of the debt-growth relationship but, 
on the other, it does not provide any one-way conclusion: the relationship may 
be negative, positive, or even no relationship may exist, both from a theoretical 
and an empirical point of view. Even less is theoretically founded the existence 
of a general debt-to-GDP threshold above which growth is consistently stifled. 
Each country’s specific characteristics, circumstances, and events have an 
overwhelming importance that cannot be encapsulated in a single general law.  
In Chapter 1, I also present a fiscal model of endogenous growth that may help 
address the theoretical issues in an orderly and consistent manner along two 
specific coordinates of debt assessment: sustainability/unsustainability, and 
efficiency/inefficiency. The thrust of the model is that no meaningful 
assessment of debt and its effect on growth at any point in time is possible 
without reference to the whole debt trajectory and the specific state of the 
economy along the trajectory.  
Chapter 2 reviews the empirical literature and focuses on the debt-growth 
relationship from an econometric point of view. As before, it is difficult to derive 
a univocal conclusion on the nature of such a relationship on the basis of the 
literature’s findings: the existence of a significant negative relationship 
between debt and growth is the predominant thinking, though in contrast with 
the conclusions of several works.  
For these reasons, the aim of Chapter 2 is to go to the roots of the debt-growth 
relationship, to investigate whether the outstanding debt and the GDP are 
linked. To this end, I have adopted a research methodology that differs from the 
most common employed in the literature on debt-to-GDP thresholds. First, my 
analysis does not hinge on any specific theory, and it should not be considered 
as a proof of a specific theoretical statement. Rather, it is based on the approach 
outlined by Hoover et al. (2008) and aims at understanding "what the data say" 
without imposing aprioristic theoretical structures. 
A second methodological choice consistent with this approach is to treat the 
(growth of the) amount of public debt and (the growth of) GDP as the two 
genuine primitives, without imposing the debt-to-GDP ratio as a primitive 
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itself. In fact, for this to be possible, the two underlying primitives should 
display well defend statistical properties, namely cointegration and 
convergence towards a long-term equilibrium value, which are usually not 
tested in the literature. 
Third, I believe that the heterogeneity, or non-generality, of results that I have 
pointed out before should be taken as an intrinsic feature of the problem at 
hand, so that a viable strategy is to restrict, rather than expand, the 
observational field. I have set time and space limits to my dataset by purpose: 
my analysis is based on a panel dataset including quarterly data for 25 Eastern 
and Western European countries from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4. The Eurozone 
represents a unique "field experiment" of a large number of countries where 
some key conditioning factors of fiscal policy are common and exogenous, 
namely fiscal targets and rules, monetary policy, and the exchange rate with 
the rest of the world. 
The main result is that a long-run equilibrium relationship between GDP and 
debt exists for some countries ― and debt and GDP tend to adjust towards it ― 
but it is not generalisable. Where a relationship exists, it does not always imply 
that the debt-to-GDP ratio may be the appropriate variable for describing it. 
Moreover, cross-country heterogeneity and the role of the financial crisis and of 
the austerity periods remain substantial and overwhelming factors. Therefore, 
a unique equation describing the GDP-debt relationship does not seem to exist, 
which entails the impossibility to derive a meaningful general debt-to-GDP 
threshold. 
Thus far I have focused on the general relationship between debt and growth 
from both the theoretical and the empirical points of view. Turning to the 
analysis of the Sovereign Debt Crisis and of the austerity period, Chapter 3 
attempts to explain what has driven austerity ― measured as the first 
difference of the cyclically adjusted structural primary balance ―  within a 
dataset of 28 European countries. 
In the first part of this chapter I present a correlation analysis that describes 
the relationship between the variable austerity and each of the considered 
determinants, that are brought back to four main sets of variables: fiscal 
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discipline, market discipline, fiscal consolidation, and macroeconomic 
stabilisation. 
The second part implements a panel econometric analysis based on the 
principal component factor analysis and on the pooled partial common 
correlation effect estimator. Results show that the variables and factors of the 
analysis are not able to fully explain austerity, though an important 
contribution is provided by the enforcement of the Eurozone fiscal rules (the 
adoption of excessive deficit procedures) and is partially counterbalanced by the 
cyclical position of the economy.  
The last chapter, Chapter 4, aims at gaining insight into the role of debt and 
government expectations and their impact on growth under uncertainty 
conditions. In fact, it is possible that the effects of austerity measures in some 
countries, for instance the so-called PIIGS, were amplified by uncertainty. My 
ambition is to relate austerity with consumers’ expectations, thus studying 
whether and when consumers’ beliefs about public debt and government 
intervention affect their consumption, savings, and tax compliance choices with 
a direct impact, at the aggregate level, on economic growth. 
Therefore, Chapter 4 implements a laboratory experiment to study how people 
react in a generalized framework in which public debt may be unexpectedly 
reduced. The debt dynamics arises endogenously: within a public good game, 
taxes are collected from all participants and are used to cover a given level of 
public expenditure, which is then equally distributed to the same participants 
at the beginning of each round. If the collected amount of taxes is lower than 
what the public expenditure would require, a deficit is generated. Moreover, 
reproducing a forced withdrawal, the outstanding amount of public debt can be 
reduced upon accessing subjects’ savings. 
Within this setting, expectations are directly elicited by asking subjects if they 
believe that public debt is going to be reduced, and if they think that the other 
subjects believe that public debt is sustainable. Therefore, it is possible to 
identify whether and how agents’ allocations and expectations are affected by 
the public debt path. As mentioned above, a peculiarity of my approach is the 
endogenous dynamics of public debt: not only it avoids introducing 
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predetermined dynamics, but also increases the ecological validity of the 
experiment. Participants are indeed more psychologically involved in the debt 
mechanism and they might feel responsible for the raise in debt. On the other 
hand, an exogenous dynamics could depict public debt and tax compliance as 
irrelevant. 
Results show that this experimental framework is characterized by relatively 
high and often increasing aggregate savings and relatively low and decreasing 
aggregate consumption. Interestingly, an increase in the debt-reduction 
expectations and a decrease in the perceived debt sustainability are also found 
to explain savings and consumption behaviours, as is shown in the econometric 
part of Chapter 4. 
 
While this quick outlook of the thesis makes evident the importance of 
reconsidering the debt-growth relationship and the implementation of the 
austerity policies, further investigations are also necessary. The impact of 
austerity on inequalities, the causality direction between debt and growth, the 
distinction between internal and external debt, and the debt maturity structure 
are only some of the elements that should be reconsidered and analysed to 
answer still open questions and to fully depict the relationship between 
economic growth and public debt.  
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Chapter 1 
Public Debt and Economic Growth: 
A Literature Review in Search of Theory 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The recent wave of research on the relationship between public debt and growth has 
been largely dominated by the pursuit of "the" debt-to-GDP ratio beyond which debt 
depresses growth; yet no univocal conclusion has been reached either about the 
quantification of the critical ratio or even about its existence. Foundational work is 
however lacking: why should we expect a negative public debt-growth relationship in 
the first place? If such a relationship exists, why should it take the specific form of a 
threshold of the debt-GDP ratio, and why should we expect this threshold to be equally 
valid across time and space? This chapter surveys the theoretical literature concerning 
public debt and economic growth. Overall, there is no clear and straightforward answer 
to the previous questions. Or, from another perspective, there are many possible 
answers and many elements affecting them, thus reflecting the complexity of the 
argument, as well as the variety of the empirical situations. In particular, I have found 
no direct or indirect theoretical foundation to the existence of a critical debt-to-GDP 
ratio with general validity. I also present a fiscal model of endogenous growth that may 
help address the theoretical issues in an orderly and consistent manner along two 
coordinates of the debt assessment: sustainability/unsustainability, and 
efficiency/inefficiency. The thrust of the model is that no meaningful assessment of 
debt and its effect on growth at any point in time is possible without reference to the 
whole debt trajectory and the specific state of the economy along the trajectory. In my 
view, research should concentrate on the study of specific conditions and cases and 
abandon the pursuit of a general law. 
 
 
 
Keywords: public debt, debt sustainability, debt efficiency, Ricardian equivalence, 
debt burden, debt overhang, economic growth, endogenous growth models. 
 8 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Policymakers and economists have long been engaged in the debate about the 
evaluation of public debt, its impact on economic activity and growth, and 
whether and when it is necessary to curb it. The large fiscal imbalances created 
worldwide by the Great Recession of 2008-09 revived general interest in the 
issue. The epicentre became Europe, and the Eurozone in particular, where the 
Great Recession was followed by acute public debt crises between 2010 and 
2012. As a result, many countries implemented, or were forced to implement, 
also in compliance with the fiscal rules of the Eurozone, restrictive fiscal policies 
aiming at reducing their budget deficit and, eventually, their public debt.  
If not dictated by immediate threats, fiscal consolidation, the so-called 
austerity, was also prescribed as a requisite for reinstating sound growth 
conditions before prolonged fiscal stimuli to the economy became self-defeating 
as public debt was growing too high. 
 
There should be little question that European economies share the need to reduce 
public deficits and debts from levels that, as confirmed by a growing strand of empirical 
literature (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Kumar and Woo, 2015) are likely to be harmful 
for growth in the medium term […] (Buti and Pench, 2012, p.1) 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), in a large panel of countries, identified a critical 
threshold of 90% of the debt-to-GDP ratio beyond which debt is harmful to 
growth. Several countries in the world, notably in the Eurozone, were fast 
approaching that threshold or already were well beyond. The Reinhart-Rogoff 
finding has spurred a buoyant empirical research in search of the debt threshold 
above which growth is jeopardised by public debt. Hitherto results of these 
researches are inconclusive or controversial (a comprehensive review of such an 
empirical literature is given in Chapter 2). 
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In the first place, the work of Reinhart and Rogoff was criticized with regard 
to the implied causality (Irons and Bivens, 2010),1 and then for some 
methodological and statistical problems (Herndon et al., 2013).2 Further 
strictly empirical works support the existence of critical debt-to-GDP ratios 
under various time and space observational fields (but there is no agreement on 
their level: see, among others, Pattillo et al., 2011; Baum et al., 2012). Some 
authors point out the existence of a positive relationship between debt and 
growth above a certain threshold (Minea et al., 2012). A third group of studies 
do not completely deny the existence of a negative relationship between the two 
variables, but rather claim that a general threshold is unlikely to exist, and it 
provides no guidance towards the adoption of widespread policies of debt 
reduction (e.g. Bowdler and Esteves, 2013; Pescatori et al., 2014). Country-
specific characteristics, contingencies and events play a prominent role, thus 
prompting a branch of literature that attempts to understand the debt-growth 
relationship and its determinants thoroughly (see, for instance, Panizza and 
Presbitero, 2014; Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015). 
In retrospect, one may say that the empirical pursuit of the debt-to-GDP 
threshold harmful to growth lacks deeper foundational work. In the first place, 
on the basis of the available theoretical literature, why should we expect a 
negative public debt-growth relationship? And, if such a relationship exists, why 
should it take the specific form of a threshold of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and why 
should we expect this threshold to be equally valid across time and space? 
To address these questions, propedeutic for any empirical analysis, I focus 
attention on the possible theoretical underpinnings of the debt-growth 
relationship. In the first part of this chapter, in Sections 2 to 5, I shall explore 
the rather extended range and vintages of theoretical explanations that can be 
found in the literature, which presents itself as a scattered, heterogeneous and 
rather incoherent constellation of theories, models and case studies, with 
largely contradictory predictions. With the aim to provide the reader with an 
                                                          
1 Their application of the Granger causality test has showed that debt does not cause growth 
and growth does not cause debt. 
2 The analysis was spoiled by coding errors, selective exclusion of available data, and 
unconventional weighting of summary statistics. 
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effective guide in the search for explanation of the debt-growth relationship, the 
material is organised in four blocks. The first two (Sections 2 and 3) comprise 
the literature descending from the roots of modern macroeconomics and their 
developments: the neoclassical and the Keynesian respectively. As will become 
clear later in the chapter, different findings have been described within the 
same theoretical approach. The third (Section 4) presents the two fundamental 
concepts of debt sustainability and efficiency within the public finance 
literature. The fourth (Section 5) and last block gathers another specialised 
literature concerned with problems of debt default. Of course, there are overlaps 
across this classification, which inevitably involves some degree of arbitrariness 
in the development of this chapter. Moreover, since the number of models 
dealing with debt and growth is relatively limited, I will present some works 
that do not directly deals with it but that are useful to describe the theoretical 
framework within which the debt-growth relationship can be studied. 
One main problem is that a consistent theoretical framework for the debt-
growth research is still missing. Therefore, in section 6 I will present a model 
within which the crucial issues in the debt-growth problem can be located, and 
possibly clarified, in a consistent and orderly manner. It is a non-standard fiscal 
model of endogenous growth freely inspired to Barro (1990) and Diamond 
(1965). In Barro (1990) endogenous growth is sustained by productive public 
expenditure fully covered by taxation. To introduce debt, I adopt a sequential 
economy with two-period generations à la Diamond (1965)3 where public 
expenditure is financed by debt in the first period and the debt burden is 
covered by taxation in the second period. Thus, it is possible to characterise and 
discuss the debt-growth relationship in four scenarios centred on the 
efficiency/inefficiency, sustainability/unsustainability of debt, which embed 
some specific debt-growth relationships present in the literature. 
Section 7 concludes: the literature that I have examined and organised, on the 
one hand offers a rich variety of explanations and insights to researchers of the 
                                                          
3 The difference here is that the generations do not overlap, but I assume that they comply with 
the intergenerational pact that each generation leaves the same endowment of capital to the 
next one. 
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debt-growth relationship, but on the other it does not provide any one-way 
conclusion: the relationship may be negative, positive, or even no relationship 
may exist, whereas in other models either debt or growth is not directly 
included. Even less is theoretically founded the existence of a general debt-to-
GDP threshold above which growth is consistently stifled. Each country’s 
specific characteristics, circumstances, and events have an overwhelming 
importance that cannot be encapsulated in a single general law. Research 
should therefore concentrate on the former and abandon the pursuit of the 
latter.  
 
2. NEOCLASSICAL VIEWS 
 
The strand of literature discussing the neoclassical models is particularly vast 
and difficult to follow. On the one hand, they share common microfoundations 
as regards competitive markets, market clearing and optimising behaviour. On 
the other hand, they differ depending on whether they consider a one-period or 
a multi-period setup, a stock or a flow analysis, etc. Consequently, I shall not 
present and discuss here the details of such models, but I shall consider the 
most popular results only, with some examples from the literature: the 
standard neoclassical approach and the crowding out effect, the Ricardian 
equivalence, the unconventional expansionary fiscal consolidation approach, 
and the endogenous growth models.  
 
2.1. Deficit spending and crowding out 
Starting from the neoclassical approach, an early suggestion of negative effect 
of debt on growth is the well-known "crowding-out" effect of public budget 
deficits (for a reassessment see Bernheim, 1989), already introduced by Adam 
Smith in The Wealth of Nations. This class of earlier neoclassical models is 
characterized by perfectly rational consumers with a finite lifespan, with access 
to a perfect capital market, and where the consumption level is determined by 
a utility maximisation process. Analysis focuses on the amount of loanable 
funds in the capital market. In this context, a budget deficit increases lifetime 
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consumption because the required taxes are shifted to future generations. 
However, provided that the economic resources are fully employed as usually 
assumed in these models, an increase in consumption implies a lower level of 
savings. The interest rate rises to keep investments equal to savings, crowding-
out private expenditure. In other words, the impact that the government deficit 
spending has on the economic system depends on the substitution between 
public expenditure and private expenditure.  
 
If the government borrows a dollar from you, that is a dollar that you do not spend, or 
that you do not lend to a company to spend on new investment. Every dollar of 
increased government spending must correspond to one less dollar of private spending. 
Jobs created by stimulus spending are offset by jobs lost from the decline in private 
spending. We can build roads instead of factories, but fiscal stimulus can’t help us to 
build more of both (Cochrane, 2009). 
 
Note two important caveats, however. The first is that the extent of crowding 
out is largely seen as an empirical matter, and in some circumstances deficit 
spending may retain some limited positive effect on economic activity 
(Bernheim 1989). The second is that there is no explicit treatment of debt 
accumulation and its effects on growth over time: if deficit spending is 
ineffective on aggregate output today, this does not necessarily imply that debt 
will reduce growth tomorrow. Indeed, one may think that if the government 
creates a surplus in order to pay for debt, this will be neutral on the economy. 
In this context, Diamond (1965) was the first to study the effects of debt on 
economic growth properly. Diamond (1965) was the first to design a neoclassical 
model aiming at exploring the effects of public debt within an infinitely long life 
and discrete-time economy, with a constant return to scale aggregate 
production function and with individuals that live for two periods of time. The 
government levies taxes on domestic lenders to finance its public debt, which is 
divided into external debt (borrowed from foreign lenders) and internal debt 
(borrowed from domestic lenders). 
Diamond shows that external debt has negative effects on growth in the long-
run because of the taxes needed to finance interest payments: in fact, taxes are 
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levied on domestic lenders whereas interests are paid to the foreign ones. Taxes 
reduce consumers’ total lifetime income, and hence consumption. As a further 
consequence, taxes reduce savings and the capital stock. 
Internal debt, on the other hand, entails both effects as well as a reduction in 
the capital stock due to the fact that individuals substitute government debt for 
physical capital in their portfolios. Therefore, within this model public debt 
crowds out private capital. 
The 1990s have seen the emergence of discordant views. Some authors 
proposed models leading to opposite conclusions with respect to those of 
Diamond. For instance, Dotsey and Mao (1994) introduced distortionary 
taxation4 and debt turned out to crowd-in investments. Ludvingson (1996) 
analysed deficit-financed fiscal policies in a forward-looking general 
equilibrium model and showed that the economy’s response to an increase in 
government expenditure depends on how it is financed. In particular, 
distortionary taxes may lead to a decline in output, consumption and 
investments, while deficits may increase output and consumption. Moreover, 
deficit-financed cuts in income taxation may increase investments even though 
agents expect future taxes to be higher (due to the substitution between leisure 
and labour), a conclusion supported also by Lin (2000). Therefore, according to 
this branch of works, there are no crowding-out effects and the impact of 
government deficits on growth can be positive. 
Recapitulating, earlier neoclassical views are nuanced. One may find support 
for the statement that public debt exerts a negative impact on growth through 
subsequent deficits mainly by way of substitution of public expenditure for 
private capital or through distortionary taxation. Some developments have 
included more elements of analysis, thereby leading to departures from the 
main crowding-out conclusion. 
                                                          
4 According to Kneller (1999), distortionary taxes in this context are those which affect the 
investment decisions of agents (with respect to physical and/or human capital), creating tax 
wedges and hence distorting the steady-state rate of growth. Non-distortionary taxation, on the 
other hand, does not affect savings and investment decisions and therefore has no effects on the 
growth rate. 
 14 
 
An important feature of all these theories is that the effects of debt on growth 
arise because the government, in one way or another, manages to repay it. It 
may loosely be argued that high debt entails worse effects, but the level of debt 
per se is not examined specifically. As to the pursuit of threshold debt-to-GDP 
ratios, the standard neoclassical theory allows no inference about the optimal 
level of debt (Barro, 1979). 
 
2.2. Ricardian equivalence 
The celebrated paper by Barro (1974) on the so-called "Ricardian equivalence" 
between taxes and government debt in financing public expenditure paved the 
way to a restatement of the neoclassical approach in the modern framework of 
intertemporal optimisation (also Barro 1989a, 1989b). Drawing on an argument 
put forward by David Ricardo in his Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, taxpayers anticipate that deficit spending today entails higher taxes 
tomorrow and react by saving more. Therefore, the only effect of public deficits 
(or changes in the public debt) is to influence the timing of taxation. In the 
Barro’s words: 
 
Households view as equivalent a current aggregate tax of $1 and a current budget 
deficit of $1 (Barro, 1984, Macroeconomics, pp. 373, 377) 
 
The algebra of the Ricardian equivalence is relatively simple. Intertemporal 
accounting with free borrowing and lending at the market interest rate r and 
the no-Ponzi condition require, for any economic agent, that the present value 
of expenditures does not exceeds the present value of revenues. Let the 
government borrow Bt = Gt − Tt at time t, where Gt is government purchases 
(government investments included), and Tt is taxation.5 Therefore, the 
following constraint holds: 
                                                          
5 Gt is often called "public consumption", which is, however, misleading. First, Gt may include 
expenditure for current goods and service as well as expenditure for capital goods (i.e. public 
investments). Second, even with the former type of expenditure, the public sector does not 
"consume", say, health services, education or national defence. It produces them, and it is of 
course citizens who consume public goods and services. The public sector does employ resources 
to produce its supply of goods and services, which, as in any other production unit, include 
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that is, the present deficit equals the present value of future surpluses. This 
equivalence enters households’ intertemporal budget constraint via the 
sequence of consumption of public goods, Gt, and of disposable incomes, (Yt − 
Tt). Then, if Ct denotes the present private consumption, the households’ 
intertemporal budget constraint implies: 
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The government constraint and rearrangement yield 
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that is, the present value of aggregate demand on the left-hand side is 
constrained by the present value of GDP, which is given by technology and 
resources, no matter how households and the government distribute their 
expenditures over time.  
This approach received a great impulse between the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Barro (1979) proposed a specific model incorporating the Ricardian Equivalence 
and an empirical analysis supporting it, while in Barro (1989b, p.1) he 
concluded that the Ricardian Equivalence is a "good first-order approximation 
to reality", supported also by the empirical evidence. A noteworthy difference 
with earlier neoclassical models is that households are characterized by a sort 
of "inter-generational altruism", namely a sense of obligation to the next 
generation, as if they were living infinitely. If current public expenditure is 
                                                          
capital, labour and intermediate goods. For instance, in the Barro model, Gt is purchases of the 
public sector in order to provide goods and services, and therefore appears as absorption of 
output. This is also misleading. Like any other sector, according to the National Accounts 
principles, the public sector contributes to the formation of GDP with the value added of its 
supply of goods and services, that is, total value net of intermediate goods. Since the public 
sector is a zero-profit institution, its value added is total labour incomes. 
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financed by resorting to public debt, the current generation will leave the 
necessary amount of money to the following generation in order to compensate 
the future increment in taxes. Thus, Ricardian equivalence has also the strong 
implication that public deficits have no effects on the interest rate. The 
hallmark of traditional neoclassical theory (and quite a popular argument about 
the negative effects of high indebtedness) is muted. Moreover, as already noted 
above, if creating a deficit is neutral on economic activity, correcting the deficit 
when the debt service falls due will also be neutral (taxpayers have already 
hoarded the equivalent of taxation). Hence Ricardian equivalence alone does 
not seem an appropriate approach to the debt-growth problem, at least as long 
as the government is on its intertemporal budget constraint. These aspects have 
raised doubts and debates also in the neoclassical camp fostering research of 
caveats and limitations to this theory.  
As reported by Bernheim (1989), the Ricardian paradigm needs unrealistic 
assumptions to hold that make it implausible. Ricardian equivalence has also 
been tested in experimental laboratories by resorting, in general, to an 
overlapping generations design. Cadsby and Frank (1991) support the validity 
of the Ricardian equivalence, but further developments have found evidence of 
departures when more articulated experimental designs are employed (Slate et 
al., 1995; Ricciuti and Di Laurea, 2003). This brach of literature is briefly 
reviewed in Chapter 4. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning a few alternative models that deviate from the 
standard framework devised by Barro. For instance, Woodford (1990) argues 
that "the analysis provided by the neoclassical model may not be an adequate 
guide to policy, even if certain of its predictions are correct" and that "the 
Ricardian equivalence fails because it does not consider imperfect financial 
intermediation". Therefore, he proposes a simple economy embedding credit 
constraints and finds that public debt can be efficient because it keeps interest 
rates higher and closer to time preference rates. At the same time, public debt 
can crowd investments in by a permanent increase in the level of the public 
debt. 
 17 
 
In a similar vein, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1994) argue that government debt 
improves the liquidity of households by providing an additional means of 
smoothing consumption, while Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), interpreting 
government debt as a vehicle for storing wealth, claim that public-debt issuance 
serves as a collateral in the economy, a conclusion in line with Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). 
 
2.3. Expansionary fiscal consolidations 
A new neoclassical variant was introduced in the 1990s under the name of 
"expansionary fiscal consolidations", or "Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy", 
and it maintains that consolidation policy is not harmful for growth but, on the 
contrary, may have a positive effect. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), and Alesina 
and Perotti (1995) were among the first to empirically test this hypothesis, 
followed by Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2013), and others. Their main 
conclusion, the fact that "even drastic fiscal adjustments are not associated with 
major recessions" (Alesina and Perotti, 1995, p.24), has been recovered in 
support of the Eurozone austerity policies,6 that are analysed in Chapter 3. 
Though framed within the modern intertemporal approach, this strand of 
literature was born ― and has remained ― essentially empirical, being based on 
analyses of success stories of fiscal consolidations followed by fast recovery. 
Indeed, these analyses boil down to the choice of a growth-friendly consolidation 
design: large, front-loaded, with expenditure cuts rather than tax hikes (Alesina 
and Ardagna 2010, 2013, Carnot 2013). As regards the fiscal mix, this 
recommendation is in line with the earlier model by Diamond (1965) and with 
the standard presumption that public expenditure is just consumption and 
taxes are distortionary. The recommendation of a large and front-loaded 
consolidation relies on the argument that incomplete or delayed consolidation 
raises the present value of future surpluses; this is matched with less current 
spending and more hoarding by the private sector with a depressive effect on 
economic activity. If the government fails to adopt the right consolidation 
                                                          
6 See Blyth (2013, pp. 205 ff.) for a recollection of the evolution of this idea. 
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design, then the conclusion may be that the debt repayment has a negative 
effect on growth. Yet this conclusion also means that it is not the level of debt 
per se that can be pointed to as the determinant of future growth. 
On the empirical ground, some recent studies have cast doubts on the 
reliability of expansionary consolidations and, more importantly, on their 
general value. For instance, Perotti (2012) studied four individual episodes in 
different countries. He showed that all these episodes were in fact associated 
with an increase in growth but the explanation of why this occurred was to be 
found in the specific conditions of those countries. In line with this finding, 
Guajardo et al. (2014) argued that once changes in fiscal policy are motivated 
by a "desire to reduce the budget deficit and not by responding to prospective 
economic conditions", there is little evidence of expansionary effects. Jordà and 
Tylor (2016) also concluded that a fiscal consolidation is always associated with 
a fall in real GDP over a period of five years.  
The Eurozone is a natural observational field of large fiscal consolidations, and 
the prevalent assessments yield negative effects on subsequent growth at least 
in the short to medium run (Berti et al., 2013; in’t Veld, 2013; Beetsma et al., 
2015; Buti and Carnot, 2013). Critiques to the austerity policies implemented 
in the Eurozone hinge on the point that it was enacted too early and too much, 
with the economies dwelling in recession, thereby creating a strong procyclical 
effect (as to the wide debate on austerity see e.g. Corsetti (ed.) 2012; Gros and 
Maurer, 2012; Tamborini, 2015b). If the fiscal consolidation is procyclical, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio may rise instead of falling, as in fact happened throughout 
the Eurozone.7 Such an effect, therefore, envisages a possible reverse causality 
between higher debt ratio and lower growth. On the other hand, success "Non-
Keynesian" consolidation stories may in fact be due to several favourable 
Keynesian side conditions, regarding in particular the concomitant stance of 
monetary and exchange-rate policies (e.g. Favero et al., 2011; Perotti, 2012; 
Blyth, 2013, Part 3). That a fiscal contraction accompanied by expansionary 
                                                          
7 This effect occurs when the fiscal multiplier is greater than the reciprocal of the initial debt-
to-GDP ratio (Tamborini, 2013). Therefore, when the debt ratio is large, even a relatively small 
multiplier may produce the effect.  
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monetary policy and exchange-rate depreciation may end up with a neutral, or 
net positive, effect on GDP has been well known ever since the basic Mundell-
Fleming model. 
Can the expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis add insight into the debt-
growth relationship? If taken at face value, this hypothesis seems to imply that 
(high) debt need not be harmful to growth, if the problem lies in the extent of 
fiscal consolidation, and if specific conditions occur. Its theoretical 
underpinnings, however, are seldom spelt out clearly. As said above, the 
framework is one where private agents anticipate and internalise in their 
constraints optimal spending decision and the future path of public expenditure 
and taxation for a given initial state of public borrowing (debt).  
Leaving the neoclassical homo oeconomicus aside and intact, an interesting 
case in point should be that the public sector is not (no longer) on its 
intertemporal budget constraint. A simple device is an unexpected shock that 
raises outstanding debt. In that moment, the private agents discover that fiscal 
consolidation ― the present value of future public surpluses ― should be larger 
than previously expected. Then two alternative scenarios are possible: the 
government consolidates or not. In the former scenario, the effects on the 
economy arise as a consequence of consolidation. In the latter, they arise as an 
anticipation of future insolvency. As to the non-consolidation scenario, the 
theoretical framework should be different, and more challenging, precisely 
because one of the agents in the economy is drifting away from its intertemporal 
budget constraint (i.e. it is necessary to deal with out-of-equilibrium states). I 
shall return to this issue in Section 5. 
 
2.4. The endogenous growth approach 
Within the neoclassical approach, endogenous growth theory deserves a specific 
treatment. This approach spread during the 1990s attempting to explain how 
long-term growth can be generated without relying solely on exogenous or 
"residual" technological changes as in the Solow foundational model. This 
strand of literature is relevant because, following the model proposed by Barro 
(1990), it examines how fiscal variables interact with the variables that 
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generate endogenous growth, and I base my theoretical model on this paper. 
Interaction can be indirect (this is typically the case of taxation) or direct to the 
extent that public expenditure can sustain endogenous growth. This latter case 
is particularly important because it marks a shift of approach with respect to 
the neoclassical views examined above which typically see public expenditure 
as sheer consumption of resources. The Barro model obtains a typical inverted 
U function of the relationship between public expenditure and growth, with an 
optimal level of expenditure (taxation) that maximises growth. Public 
expenditure is fully covered by taxation (of capital incomes), and taxation 
depresses growth. Below the optimal level of public expenditure, the 
government does not exploit its growth-enhancing effect, beyond that point the 
growth-depressing effect of taxation prevails. On the other hand, the bulk of 
this literature is concerned with the effects of fiscal variables on growth along 
a balanced budget path, showing a rich variety of results and policy implications 
(see Zagler and Dürnecker, 2003 for an accurate survey), which, however, are 
not immediately suitable for analysis of the debt-growth problem. 
More to the point, Teles and Cesar-Mussolini (2014) proposed an endogenous 
growth model in which the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth is 
negatively affected by the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This effect works via 
the debt interest: a portion of young people’s savings is extracted and paid to 
elderly people, who do not save, thus implying an allocation exchange between 
generations. The negative effects of government debt on growth have been 
shown also by Saint-Paul (1992) and, by studying the impact of fiscal 
constraints on growth, i.e. limited tax and debt capacity, Aizenman et al. (2007) 
reached similar conclusions: lower maximal tax rate and higher outstanding 
debt can lower the growth rate, supporting the fact that differences in growth 
rates can stem from differences in fiscal policy constraints. 
 
3. KEYNESIAN AND NEW-KEYNESIAN VIEWS 
 
As for the neoclassical literature, the Keynesian and the New Keynesian models 
are heterogeneous and comprise a variety of different findings. In this section, 
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I shall present the most popular results, following primarily the historical 
development of these theories.  
 
3.1. Fiscal multipliers 
The hallmark of the Keynesian approach to fiscal policy is that the primary 
neoclassical assumption of fully employed resources is relaxed. It is instead 
assumed that resources are underemployed, or there is excess capacity in the 
output market and excess savings in the capital market. To put it in Cochrane’s 
words, the dollar that the government borrows is not subtracted to other uses 
but is idle (Krugman, 2011). The interest rate need not change, which is, for 
opposite reasons, the same result with Ricardian equivalence. Consequently, in 
the basic Keynesian expenditure model of GDP, a fiscal expansion (e.g. a tax 
cut or an increase in the public expenditure financed with debt) has a multiplier 
effect on aggregate demand and total output, or the "fiscal multiplier" is greater 
than 1. Furthermore, if markets are incomplete, it has been argued that public 
deficits can assist capital formation and economic growth by encouraging the 
development of financial institutions (Ferguson, 2001, p. 135). 
Bernheim (1989) recognises the advantages of the Keynesian approach, but he 
criticises some aspects related to the fact that budget deficits have not only 
positive effects but also negative effects when the Keynesian hypotheses are not 
completely satisfied. In fact, developments of the IS-LM apparatus re-
introduced crowding-out effects, that are due to indirect changes in the interest 
rate (and, in an open economy, in the exchange rate) that reduce the magnitude 
of the multiplier. These variations in the interest rate have also a direct 
substitution effect on the private sector’s goods and services. The everlasting 
debate on the magnitude of fiscal multipliers is still unsettled (see e.g. Hebous, 
2011; Favero et al., 2011; Gechert et al., 2015), and it is not my direct concern 
here.  
At first sight, one may argue that, as long as conditions of "large" fiscal 
multipliers prevail, the debt accumulation generated by deficit spending 
sustains the economy along its trend growth. By the same token, however, it 
may be argued that debt repayment, to the extent that a fiscal restriction is 
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necessary, has a negative effect. In fact, modern fiscal systems have developed 
a wide array of "automatic stabilisers" that generate deficits for stabilisation 
purposes which are (expected to be) self-repaying over the business cycle 
(Musgrave, 1959). "Let the stabilisers work", without large discretionary 
interventions, is in fact one of the pillars of the fiscal regulations of the 
Eurozone (e.g. Buti and Franco, 2005). Eventually contingent situations are 
more important. According to Favero at al. (2011), 
 
the question "what is the fiscal multiplier" is an ill-posed one. There is no unconditional 
fiscal policy multiplier. The effect of fiscal policy on output is different depending on 
the different debt dynamics, the different degree of openness and the different fiscal 
reaction functions across different countries (p. 1). 
 
Another particular, indirect debt-growth channel that can be found in this 
context relates to the so-called "fiscal space". This is a measure of the extent of 
fiscal expansion a government enjoys, given its outstanding debt and some 
target or constraint on it.8 The different indicators converge to the point that 
the higher the debt, the lower the fiscal space. Consequently, high debt inhibits 
the stabilisation capacity of the government. This consequence may have 
various negative implications, but it does not necessarily provide a debt-growth 
channel, especially if one espouses the mainstream view of the separation 
between cycle and growth trend. Persistent under-stabilisation may instead 
impinge on growth in the long-run if other phenomena are considered such as 
hysteresis (DeLong and Summers, 2012).  
Overall, though traditional Keynesians would tend to think that (large and 
prolonged) fiscal restrictions depress economic activity, thus supporting the 
view that (high) debt reduces growth for this reason, this implication is not 
univocal. Yet, beyond the issue of the extent of fiscal multipliers, the earlier 
Keynesian theory of fiscal policy, like the neoclassical one, is ill-suited to 
address to debt-growth problem because there is no explicit treatment of debt 
                                                          
8 Different indicators have been proposed by e.g. Aizenman and Hutchison (2012), Ghosh et al. 
(2013), Buti and Carnot (2016). 
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accumulation and repayment. This said, the Keynesian view of fiscal policy to 
smooth fluctuations of economic activity has also been extend into a theory, 
positive and normative, of public debt as a means to redistribute over time, and 
across generations, the ensuing welfare costs and benefits (see the classic 
Musgrave 1959 and Section 4 of this chapter). From this point of view, the debt-
growth relationship cannot be examined independently of the entire path of 
debt: when, how and to the benefit of whom it was created, when, how and on 
the shoulders of whom it falls due. I will consider this aspect in detail below. 
 
3.2. Sovereign risk and confidence 
In the so-called "New Keynesian macroeconomics", or "New Neoclassical 
Synthesis" developed since the early ‘90s, macromodels of sovereign risk should 
be mentioned (e. g. Buti and Pench, 2012 for an assessment with reference to 
austerity in the Eurozone). The key feature of these models is an attempt to 
directly address the issue of consolidation fiscal policy in the context of high 
public debt, and the issue whether it is sustainable or not. As is the hallmark 
of this school, we find a composition of Keynesian and neoclassical non-
Ricardian features recasting in new clothes the traditional problem of the 
balance between negative and positive effects of the fiscal restriction via the 
interest rate. However, the involvement of the interest rate is not due to excess 
absorption of loanable funds (a flow concept), but to increasing sovereign risk 
(a stock concept). As aptly summarized by Buti and Pench (2012), the key 
factors can be encapsulated in a formula of the fiscal multiplier like the 
following: 
 
[1 − confidence]  [1 + (monetary policy) + (competitiveness) − (financial constraints)] 
 
Confidence has two forward looking components. Financial investors believe 
that the fiscal restriction lowers the probability of future default and demand a 
lower risk premium. The domestic private sector enjoys a lower interest rate 
and anticipates the lower path of future taxes: both spur expenditure. The 
higher the confidence, the smaller the fiscal consolidation multiplier. Other 
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factors that reduce the multiplier relate to the side Keynesian factors 
mentioned above: the monetary policy stance (an accommodative stance helps 
reduce the interest rate and sustain aggregate demand) and competitiveness 
gains via real exchange rate depreciation (which also sustain the foreign 
component of aggregate demand). Finally, financial constraints, another typical 
New Keynesian feature, inhibit Ricardian neutrality and amplify the impact of 
the fiscal restriction on aggregate demand. The confidence channel has also 
been tested, and partially supported, through laboratory experiments (see 
Chapter 4). Unsurprisingly, such a rich set of factors yield nuanced results and, 
once again, results are conditional on the state of the economy and other side 
elements (Corsetti et al., 2010 and 2013).  
In relatively extreme cases where fiscal strains are severe and monetary policy 
is constrained for an extended period, fiscal tightening may even exert an 
expansionary effect. That being said, fiscal retrenchment is no miracle cure. 
Indeed, all our simulations feature a deep recession even if tighter fiscal policy, 
under the aforementioned conditions, may stimulate economic activity relative 
to an even bleaker baseline (Corsetti et al., 2010, p. 41, italics added).  
Other studies applied to the Eurozone share the same tone (Berti et al., 2013; 
Roeger and in’t Veld J. 2013; Beetsma et al., 2015), though the prevailing 
conclusion is that fiscal consolidation has depressed growth, at least in the 
short-medium run. Another analysis dealing with this topic is proposed by 
Denes et al. (2012), who presents a New Keynesian DSGE model to study how 
fiscal policies affect budget deficit, how deficit affects expectations and, 
consequently, how deficit affects short-run aggregate demand. Among the 
findings emerges that "a commitment to reduce the size of the government in 
the long run or to reduce future labour taxes increases short-run demand" and 
also that "if higher deficits trigger expectations of higher future inflation, they 
are expansionary at a zero-interest rate, since this reduces the real interest rate 
and then increases demand" (Denes et al., 2012, p.5 and p.35). 
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4. PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
4.1. Sustainability 
Beside macroeconomic connections between debt and growth, the idea that 
public debt may represent a burden for the economic system has distant origins 
in public finance. Its focus is on who and how should pay for debt, and with 
what consequences on the economy. In this regard, such a public finance 
literature is complementary to, and more detailed than, the macroeconomic one 
explored so far, and it is propaedeutic to recent developments in debt 
sustainability analysis. 
A formal definition of sustainability, based on financial first principles, states 
that the outstanding value of debt should not exceed the discounted value of the 
current and futures expected primary surpluses, and sustainability analysis 
seeks to identify and measure the ability of a government to meet its debt 
obligations. Hence the impact of debt repayment on the economy, according to 
different repayment strategies, is of course central to this analysis, which is in 
turn propaedeutic to debt-growth analyses where the probability of default is 
considered. 
This definition is fraught with several implementation problems (e.g. the 
choice of the appropriate discount rate, time horizon, and budget items) leading 
to controversial if not inconclusive judgements. Therefore, less demanding, 
empirically based, criteria have been put forward.  
Liviatan (1984) proposed a "macro-absorption" approach for the sustainability 
of the public debt burden and he classified the related indicators into three 
categories: naive, simple, and composite. Naive indicators concern the total 
amount of debt and the related measures, such as the interest rate and the 
maturity; simple indicators involve the debt service and the related ratios, 
while composite indicators are weighted averages of naive and simple indicators 
and aim at better identifying the debt burden and the approaching of a default. 
Further developments include, among others, Collignon and Mundschenk 
(1999), Arnone and Presbitero (2007), Fincke and Greiner (2012). 
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Particularly relevant is the approach put forward by Bohn (1995, 1998). It is 
based on the fiscal policy reaction function that relates the primary balance, as 
the control variable, to outstanding debt in such a way that the debt grows at a 
rate slower than the interest rate (for applications to the Eurozone countries, 
see e.g. Greiner et al., 2007; Ghosh et al., 2013; Passamani et al., 2015). One 
main merit of this approach, on which I shall return in Chapter 3, is that it 
allows for a relatively simple and measurable "fiscal effort" that should 
consistently be borne by the government (i.e. the relevant economic subjects) 
over time. In this regard, the composition of the effort (e.g. more taxes vs. less 
expenditure) may matter as suggested by the studies on the expansionary fiscal 
consolidations. However, the evaluation of sustainability of a given fiscal effort 
by the government is not simply a technical matter, but it also depends on the 
political assessment of its costs and benefits, or the costs and benefits of some 
degree of default, which leads to the political economy literature on the 
solvency/default choice of governments.  
The debt burden is usually identified and described by some indicators, and 
the most common involve the debt service: the interest-to-debt ratio, the 
interest-to-external debt ratio, the interest-to-taxation ratio, or the interest-to-
export ratio. The amount of external debt with respect to the total outstanding 
debt is considered as a measure of the external burden, a relevant indicator 
when the focus is on the foreign creditors.  
In the mid-1950s, Sun (1954) distinguished between three interrelated 
concepts of debt burden: psychological (subjective and related to people’s 
confidence in the government debt policies and in the stability of the economy), 
financial (referred to the amount of taxes required to repay the principal and 
the interest charges), and real economic burden (related to a decrease in 
national income, a decline in production, etc.). Sun concluded that the effective 
burden of the public debt depends on the economic conditions, and that some 
principles must be respected in order to minimize it. The analysis turned to 
incentives in Meade (1958), which argued that a reduction in public domestic 
debt can improve economic incentives, but there could be a cost if the economic 
conditions worsen in the short-run. 
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In summary, the debt burden view points out several channels whereby (high) 
public debt may directly or indirectly hamper economic growth and country’s 
development. In fact, this has been the situation in which the high indebted 
poor countries have been entangled, and for which initiatives of debt reduction 
or even debt forgiveness has been widely proposed and studied in the last 
decades. These studies are important because they add further strength to the 
warning that specific conditions play a crucial role that can hardly be absorbed 
into a general law. 
 
4.2. Efficiency  
An important contribution coming from public finance is that public debt should 
be evaluated along its whole-time path rather than at a specific point in time. 
Indeed, debt is created for a reason or purpose, for instance to finance a specific 
public investment. Then, it unfolds its effects over time, and these effects are to 
be considered when assessing the relationship between debt and growth since 
they may, or may not, contribute to the future debt repayment according to the 
direct or indirect cash flows that it generates. Naturally, the sheer 
measurement of the debt level at some point may be uninformative or 
misleading. 
To be more specific, assume that the amount of debt Dt at time t is observed. 
Thus, the corresponding debt-to-GDP ratio is dt  Dt/Yt. It should be first 
recognised that these levels of debt and debt-to-GDP ratio belong to the joint 
trajectories (Dt-k, ..., Dt-1), (Yt-k, ..., Yt-1), (dt-k, ..., dt-1) determined by the 
underlying sequence of budgetary policies and their consequences on the 
economy. The observed values Dt and dt may be the outcome of an efficient or 
inefficient trajectory, while subsequently they may turn out to be either 
sustainable or unsustainable. In this literature, the debt trajectory can be 
considered efficient if the use of debt is consistent with its purpose in terms of 
general criteria of economic efficiency, and if it has no distortionary effects on 
social equity and social welfare. 
Efficiency implies sustainability ex ante. However, debt on an efficient 
trajectory may turn out to be unsustainable ex post owing to unforeseen events. 
 28 
 
Two other scenarios are possible: debt may be inefficient but sustainable, and 
debt may be both inefficient and unsustainable. These four scenarios have quite 
different implications in terms of growth, and, what is more important, the level 
of debt and the corresponding level of the debt-to-GDP ratio along the trajectory 
are irrelevant on their own 
An early example of this kind of analysis is the cyclical stabilisation role of 
fiscal policy theorised by Musgrave (1959). If debt is created during a slump and 
repaid during the recovery to equalise national income over the business cycle, 
both efficiency and sustainability (and intergenerational equity) are achieved.9 
The time profile of debt may be quite different in different specific conditions.  
Modigliani (1961), instead, pointed out that an increase in the national debt 
(both internal and external) can be advantageous for the current generation, 
but it places a burden on future generations entailing a reduction in the 
available stock of private capital, thus causing a decrease in the future flows of 
goods and services. Analogous conclusions were reached by Bowen et al. (1960), 
according to whom, even if the repayment of the debt principal is continuously 
delayed, each current generation bears a burden represented by the taxes used 
to pay debt interests. This view was initially criticized by Vickrey (1961, p.1) –
"They are right for reasons that are, if not wrong, at least needlessly roundabout 
and largely irrelevant" – and then by Mishan (1963) – "A presumption against 
increasing the public debt may well act as a brake on swift remedial action by 
the government when it faces a decline in economic activity". 
Another classic topic in this line of literature that is worth to mention is the 
so-called "golden rule" of public finance (Musgrave, 1964). This rule is the object 
of a long-standing branch of public finance which is not examined here, whereas 
it is important to note how it fits in the four scenarios. As is well known, the 
rule states that the balance between current expenditure and revenues should 
be nil, while public debt is only allowed as a means to finance productive 
investment. Here the efficiency-sustainability criteria are even more 
transparent. Productive investment is realised as growth-enhancing debt-based 
                                                          
9 Note that this argument need not hinge on the Keynesian direct effect of deficit spending on 
economic activity.  
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expenditure, and efficiency requires the equality between marginal product and 
social cost. Sustainability should be guaranteed by equality between the 
marginal increase in revenues due to additional growth and the debt service. 
Equity lies in the fact that the generation paying for debt also enjoys a higher 
level of income. A rather natural analogy is with the fiscal models of endogenous 
growth, an analogy that I shall further pursue in Section 6 of this chapter. 
 
5. UNSUSTAINABLE DEBT AND SOLVENCY DEFAULTS 
 
As previously explained, a critical point that is often blurred in the search for 
the debt-growth relationship is whether it goes through the fiscal policies that 
are adopted to service the debt or through the consequences of the debt being 
unsustainable and bound to default. In this survey, it has been seen that more 
common neoclassical as well as Keynesian views are concerned with the former 
type of channel. More recent New Keynesian models have introduced the second 
channel by way of investors’ expectations and risk premium. Country studies 
in the burden view tradition present both channels. It is therefore worth 
exploring this issue in greater detail. 
A partial or total default on public debt, either explicit ― a refusal to pay back 
the bonds and a subsequent reduction in the outstanding amount of debt ― or 
implicit ― through high inflation rates or even hyperinflation that 
conspicuously diminish the value of the real public debt ― is an extreme 
occurrence influenced also by the general financial and political situation as 
well as by agents’ behaviour and expectations. Default may be unexpected, 
anticipated or even self-generated by creditors; each case has its own specific 
impact on the economy. 
A fist crucial point to be clarified is that in many cases default is a policy choice 
of the government which trades off the costs of default with those of solvency 
(Gros, 2012; Buiter and Rahbari, 2013; Tamborini, 2015a). The economic 
consequences of default may be severe but concentrated in time, whereas the 
benefits of freeing the economy from the burden of debt may unfold over time. 
Behavioural aspects can play a role in terms of agents’ belief about past debt 
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efficiency, agents’ expectations about current sustainability, and agents’ 
confidence level about future debt repayments, though they are not deemed to 
be always founded. Notably, they have the potential to be self-fulfilling, thus 
leading to the actual default that could otherwise have been avoided. The 
historical literature about sovereign defaults is vast and it goes beyond the 
purpose of this work10. 
Before the financial and the debt crises in which many advanced countries 
have been entangled, the debt-growth relationship was of particular interest to 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC): many papers have analysed how 
the debt burden, or the "debt overhang", affects economic development, and 
whether the debt relief programs would have been useful, and, in case, which 
was the best way to implement them. Starting with the Costa Rica’s and the 
Mexico’s defaults at the beginning of the 80s, the growth of the debt burden for 
high indebted countries has been recognized as an issue. Kamin et al. (1989) 
gauged whether Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico had been better off in 
terms of GDP path for having borrowed considerable amounts before 
experiencing the debt crises, concluding that these countries were in fact worse 
off. Cunningham (1993) proposed one of the first empirical analysis 
investigating the effect of debt burden on economic growth, in which the debt 
burden was measured as the rate of change in the long-run debt service to public 
and publicly guaranteed ratio. Its main empirical finding indicates that the debt 
burden negatively affects economic growth. This conclusion is in line with the 
concept of debt overhang, initially proposed by Krugman (1988), according to 
which the relationship between public debt and national product is described 
by an inverted U relationship. Thus, above a certain level of the public debt, 
both the debtor and the creditor countries could find it convenient to forgive a 
part of the debt. In addition, the incentive to invest in the country may reduce 
when public debt becomes "large". 
                                                          
10 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); a mainly quantitative and a mainly empirical and 
qualitative literature reviews are respectively provided by Stähler (2013) and Tomz and Wright 
(2013). 
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The flourishing of empirical studies has also raised a number of challenges. In 
the first place, the relationship between the level (or growth rate) of public debt, 
the rise of risk premia, and speculative attacks has resulted of dubious nature. 
Some scholars have pointed out that the true explanatory variable is the 
amount of external debt generated by large and persistent current account 
deficits (e.g. Gros and Alcidi, 2011; Gros, 2013). External debt is often deemed 
to be the most relevant component as it implies a real transfer from the debtor 
to the creditor country. According to Karagol (2002, p.40), "foreign debt acts like 
a tax when the debt situation is such that an improvement in the economic 
performance of the indebted country has the side product of higher debt 
repayments", and he found that, for the specific case of Turkey, external debt 
service has a negative short-run impact on economic growth.  
Others have instead pointed out that speculative attacks have been driven by 
analogy with the "original sin" of many developing countries which issue debt 
in a foreign currency (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012 and 2013). This argument brings 
an institutional factor to the forefront: public debt in euros is "foreign 
denominated" for Eurozone countries because the issuers do not have a central 
bank in control of the currency. 
Both aspects were probably relevant during the Sovereign Debt Crisis of the 
Eurozone. Throughout its first decade, countries like Belgium, Italy, and Greece 
were characterized by high public debt-to-GDP ratios. Meanwhile, "emerging" 
and fast-growing countries like Spain and Ireland started from very low levels 
of public debt but rapidly rising levels of private debts. Initially, investors 
regarded public debts in the Eurozone as substantially equivalent, prompting a 
remarkable convergence of interest rates towards the German safe rate. They 
became increasingly worried about debt sustainability after the Papandreu 
government’s disclosure of the huge deterioration of Greek public finances, and 
after the sharp rise in the debt-to-GDP ratios due to the financial crisis and 
bank bailouts in other countries (notably Spain and Ireland), leading to a 
dramatic increase in the interest rates of the bonds of the so-called "periphery 
countries" (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). The New Keynesian models 
mentioned above have been designed to capture these events. Their negative 
 32 
 
debt-growth relationship is the result of the combined effects on consumption 
and/or investment of higher interest rates and the anticipation of fiscal 
consolidation or default (as already discussed, conclusions about the effects of 
consolidation are contradictory). 
A third problematic area concerns the transmission channels of risk premia 
across countries. In this regard, there is evidence that post-2009 spreads not 
only reflected country-specific fundamentals but were also highly sensitive to 
"systemic risk" and other exogenous factors (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; 
Attinasi et al., 2009; Caceres et al., 2010). In particular, research has focused 
on "contagion", that is, the transmission of high spreads across countries via 
non-fundamental channels (Constancio, 2012; Arghyrou and Kostunica’s, 
2012). 
Finally, the issue of self-fulfilling default expectations should be considered 
and is particularly relevant since it affects the ex-ante evaluation of public debt. 
Indeed, self-fulfilling attacks are disconnected from the fundamentals and 
might thus involve both sustainable and unsustainable public debts, therefore 
forcing a government to default even if its public debt was, before the attack, 
perfectly sustainable, and regardless the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Therefore, this channel could affect the debt-growth relationship at any debt-
to-GDP level, in an unpredictable way and without well-defined a priori 
conditions for its occurrence.  
The introduction of self-fulfilling expectations in macroeconomic models dates 
back to the 1980s (Farmer, 1993). In general, they also entail multiple 
equilibria, the selection of which depends of the state of expectations. In this 
context, the typical mechanism is one where, as default expectations arise, the 
cost of debt solvency also rises (e.g. because of higher risk premium) thus 
making the government default decision more likely.  
The seminal study is represented by the influential paper by Calvo (1988), who 
recognised that expectations about debt default may determine the equilibrium 
that is reached by the economy. This model was then further developed by 
Beetsma (1996) to allow for inequality in real debt holdings, and multiple 
equilibria still emerged. Many other applications followed up to nowadays, and 
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it is not possible to cite all of them. For instance, Cole and Kehoe (2000) 
presented a model in which, among other aspects, investors’ fear may cause a 
financial crisis. In details, the fear of a future government default leads 
domestic investors to reduce the investment level, which in turn reduces future 
output and leads to a financial crisis.  
The Eurozone debt crisis has also prompted new contributions. De Grauwe 
(2012) presented a model of exogenous expectations determining an area of 
threat of self-fulfilling speculative attacks. Gros (2012) introduced a political-
economy model of investors’ subjective expectations of default affecting the 
market interest rate and the likelihood to observe multiple equilibria. 
Moreover, creditors may find it profitable to forgive part of a country’s debt to 
avoid the default, in line with the debt overhang theory. By following the same 
methodology, Tamborini (2015a) showed that multiple equilibria can arise as a 
consequence of investors’ heterogeneous beliefs about primary balance 
sustainability (the so-called "fiscal effort"), where the risk premium is higher 
the larger is the share of "pessimistic" investors about the level of fiscal effort 
beyond which the government prefers default. This model clarifies how the level 
of debt, its burden and sustainability are highly conditioned by the distribution 
of investors’ beliefs. 
Empirical evidence of self-fulfilling speculative attacks is uneasy to collect. 
Padoan et al. (2012) studied debt, growth and risk premium in a two equilibria 
model characterized by an intertemporal view and by a negative relationship 
between debt and growth, explicitly inspired to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). 
This study empirically identified the good and the bad debt and growth 
equilibria ― the first given by stable growth, debt and confidence; the second by 
growing debt, and decreasing growth and confidence ― and used them to 
suggest structural reforms as a way to escape from debt traps. De Grauwe and 
Ji (2013), and Passamani et al. (2015) can also be mentioned. It can also be 
recalled that the ECB President Mario Draghi opened his famous "whatever-it-
takes" speech by saying that 
[…] we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the euro area in what we 
call a "bad equilibrium", namely an equilibrium in which you may have self-fulfilling 
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expectations that feed upon themselves and generate very adverse scenarios. So, there 
is a case for intervening, in a sense, to "break" these expectations (Draghi, 2012, p. 4). 
 
6. FOUR SCENARIOS FOR THE STUDY OF THE 
DEBT-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP 
 
On the basis of the previous literature review, it is not possible to reach a 
univocal conclusion regarding the debt-growth relationship. In fact, it seems 
that both a positive and a negative relationship are equally possible, as well as 
the absence of any relationship. Even less is theoretically founded the existence 
of a general debt-to-GDP threshold above which growth is consistently stifled. 
More importantly, a consistent, unified theoretical framework underpinning 
the empirical debt-growth research is still missing.  
The remaining part of the chapter exemplifies a possible theoretical 
framework within which the key issues in the debt-growth problem can be 
located, and possibly clarified, in a consistent and orderly manner. The 
ingredients that I pick up from the literature consist of the intertemporal setup 
of the fiscal models of endogenous growth, on which I graft public debt as a 
means to finance productive public expenditure. Thus, I will be able to 
characterise and discuss the debt-growth relationship in the four scenarios 
centred on the efficiency-sustainability criteria presented in Section 4. As will 
be seen, the model also embeds some specific debt-growth relationships 
previously presented.  
 
6.1. A fiscal model of endogenous growth with efficient and 
sustainable public debt 
I propose a fiscal model of endogenous growth freely inspired to Barro (1990) 
and Diamond (1965). Barro (1990) presents a now standard model of growth 
sustained by productive public expenditure fully covered by taxation.11 To 
introduce debt in this setup, I adopt a sequential economy with two-period 
                                                          
11 I draw on the version by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1998, ch. 4). 
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generations à la Diamond (1965)12 where public expenditure is financed by debt 
in the first period and the debt burden in covered by taxation in the second 
period. 
The key assumption in the Barro model is that the economy consists of 
competitive firms producing an aggregate output Y according to a neoclassical 
(Cobb-Douglas) production function augmented by productive public 
expenditure G, where productive means a kind of expenditure in public goods 
that can raise private factors’ productivity (typical examples are 
infrastructures, education, research, health care, etc.). I reformulate the Barro 
production function in terms of labour L, private capital K, and public capital 
KG (i.e. the stock of public goods mentioned above), with the usual condition 0 < 
 < 1: 
(1.5) 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐿1−𝛼𝐾𝛼𝐾𝐺
1−𝛼 = 𝐴(𝐾𝐺𝐿)
1−𝛼𝐾𝛼  
and public capital is labour enhancing. 
It is convenient to introduce a dual technology, one with public capital, like 
(1.5), and one without it, a conventional Cobb-Douglas. To activate the former, 
public investment is needed. In order to introduce public debt, I treat the 
economy as a sequence of two-period generations of equal size. Each generation 
starting in period (t) is endowed with labour Lt and private capital Kt inherited 
from the previous generation Labour is supplied inelastically in each period and 
normalized to 1. Likewise, I set the scale factor A = 1 in each period. For 
simplicity, the depreciation rate of private capital is zero; its gestation time is 
1 period. The feasible production in t is given by the private technology, 
therefore 
(1.6) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
𝛼 
With neither private nor public investment in period t, the economy remains 
at this constant output. If all generations unfold equally, this is also the steady 
state of the economy. 
                                                          
12 The difference here is that the generations do not overlap, but I assume that they comply 
with the intergenerational pact that each generation leaves the same endowment of capital to 
the next. 
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If, instead, the private sector invests the amount It, the private capital stock 
Kt+1 = Kt + It will be operative in t+1. The government, too, can invest in public 
capital the amount Gt financed by debt, Dt = Gt. Public capital KGt+1 = Gt > 1 will 
also be operative in t+1. Therefore, feasible production in t+1 will be: 
(1.7) 𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝑡+1
𝛼 𝐾𝐺𝑡+1
1−𝛼  
The government fulfils its intertemporal budget constraint by taxing all 
incomes in period t+1 with the flat rate . Incomes include the public debt 
service (principal and interests). Therefore, the following public budget equality 
holds: 
(1.8) 𝜏𝑌𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜏)𝐷𝑡𝑅
𝐷
𝑡+1 
where 𝑅𝐷𝑡+1 is the unit debt service. Under the efficient capital market 
hypothesis, the return to capital is equalized, across the private and public 
sectors, to the marginal product of private capital, given by:  
(1.9) 𝑅′𝑡+1 = α (
𝐾𝐺𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡+1
)
1−𝛼
 
Consequently, (1 − 𝜏)𝑅𝐷𝑡+1 = (1 −  )𝑅′𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝑡+1 is the after-tax return earned 
on both forms of capital, the (gross) interest rate for short. Since 𝐷𝑡 = 𝐾𝐺𝑡+1, the 
public budget constraint (1.8) can be rewritten Yt+1 = KGt+1Rt+1, which sets the 
feasible stock of public capital. Since Yt+1 is determined by (1.7), the result is 
(1.10) 𝐾𝐺𝑡+1 = (
𝜏
𝑅𝑡+1
)
1
𝛼
𝐾𝑡+1 
The complementarity between public and private capital is the first key feature 
of this economy.  
Recalling that (1 −  )𝑅′𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝑡+1, and substituting public capital into (1.9), 
we obtain: 
(1.11) 𝑅𝑡+1 = [𝛼(1 − 𝜏)]
𝛼𝜏1−𝛼 
The second notable result is that the interest rate is invariant to the capital 
stock – a result propaedeutic to endogenous growth. The interest rate is 
however a concave function of the tax rate, which leads to the peculiar 
relationship between debt and growth in this economy. 
To this end, I first consider the optimal consumption path of the representative 
household of the t-th generation, which maximises a time separable logarithmic 
utility function subject to its two-period budget constraints: 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑡,𝐶𝑡+1 𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝐶𝑡+1) = log(𝐶𝑡) + 𝛽 log(𝐶𝑡+1) 
s.t.  𝐶𝑡  =  𝑌𝑡 –  𝐼𝑡 –  𝐷𝑡 
𝐶𝑡+1  =  (1 −  )𝑌𝐿𝑡+1 +  (𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡)𝑅𝑡+1 
where I assume that period 1 production takes place only through private 
technology and, therefore, 𝑌𝑡 is given by equation (1.6), and where 𝑌𝐿𝑡+1 is labour 
income, 𝛽 = (1 + )−1 < 1 is the time discount factor,  > 0 is the rate of time 
preference, 𝑅𝑡+1 is the after-tax net return, and where, to start the analysis,  
By combining the first order conditions with respect to 𝐶𝑡 and 𝐶𝑡+1, one can 
obtain the Euler equation and the optimal consumption path 
(1.12) 𝛾 ≡
𝐶𝑡+1
𝐶𝑡
=
𝑅𝑡+1
1+𝜌
 
As usual, an increase in the interest rate rises Ct+1 with respect to Ct, while an 
increase in the rate of time preference decreases it. Substitution of the interest 
rate equation (1.11) into (1.12) yields the growth equation for this economy, 
namely 
(1.13) 𝛾 =
(𝛼(1−𝜏))𝛼𝜏1−𝛼
1+𝜌
 
We thus see the crucial result, namely that growth is a concave function of the 
tax rate necessary to finance public capital. Concavity reflects the double-edge 
role of taxation: 
1−
 is the growth-enhancing effect of financing public capital, 
(1−)

 is the growth-depressing effect of taxing capital income. As a 
consequence, there exists a unique tax rate 𝜏∗ that maximises , namely 
(1.14) 𝜏∗ = 1 − 𝛼 
which is the same result as in the original Barro model (depicted in Figure 1.1), 
and, since 𝐿 = 1, "the government sets its share in GDP to equal the share it 
would get if public services were a competitively supplied input of production" 
(Barro, 1990, p. S109).  
The public finance implication is that, given 𝜏∗, each generation has its own 
optimal public debt which is both sustainable and efficient. In particular, there 
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is neither "crowding out" when debt is created in t (indeed there is crowding-
in)13 nor is there excess fiscal burden in t+1. 
 
Figure 1.1. The optimal level of * and the corresponding 𝛾∗. 
 
1 and 2 are inefficient because, respectively, too low and too high. 
 
As said above, a notable feature of the economy is the complementarity 
between public and private capital. Along the optimal growth path, the 
public/private capital ratio is constant, as can be seen upon substituting the 
optimal values of 𝜏 and 𝑅𝑡+1 into (1.10): 
(1.15) 
𝐾∗𝐺𝑡+1
𝐾∗𝑡+1
≡ 𝑘∗𝑡+1 = (
1−𝛼
𝛼2
) 
One possible interpretation of this relationship is that the government can 
expand debt-financed public investment in proportion to the willingness of the 
private sector to invest. 
As to the debt-to-GDP ratio, it can first be noted that the relevant ratio (in 
terms of debt burden) for the t-th generation is given by the GDP equation (1.7), 
i.e. 
(1.16) 𝑑𝑡+1 ≡
𝐾𝐺𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡+1
 
Developing this expression for optimal values, the result that is obtained is: 
(1.17) 𝑑∗𝑡+1 = (𝑘
∗)𝛼 
That is to say, the optimal debt-to-GDP ratio may be whatever is appropriate 
for each economy and each generation, given endowment, preferences and 
technology, so that no generalisation or comparison is meaningful across time 
                                                          
13 According to equation (1.9), as long as  < *, raising public capital increases the marginal 
product of private capital, which allows for a larger private capital stock, and shifts 
consumption to the future, which generates more saving for capital accumulation. 
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or different economies. In other words, "high" and "low" debt-to-GDP ratios may 
equally be efficient and sustainable. 
 
6.2. Sustainable but inefficient debt 
The previous model provides an immediate instance of cases in which public 
debt is sustainable but inefficient in terms of growth. Since the relationship 
between taxation and growth is concave, the cases in consideration occur 
whenever public debt, i.e. public capital, is either too low or too high with 
respect to (1.16). In the former case, the government fails to exploit the full 
range of growth-enhancing public investment; in the latter excess investment 
requires excess taxation that depresses growth. Therefore, note in the first 
place that growth may be sub-optimal not only because debt is "too high". In the 
second place, even when debt is in fact too high, it remains perfectly 
sustainable. Indeed, lower growth is due to the fact that the government 
complies with sustainability by levying excess taxation. This, moreover, need 
not come as an unexpected event but may be fully anticipated. In other words, 
inefficiency defines a set of effects of public debt on growth that do not depend 
either on unsustainability nor on default risk but, quite the contrary, on the 
anticipation of the sustainable path of fiscal policy. Finally, sustainable debt is 
not synonymous with efficient fiscal policy and optimal growth of the economy. 
As explained in the previous section, the threshold between efficient and 
inefficient level of debt is hard to draw in comparisons over time or across 
different countries. 
 
6.3. Efficient but unsustainable debt: fiscal consolidation 
The third case I examine is one where public debt is ex-ante efficient and 
sustainable whilst it is not ex-post. I model this situation by means of an 
unanticipated shock that in period 2 of the t-th generation lowers total factor 
productivity. This simple device may capture different situations: from true 
recessions, to ex-ante overvaluation of public investment productivity, or 
misbehaviour of the government that deviates a share of debt to unproductive 
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uses. In any case, the consequence which I focus on is the necessity of fiscal 
consolidation in period 2, i.e. a fiscal adjustment that guarantees debt solvency. 
The first period of the t-th generation is the same as in the base case, except 
that the coefficient A in the production function is now a random variable of 
unit expected value which in t+1 takes the value At+1 < 1. Note that, by 
assumption, the stocks of private and public capital operational in t+1, which 
ere optimal for At+1 = 1, have been installed in t and are irreversible (denoted 
by a bar). Consequently, 
(1.18) 𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝑡+1(?̅?𝑡+1)
𝛼(?̅?𝐺𝑡+1)
1−𝛼 = 𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1 
where 𝑌∗𝑡+1 denotes the ex-ante optimal GDP as in the first case. Therefore, the 
government budget as given by equations (1.8) and (1.9) and the optimal tax 
rate * = 1 −  can no longer be satisfied. A fiscal consolidation is necessary, 
and to this end the government changes the tax rate so that:  
(1.19)  𝜏𝑡+1𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1)?̅?𝐺𝑡+1?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷
 
where ?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷  is the unit debt service to which the government is committed from 
the previous period when At+1 = 1 was expected. Therefore,14 
(1.20) ?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷 = 𝛼 (
?̅?𝐺𝑡+1
?̅?𝑡+1
)
1−𝛼
= 𝛼?̅?𝑡+1
1−𝛼 
From the base model, we know the ex-ante values of 𝑌∗𝑡+1 and of the optimal 
public/private capital ratio. Upon substituting these values in the public budget 
constraint, we find that the new tax rate should satisfy15: 
(1.21) 𝜏𝑡+1𝐴𝑡+1?̅?𝑡+1
−𝛼 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1)𝛼?̅?𝑡+1
1−𝛼 
As a result, the solvency tax rate is 
(1.22) 𝜏𝑠𝑡+1 = (1 +
𝐴𝑡+1
𝛼?̅?𝑡+1
)
−1
 
Since 𝜏𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝜏
∗ for At+1 = 1, the new tax rate is certainly higher than the ex-ante 
optimal one, and it should be higher the worse the productivity shock. 
What are the concomitant effects of fiscal consolidation on the economy? The 
first is that the growth rate is reduced, yet this is the direct and exclusive effect 
of the productivity shock on the GDP path, not of fiscal consolidation by itself. 
                                                          
14 Note that consequently the unit debt service is no longer equal to the actual return to capital 
which falls by At+1 < 1. 
15 Check that for 𝐴𝑡+1 = 1 and 𝜏𝑡+1 = 1 − 𝛼, (1.20) is indeed an identity. 
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The second effect, directly due to fiscal consolidation, is on households’ 
consumption which necessarily deviates from the optimal path given by (1.12). 
The increase in the tax rate, in addition to the productivity shock, affects the 
t+1 budget constraint as follows 
(1.23) 𝐶𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜏
𝑠
𝑡+1)[(1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1 + (𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡)𝑅
′
𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷 ] 
where (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1 is the gross income share of labour. Likewise, we can 
write (𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡)𝑅
′
𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1, and therefore: 
(1.24) 𝐶𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜏
𝑠
𝑡+1)[𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷 ] 
As can be seen, households suffer from lower gross income from the private 
sector and higher tax rate. Moreover, their consumption is fully constrained by 
current disposable incomes, so that the economy also displays this "Keynesian" 
feature. 
 
6.4. Inefficient and unsustainable debt 
Debt-financed public expenditure may be ex-ante inefficient for a number of 
reasons, ultimately because the government spends and taxes too much (beyond 
the optimal level identified in the first scenario) or because the projects are in 
fact less productive. To simplify the analysis of the fourth scenario, we can note 
that when the economy is hit by an adverse shock as in the third scenario, public 
debt observationally results both inefficient and unsustainable ex post. Drawing 
on the political economy literature on the default choice mentioned in section 5, 
I now examine the point that, since fiscal consolidation is a costly decision for 
the government, it may consider the option of default. Yet also default is a costly 
decision.  
To address this problem various specifications of the government’s decision 
are available. In this context, it is natural to assume the representative 
consumer’s utility as the welfare function of the government. Consequently, let 
me consider the post-shock consumption level in t+1: 
(1.25) 𝐶𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1)[𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜙)𝐷𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷 ] 
where the government has two policy variables, the tax rate 𝜏𝑡+1 and the rate of 
"haircut" of the debt repayment 𝜙. Note immediately that the former variable 
affects consumption via after-tax income, whereas the latter affects 
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consumption via pre-tax income. Therefore, the government faces the typical 
trade-off between increasing the consumer utility by lowering 𝜏𝑡+1 and 
decreasing it by raising 𝜙. The point is that the two variables are inversely 
related to the extent that the government lowers 𝜏𝑡+1 below the solvency level 
𝜏𝑠𝑡+1 given by (1.22). In fact, on the basis of the government’s budget, it is 
possible to see that: 
(1.26) 𝜙 = 1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
(𝐴𝑡+1𝑌
∗
𝑡+1+𝐷𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷 )
𝐷𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷  
Since 𝜏𝑠𝑡+1 =
𝐷𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷
𝐴𝑡+1𝑌∗𝑡+1+𝐷𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
𝐷 , 𝜙 = 0 if 𝜏𝑡+1 = 𝜏
𝑠
𝑡+1, and 𝜙 = 1 if 𝜏𝑡+1 = 0. Upon 
substituting 𝜙 into (1.25) it is possible to see that Ct+1 is a concave quadratic 
function of 𝜏𝑡+1. The optimal debt policy is the (𝜏
𝑑
𝑡+1, 𝜙) combination that 
maximises the consumer utility, i.e. 
(1.27) 𝜏𝑑𝑡+1 =
𝜏𝑠𝑡+1
2
,  𝜙 = 0.5 
where (d) denotes that the tax rate implies partial default. 
Interestingly, the optimal debt policy is independent of any other variable 
except the solvency tax rate 𝜏𝑠𝑡+1, but of course this is due to the utility function 
that I have assumed. It is however generally true that post-shock consumption 
is concave in 𝜏𝑡+1, i.e. it reaches a maximum for a specific combination (𝜏
𝑑
𝑡+1, 𝜙). 
This result prompts two remarks. First, (partial) default is always a policy 
option for a government facing (unexpectedly) unsustainable debt. Second, the 
effect of debt on the economy cannot be gauged independently of whether debt 
is inefficient/unsustainable, and the government chooses the default option. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Research on the relationship between public debt and economic growth has a 
long history. Interest has been revived by the fiscal consequences of the Great 
Recession of 2008-09. This new wave of research has been mostly empirical, and 
largely dominated by the pursuit of "the" debt-to-GDP ratio beyond which debt 
depresses growth; yet no univocal conclusion has been reached either about the 
quantification of the critical ratio or even about its existence. 
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Foundational work is however lacking: why should we expect a negative public 
debt-growth relationship in the first place? If such a relationship exists, why 
should it take the specific form of a threshold of the debt-GDP ratio, and why 
should we expect this threshold to be equally valid across time and space? 
In an attempt to address these questions, I have examined a wide range of 
different literatures concerning public debt and its impact on the economic 
system. Overall, there is no clear and straightforward theoretical answer to the 
previous questions. Or, from another perspective, there are many possible 
answers and many elements affecting them, thus reflecting the complexity of 
the argument, as well as the variety of the empirical situations. In particular, I 
have found no theoretical foundation to the existence of a critical debt-to-GDP 
ratio with general validity. 
One main problem in the theoretical literature is that three different 
analytical approaches are intertwined: static, single-period vs. dynamic, 
intertemporal setup; flow (budget deficits) vs. stock (outstanding debt) analysis; 
expected solvency vs. expected default. In each of them, or combination of them, 
debt has distinct effects on the economy. I have thus completed this chapter 
with a fiscal model of endogenous growth that may help deal with these features 
in an orderly and consistent manner along two coordinates of debt assessment: 
sustainability/unsustainability, and efficiency/inefficiency. The thrust of the 
model is that no meaningful assessment of debt and its effect on growth at any 
point in time is possible without reference to the whole debt trajectory and the 
specific state of the economy along the trajectory. If, for instance, public debt is 
on a sustainable and efficient trajectory, the debt level, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
and the growth rate at any point in time may be whatever is consistent with 
the fundamentals of the economy; the mere comparison between different 
countries has no informative value. Specific analyses, leading to different 
predictions, are necessary when public debt is either inefficient or 
unsustainable, and whether the government wishes to consolidate or not. 
If a comprehensive conclusion may be drawn is that each country’s debt history 
and specific characteristics, circumstances, and events have an overwhelming 
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importance that cannot be encapsulated in a single general law. Research should 
concentrate on the former and abandon the pursuit of the latter. 
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Chapter 2 
Analysing Economic Growth and Debt 
Relationship in a Panel of European Countries 
 
 
Abstract 
After the large public debts created by the Great Recession 2008-09, the idea that 
public debt has a negative impact on economic growth has become very popular in the 
literature, and it has paved the way towards the adoption of policies of debt reduction. 
Many studies have attempted to provide support for this claim and for the existence of 
general debt thresholds above which debt would negatively affect growth. However, 
because of heterogeneous conditions, such thresholds might not be generalised to any 
country and any period. 
Therefore, leaving the estimation of debt-thresholds aside, this chapter aims to deepen 
the understanding of the relationship between public debt and economic growth by 
analysing a slightly unbalanced panel dataset including 27 Western and Eastern 
European countries with quarterly data from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4. 
The proposed methodology is divided into two steps. In the first step, I carry out a time-
series cointegration analysis that allows for the maximum degree of within-country 
heterogeneity, to understand if a long-run relationship between GDP and public debt 
exists, and to find and describe any difference between countries. In the second step, I 
deal with the between-country dimension by estimating appropriate panel models. 
The main findings show that a) a long-run relationship between public debt and GDP 
exists for some countries but it cannot be generalised; b) such a long-run relationship 
is not unique and does not always correspond to the debt-to-GDP ratio, the 
sustainability measure that is commonly adopted to describe the debt burden; and c) 
the short-run linkage between public debt and GDP is negative, but also weak and 
heavily influenced by the events that followed the financial crisis. Therefore, country 
heterogeneity and the role of specific events are overwhelming factors in the debt-
growth nexus. 
 
 
Keywords: economic growth, public debt, debt thresholds, cointegration analysis, 
panel data dynamic models, coefficient heterogeneity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. The Pursuit of the debt threshold 
Interest in the debt-growth relationship in the advanced economies has 
emerged as a consequence of the Great Recession of 2008-09 and the large fiscal 
stimuli adopted by governments. In the OECD as a whole, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio escalated from 73.5 percent in 2007 to 122.0 percent in 2015. The Eurozone 
followed a very similar path, falling into a severe public debt crisis between 
2010 and 2012 ignited by Greece. Early in 2010, at the Toronto summit, leading 
governments, more forcefully those in the Eurozone, decided to cope with this 
situation by implementing a set of restrictive fiscal policies, whose aim was to 
reduce public budget deficits and outstanding debts that were considered no 
longer sustainable and a burden on the future growth of the economies. 
Particularly influential both for academic research and the implementation of 
fiscal corrective measures was the paper by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), whose 
main finding is a negative relationship between growth and debt above a 
general threshold of 90 percent of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Although Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s work was criticized, first by Irons and Bivens (2010) for what 
regards the applicability of the analysis to the U.S. and the implied causality, 
and then by Herndon et al. (2013) for the methodology, it has sparked a wave 
of studies searching for debt thresholds in advanced countries: the pursuit of 
the debt threshold above which growth is definitely jeopardised by public debt, 
a sort of "extreme limit" beyond which a government should not go. 
Taking a step back, before the financial crisis the research focus was 
essentially on poor and developing countries. This literature was supported by 
the debate around the debt cancellation programs, that became popular since 
the 80s (see Chapter 1). In this vein, the empirical analysis of Nguyen et al. 
(2003) argue that a level of internal debt above 50 percent of GDP (or above 20-
25 percent if its net present value is considered) can negatively affect growth in 
low-income countries because of an inefficient use of the available resources. By 
employing a large panel dataset of developing countries, Pattillo et al. (2011) 
have reached similar conclusions: a debt-to-GDP ratio above 35-40 percent 
 47 
 
negatively affects growth, but a negative marginal impact of debt on growth 
arises even at a half of this estimated threshold.  
Nowadays, the debt-growth debate has mainly changed perspective by 
focussing on high-income countries and, in particular, on the Eurozone 
members. Even though the most popular idea is that there is a negative 
relationship between debt and growth ― and that negative effects arise earlier 
for poor countries than for rich countries ― empirical threshold results can 
actually be divided into three categories that focus on the consequences of 
breaching a specific debt threshold: 1) Public debt stifles growth above a specific 
threshold of the debt-to-GDP ratio; 2) Public debt has no effects on growth above 
a specific debt-to-GDP threshold; and 3) Public debt has a positive effect on 
growth above a specific debt-to-GDP threshold. Little is said about what 
happens below those thresholds. 
The first group includes the majority of the threshold-based works, whose 
methodology and results are indeed quite similar. For instance, Caner et al. 
(2010) have performed a comparison between developing and developed 
countries. By employing a large dataset of 99 countries, they have showed that 
growth is negatively affected above 77 percent of the long-run debt-to-GDP 
ratio, and above 64 percent if only developing countries are considered. Similar 
conclusions have been reached by Cecchetti et al. (2012) (who have identified a 
threshold at 84 percent of GDP and at 96 percent of GDP when a control 
variable for crisis periods is added) and by Afonso and Jelles (2013) (who have 
found a negative impact of debt on growth, besides an effect of worsening of 
financial crises above a threshold of 90 percent of GDP).  
A series of papers has attempted to better describe the whole GDP-debt 
relation. Baum et al. (2012) have demonstrated that, on the basis of a dataset 
including 12 Eurozone countries from 1980 to 2008, the short-run impact of debt 
on growth is positive and statistically significant for low levels of debt-to-GDP 
but decreases and, eventually, has a negative impact above a threshold of 95 
percent. They have also pointed out that the long-term bond interest rate is 
subject to an increased pressure when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above 70 
percent. Checherita-Westpahl and Rother (2012) have employed a dataset 
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extended to the period 1970-2010 to show that the relation linking debt and 
growth is concave and U-shaped, with a turning point around 90-100 percent of 
GDP, and the existence of such a relationship has been ascribed to public 
investments and total factor productivity. Finally, in another paper, 
Checherita-Westphal et al. (2014) have proposed a theoretical explanation for 
the U-shaped relationship.1  
At the same time, other studies reached the conclusion that no relationship 
seems to link debt and growth. Cordella (2010), Presbitero (2012), and Egert 
(2015) have suggested that a non-linear relationship exists, but debt becomes 
irrelevant for high levels of debt-to-GDP ratio. Presbitero (2012) has explained 
these findings referring to country-specific factors, sample composition and to 
the fact that "debt overhang is a growth constraint only in countries with sound 
macroeconomic policies and stable institutions" (Presbitero, 2012, p.1). In 
another work, Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) have claimed that, by applying 
a standard Error Correction Model (ECM) and accounting for heterogeneity, a 
non-linear relationship between debt and GDP across-countries arises.2 
However, a systematic within-country relationship has not been found and a 
general debt-to-GDP threshold is unlikely to exist.  
The analysis of this chapter is close to that of Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015). 
Indeed, they share the same starting point, that is, the groundlessness of the 
assumptions that there is one debt threshold beyond which growth is negatively 
affected, and that all countries are characterised by the same debt-growth 
equilibrium relationship. There are, however, differences for what concern the 
sample of countries: the dataset of Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) includes 
yearly data over the period 1961 - 2012 of 118 countries, whereas my dataset 
includes a relatively more homogenous group of 25 European countries, with 
quarterly data over the period 1999Q1 - 2015Q4. 
                                                          
1 Greiner (2012) has criticized this conclusion. Specifically, it claimed that the model was based 
on a very simple and unrealistic fiscal policy with exogenously fixed deficits, and that "once a 
more general debt policy is considered, one finds that smaller public deficits and lower public 
debt always generate a higher growth rate" Greiner (2012, p.6). 
2 In that study, debt has been regarded as exogenous with respect to economic growth. 
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Given these dissimilarities, the two works follow different developments. The 
first part of the work of Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) essentially aims at 
considering both heterogeneity across countries and the cross-sectional 
dependence within an error-correction framework, two aspects that, as specified 
above, were not considered in the previous empirical works. Subsequently, they 
introduced a non-linear approach which allows to study the short-run and the 
long-run behaviour around specific thresholds, concluding that the common 
thresholds of 60% and 90% of the debt-to-GDP ratio do not hold. 
The methodology that I adopt is similar, but rather than estimating a 
heterogeneous error correction model including all countries, I first test for 
cointegration country by country to estimate the long-run relationships, and 
then I group the countries according to the detected statistical properties. This 
methodology allows to compare groups of countries that share the same long-
run statistical properties taking, at the same time, heterogeneity into 
consideration. Moreover, the more recent period of analysis permits to focus on 
the impact of the austerity period.  
Finally, the conclusions of the two works agree in saying that a single debt-
threshold is unlikely to exist, because of heterogeneity. While I draw this 
conclusion implicitly from the cointegration analysis and the subsequent panel 
group estimation, Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) draw this conclusion 
explicitly by analysing the validity of two specific debt-to-GDP thresholds. 
Then, on the one hand I conclude that a long-run equilibrium relationship is 
not generalisable and does not always correspond to the debt-to-GDP ratio, a 
debt burden measure that is commonly adopted. On the other hand, I notice 
that the sign of the short-run relationship between debt and growth is not 
constant over time.  
Summing up all the previous contributions, it is difficult to derive a unified 
thinking and to reach a one-way conclusion, especially because of countries’ 
heterogeneity. Most of the studies have supported the view that debt 
jeopardizes growth above a certain threshold (but there is no agreement on its 
level and little or nothing is said about what happens below that threshold), 
whereas other authors have found no evidence about the existence of such a 
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threshold. Finally, some authors supported the existence of a positive 
relationship above a certain threshold. See, for instance, Minea et al. (2012): 
debt reduces growth for values of the debt-to-GDP ratio below a threshold of 
115 percent, but this effect disappears and becomes positive above that 
threshold. 
In general, a debt threshold may be useful from a political and institutional 
perspective, but, because of heterogeneity, it would be optimistic to believe that 
such a threshold could be applied to any country in any period. This is exactly 
the conclusion presented in Chudik et al. (2015): based on a dataset of advanced 
and emerging countries, the research has not found any evidence about a 
general debt threshold. Nevertheless, authors showed that this conclusion does 
not compromise the existence of a long-run negative relationship between rising 
public debt and growth, suggesting that "the debt trajectory can have more 
important consequences for economic growth than the level of debt-to-GDP 
itself" (Chudik et al. 2015, p.28). In conclusion, the value of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio at a given point in time is perhaps too narrow a variable to explain such a 
complex question as economic growth. 
 
1.2. Beyond thresholds: is there a general causal relationship 
involving debt and growth? 
In retrospect, one may say that the empirical pursuit of the debt-to-GDP 
threshold harmful to growth lacks deeper foundational work. Why should we 
expect a negative public debt-growth relationship in the first place? If such a 
relationship exists, why should it take the specific form of a threshold of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and why should we expect this threshold to be equally valid 
across time and space? Such research questions have motivated the analysis 
presented in this chapter. 
Pescatori et al. (2014) have argued that a simple debt-to-GDP threshold above 
which growth is stifled does not exist. Instead, the relationship between debt 
and growth seems to be highly influenced by the past trajectory of debt. This 
statement could be used as a synthesis of the findings of that branch of 
literature that departs from the pursuit of the debt-to-GDP thresholds. 
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Closely searching for causal channels, Deshpande (1997) has explicitly dealt 
with the Neoclassical claim that public debt crowds out investments but, unlike 
Nguyen et al. (2003), he has considered external debt only. With a dataset that 
includes 13 countries characterized by high debt-to-GDP ratios, external debt 
is found to exercise a negative impact on investments. In the same vein, 
Balassone et al. (2011) have used Italian data from 1861 to 2009 to show that 
the negative relationship between public debt and growth is mainly due to the 
negative impact of debt on the investment level. Evidence about the existence 
of a general negative relationship is also supported by Ceh Casni et al. (2014) 
(whose analysis has been based on Central, Eastern, and Southeastern 
European countries data) and by Bordo et al. (2010). A different methodology 
has been proposed by Panizza and Presbitero (2014), who initially confirmed 
the existence of a negative relationship between debt and growth but, once an 
instrumental variable for public debt based on the exchange rate was 
introduced, the linkage between the two variables disappeared. These authors 
have explicitly excluded causality after the inclusion of the instrumental 
variable, a conclusion shared by Irons and Bivens (2010), quoted in the previous 
section. 
Another analysis of causality was performed by Kumar and Woo (2015) by 
adopting a panel dataset of both advanced and emerging economies. This study 
has accurately considered the intertemporal nature of such a relationship, 
examining the influence that the public debt has on the growth rate of the 
subsequent five to twenty years. The analysis has suggested the existence of a 
negative relationship between the initial debt and the subsequent growth or, 
using the words of the authors, a 10-percentage point increase in the initial 
debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a decrease in real per capita GDP growth 
of 0.2 percentage points per year, an impact that is smaller in advanced 
economies. 
Finally, Lof and Malinen (2014) have proposed a panel VAR analysis on the 
stationary growth rates of debt and GDP of 20 advanced countries and have 
reached opposite conclusions to Woo and Kumar (2015): debt has no statistically 
significant effects on growth but, in fact, growth has a statistically significant 
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negative effect on public debt. In other words, the negative correlation between 
debt and growth is due to the negative impact that growth has on debt. 
As before, it is difficult to derive a clear conclusion and it is not easy to solve 
the causality direction dilemma. Even when it is recognized that a general debt 
threshold for economic growth is unlikely to exist, results on the nature or the 
direction of the causal effect do not agree. In any case, the existence of a 
significant negative relationship between debt and growth is the predominant 
thinking, although in contrast with the conclusions of a number of other works. 
Hence, the aim of the present study is to go to the roots of the debt-growth 
relationship, first to investigate whether debt and growth are linked and, 
second, to ascertain under what conditions (i.e. specific countries and times) 
debt has a negative impact on growth. To this end, I have adopted a research 
methodology that differs from the most common empolyed in the literature on 
debt-to-GDP thresholds.  
First, I have assumed an "agnostic" stance, that is to say, this work does not 
hinge on any specific theory, and it should not be considered as a validation of 
a specific theoretical statement. Rather, it is based on the approach outlined by 
Hoover et al. (2008) and aims at understanding "what the data say" without 
imposing aprioristic theoretical structures.  
A second methodological choice consistent with this approach is to treat the 
(growth of the) amount of public debt and (the growth of) GDP as the two 
genuine primitives, without imposing the debt-to-GDP ratio as a primitive 
itself. In fact, for this to be possible, the two underlying primitives should 
display well defined statistical properties, namely cointegration and 
convergence towards a long-term equilibrium value, which are usually not 
tested in the literature.  
Thirdly, I have set time and space limits to the dataset by purpose. My 
analysis is based on a slightly unbalanced panel dataset including quarterly 
data for 25 Eastern and Western European countries3 from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4. 
                                                          
3 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. 
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I believe that the heterogeneity, or non-generality, of results that I have pointed 
out before should be taken as an intrinsic feature of the problem at hand, so 
that a viable strategy is to restrict, rather than further expand, the 
observational field4. Indeed, more recent empirical research has also shown 
that the effects of fiscal policy are space and time-varying in relation to a 
number of contingent "conditioning factors", for instance the business cycle, the 
monetary policy and exchange-rate regime, the degree of openness of the 
economy, and others (e.g. Favero et al. 2011, Hebous 2011, Gechert et al. 2015). 
In this view, my chosen observational field is Europe at time of the single 
currency. The majority of countries in my dataset belongs to the Eurozone. It 
represents a unique "field experiment" of a large number of countries where 
some key conditioning factors of fiscal policy are common and exogenous, 
namely fiscal targets and rules, monetary policy, the exchange rate with the 
rest of the world. The non-Eurozone countries, though not sharing the single 
currency, present similar structural and institutional features. Alas, time and 
space boundaries have a cost in terms of observations, and hence the feasibility 
and reliability of econometric tests, that I have sought to manage at best. 
Hopefully, the boundaries set are sufficiently well tailored (not too large, not 
too small) in order for conclusions to be meaningful in the context of Europe and 
the Eurozone in particular.  
Within this observational field, the main result is that a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between GDP and debt exists for some countries − and debt and 
GDP tend to adjust towards it − but it is not generalisable. Cross-country 
heterogeneity, and the role of specific occurrences like the financial crisis and 
austerity, remain substantial and overwhelming factors. Moreover, where a 
relationship exists, it does not always imply that the debt-to-GDP ratio may be 
the appropriate variable. Therefore, a unique equation describing the GDP-debt 
                                                          
4 As is well known, statistical inference of economic data is plagued by various trade-offs. One 
of these concerns generality vs. specificity. "Hard" scientists seek general laws, which require 
large amounts of observations. In the economic world, however, maximising observations by 
spanning across wide time and space coordinates can easily violate the assumption that data 
come from the same generating process. 
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relationship does not seem to exist, which entails the impossibility to derive a 
meaningful general debt-to-GDP threshold. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. After introducing my dataset 
with some descriptive statistics in Section 2, in Section 3 I test whether a long-
run relationship between the growth rates of GDP and public debt exists by 
performing cointegration analysis at the country level. Five groups of countries 
are identified as rejecting or non-rejecting cointegration, and with different 
cointegration characteristics. Then, in order to compare such groups of 
countries, and in an attempt to derive implications about the sign and short-
term dynamics of the debt-growth relationship, in Section 4 I present five 
models estimated by employing panel dynamic techniques. I also provide 
further extensions to check for robustness, goodness of fit, heterogeneity, and 
specific events like the financial crisis and austerity. Conclusions follow and 
close the chapter in Section 5.  
 
2. DATASET DESCRIPTION 
 
The two fundamental variables of the dataset are the real general government 
outstanding public debt and the real GDP, computed as described in the Data 
Appendix at the end of this chapter. Real time series are required to leave the 
effect of inflation aside from the cointegration analysis. 
GDP data cover the period from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4 and have been adjusted for 
seasonality. For the majority of countries, data about public debt cover the 
period from 2000Q1 to 2015Q4 and have been adjusted for seasonality only 
when seasonality was previously identified. Overall, the number of GDP 
observations counts to 1700, while the number of public debt observations 
counts to 1612. Whenever a strongly balanced dataset is required, I employed 
a dataset reduced to the interval 2000Q1-2015Q4. 
Table 2.1 summarises the structure of my dataset, Figure 2.1 displays the 
growth rates of GDP and debt, while their summary statistics are shown in 
Table 2.2, jointly with the correlation coefficients. All countries have 
experienced a decline in GDP because of the global financial and economic 
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crisis, while the greatest changes in the debt levels have been experienced by 
Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, and Spain during the subsequent 
time period. 
Turning from levels to growth rates, GDP growth rates look more stable than 
debt growth rates. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients, in 19 countries out of 27, is strictly greater than 0.1 in 
absolute value, but the sign is often negative. 
The Spearman’s rho, less sensitive to outliers and used to capture whether a 
variable is a monotone function of the other, is almost always negative. 
Noteworthy, Spearman’s coefficients are always far from 1 and -1, thus 
indicating that a decreasing monotonic trend between GDP and debt may exist 
but it is rather weak. Finally, the Kendall’s tau, which captures the rank 
ordinal association between the two variables, does not show a strong ordinal 
correlation between the two variables of interest. 
 
Table 2.1. Dataset structure, seasonal adjustment, and EMU membership. 
Country GDP Public Debt Season. Adj. EMU 
1. Austria 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 1999 
2. Belgium 1999Q1-2015Q4 1999Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 1999 
3. Bulgaria 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP - 
4. Croatia 2000Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt - 
5. Cyprus 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 2008 
6. Czech R. 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP - 
7. Denmark 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 1999 
8. Estonia 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 2011 
9. Finland 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 1999 
10. France 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 1999 
11. Germany 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 1999 
12. Greece 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 2001 
13. Hungary 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP - 
14. Ireland 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 1999 
15. Italy 1999Q1-2015Q4 1999Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 1999 
16. Latvia 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 2014 
17. Lithuania 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 2015 
18. Luxembourg 2000Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 1999 
19. Malta 2000Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt 2008 
20. Netherlands 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 1999 
21. Portugal 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 1999 
22. Romania 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP - 
23. Slovak R. 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 2009 
24. Slovenia 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP 2007 
25. Spain 1999Q1-2015Q4 1999Q1-2015Q4 GDP 1999 
26. Sweden 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP - 
27. the UK 1999Q1-2015Q4 2000Q1-2015Q4 GDP, Debt - 
Source: Eurostat (namq 10 gdp, gov 10q ggdebt) 
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Figure 2.1. Debt (red) and GDP (blue) growth rates for each country. 
 
 
Table 2.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between 
debt and GDP growth rates. 
Country GDP growth 
rate 
Debt growth 
rate 
Pearson’s 
Coefficient 
Kendall’s 
Tau 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
 Mean SD Mean SD    
1. Austria 0,004 0,008 0,007 0,026 -0,061 -0,006 -0,002 
2. Belgium 0,004 0,007 0,003 0,011 -0,470 -0,138 -0,186 
3. Bulgaria 0,009 0,016 -0,008 0,060 -0,238 -0,196 -0,290 
4. Croatia 0.004 0.019 0.021 0.025 -0.065 -0.141 -0.210 
5. Cyprus 0,004 0,011 0,015 0,054 -0,284 -0,160 -0,249 
6. Czech R. 0,007 0,012 0,022 0,045 0,056 0,057 0,103 
7. Denmark 0,002 0,009 -0,003 0,058 -0,319 -0,015 -0,031 
8. Estonia 0,009 0,026 0,017 0,069 -0,185 -0,113 -0,182 
9. Finland 0,004 0,014 0,008 0,050 -0,203 -0,004 -0,025 
10. France 0,003 0,006 0,011 0,010 -0,281 -0,138 -0,187 
11. Germany 0,003 0,009 0,005 0,017 0,011 -0,044 -0,064 
12. Greece 0,000 0,018 0,009 0,036 0,025 -0,050 -0,074 
13. Hungary 0,005 0,011 0,010 0,043 -0,120 0,060 0,079 
14. Ireland 0,010 0,019 0,020 0,061 -0,509 -0,368 -0,535 
15. Italy 0,001 0,008 0,004 0,010 -0,138 0,005 0,013 
16. Latvia 0,009 0,023 0,026 0,100 -0,299 -0,052 -0,069 
17. Lithuania 0,010 0,029 0,019 0,055 -0,090 -0,041 -0,057 
18. Luxembourg 0,007 0,018 0,027 0,093 -0,151 0,250 0,340 
19. Malta 0.006 0.019 0.007 0.021 -0.099 -0.117 -0.178 
20. Netherlands 0,003 0,007 0,005 0,034 -0,258 -0,013 -0,029 
21. Portugal 0,001 0,008 0,015 0,024 -0,152 -0,107 -0,151 
22. Romania 0,008 0,017 0,020 0,071 -0,342 -0,116 -0,184 
23. Slovak R. 0,009 0,022 0,011 0,039 -0,013 0,035 0,058 
24. Slovenia 0,006 0,014 0,025 0,055 -0,264 -0,157 -0,220 
25. Spain 0,005 0,008 0,012 0,027 -0,734 -0,478 -0,675 
26. Sweden 0,006 0,012 0,001 0,036 -0,006 -0,026 -0,052 
27. the UK 0,005 0,007 0,017 0,036 -0,358 -0,149 -0,213 
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In order to examine whether a general conclusion can be derived for the whole 
panel, I have represented the pooled scatter-plot in Figure 2.2. In line with the 
graphs proposed by Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) or by Herndon et al. 
(2013), no clear relationship emerges from it. The regression line is slightly 
downward sloping, but this result is clearly determined by few outliers. As a 
matter of fact, when these observations are removed, the linear regression line 
becomes flatter. 
 
Figure 2.2. Debt and GDP quarterly growth rates, scatter-plot with linear regression line. 
 
 
The same graph is depicted in Figure 2.3, but now a regression line has been 
added for each country. What clearly stands out is a high degree of 
heterogeneity, as shown in Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), with regression 
slopes that assume both positive, negative, and non-significant values. This 
result is confirmed by Figure 2.4, where the two series are combined into the 
widespread debt-to-GDP ratio; obviously, they are different from the well-
known yearly values. The distributions of the debt-to-GDP ratio across 
countries differ both in terms of level and in terms of overall dispersion, but 
what arises is a general positive skewness, with the right tail longer than the 
left tail for almost every country. 
Recapitulating, by looking at the correlation coefficients, the two variables 
appear to be correlated but, by looking at the scatter-plots of the growth rates, 
no clear general relationship arises. In addition, the boxplots representing the 
distributions of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the individual scatter-plots lead to 
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identify a high degree of heterogeneity. In the following paragraphs I attempt 
to identify a long-run relationship between debt and GDP. 
 
Figure 2.3. Debt and GDP quarterly growth rates, scatter-plot 
with regression lines for each country. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Quarterly debt-to-GDP ratio, boxplots by country. 
 
 
3. A GENERAL SPECIFICATION FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The general empirical specification for the analysis in this Chapter is an 
Equilibrium Correction model representation (ECM) of the unrestricted Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) that I assume to model the stochastic process generating 
the dataset. Denoting with 𝑧𝑖𝑡 the vector of I(1) observed variables, the ECM 
representation is as follows: 
(2.1) ∆𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + Π𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑖𝑙𝛥𝑧𝑖𝑡−𝑙 + Φ𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖−1
𝑙=1  
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where the specification has been augmented to include control or exogenous 
stationary variables denoted by the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗. 
If the observed I(1) variables are cointegrated, with 𝑟𝑖 cointegrating vectors, 
the matrix Π𝑖 has rank 𝑟𝑖 and can be written as Π𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖
′
, and model (2.1) can 
also be written as a Cointegrated VAR (CVAR): 
(2.2) ∆𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝛽𝑖
′𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑖𝑙𝛥𝑧𝑖𝑡−𝑙 + Φ𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖−1
𝑙=1  
where 𝛽𝑖
′
𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 represent the 𝑟𝑖 cointegrating relations that are I(0) and can be 
considered as long-run equilibrium relationships. According to model (2.2), 
these equilibrium relationships are assumed to differ across countries: they 
represent heterogeneous stationary relations which enter the model in the form 
of disequilibrium errors determining the short-run behaviour of the system of 
variables, jointly with the other stationary variables. 
If the observed I(1) variables do not cointegrate, Π𝑖 = 0 and a VAR in first 
differences would be the appropriate model.  
In order to simplify the application of model (2.2), I assume no between-
countries cointegration: this is quite reasonable, since finding stationary linear 
relations across countries is very hard, particularly over the period of 
observation, and I reckon that any cross-sectional dependence, in terms of 
common factors, could be dealt with when estimating the dynamic panel data 
model (2.2). 
In the following, my focus will be, first, on within country cointegration, in 
order to determine whether any long-run stationary relationship between the 
I(1) variables of interest can be detected at country level. The estimated 
stationary variables representing the long-run relationships will then be 
inserted into model (2.2) before estimating it using the appropriate panel data 
procedure. 
Therefore, the following question has the priority over any further discussion: 
does a long-run relationship between debt and GDP exist at country level? As a 
matter of fact, the existence of such a relationship determines the econometric 
model to be estimated. 
In summary, the proposed methodology is developed in two steps. In the first 
step, I carry out a time-series cointegration analysis that allows for the 
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maximum degree of heterogeneity across countries: as emerged above, 
heterogeneity cannot be ignored even within my dataset of European countries. 
In the second step, I deal with the panel dimension of my dataset by estimating 
appropriate panel models. 
 
3.1. Within-country time series analysis 
3.1.1. Methodology 
The existence ― within the single country ― of a long-run relationship between 
the two main variables of interest would imply that their data generating 
process can be modelled using an adaptation of the CVAR model represented in 
(2.2), which "provides a simple linear system that can characterize the 
probability distribution of a set of variables" (Hoover, 2008, p. 253).  
The following long-run relation between the log transformed variables5 is 
assumed: 
(2.3) 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡) + 𝑢𝑡 
where 𝑓(𝑡) denotes a deterministic function of time, or a constant, and 𝑢𝑡 
represents a stationary stochastic process for debt (Debt) not to diverge with 
respect to GDP. If both debt and GDP are non-stationary I(1) variables sharing 
a common stochastic trend, then the relation (2.3) can be embedded within the 
CVAR model emphasising it. Therefore, defining 𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡) = 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃) = 𝑥𝑡, 
the adaptation of model (2.1) for the determination of the 2×1 vector 𝑧𝑡 = (𝑦𝑡, 𝑥𝑡)
′ 
for any country i is given by: 
(2.4) ∆𝑧𝑡 = Π𝑧𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑙Δ𝑧𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑘−1
𝑙=1  
where  is the difference operator;   and Γ𝑙 are 2 2  matrices containing the 
dynamic coefficients relating tz  to the lagged values of tz  and to its past 
values; k  is the order of the autoregressive process; M is a 2 d  matrix of 
coefficients on the d deterministic variables, including the constant, contained 
in tD , and t  is a 2 1  vector of disturbances, assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated with zero means and a positive definite covariance matrix  . 
                                                          
5 An advantage of specifying the relation in terms of log transformed variables is that, when it 
is embedded in a CVAR model, the estimated short-run dynamics show how the rate of growth 
of debt and GDP adjust to any disequilibrium. 
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Detection of a stationary relation like (2.3) implies that the tz  variables share 
a common stochastic trend, which means that the matrix   is of reduced rank 
r  and may be rewritten as   = , where   and   are 2 1  vectors, with   
being the cointegrating vector containing the cointegration coefficients, and   
the vector of adjustment coefficients. In the present study there is cointegration 
if 1r = ; otherwise, if 0r = , it means that no stationary relation between debt 
and GDP exists and, if 2r = , it means that debt and GDP are already stationary 
variables. Being 1r =  the case of interest for the existence of a long-run 
relationship like (2.3), the identification of the long-run structure will be just 
straightforward in this case. 
Using the Johansen (1995) approach, it is possible to determine the rank 𝑟 of 
Π and test restrictions6 on 𝛽 and restrictions7 on 𝛼 once the deterministic 
function ( )f t , which makes tu  stationary in (2.3), has been specified. Given that 
the sample period does not cover many decades but just less than two decades 
including the recent crisis period, it is reasonable to allow for a more elaborate 
specification of the deterministic function ( )f t  including, if necessary, 
structural changes like shifts in the mean of the differenced variables, or broken 
linear trends in the levels of the variables, instead of a simple linear trend 
which takes a longer period of time to converge to the mean. As Juselius (2006, 
p.293) points out, "an I(1) stochastic trend around a broken linear deterministic 
trend, can in some cases avoid the I(2) analysis altogether by allowing for 
sufficiently many breaks in the linear trend", a strategy that considers also the 
implications of the well-known Lucas’ critique. In fact, looking at the graphs of 
the data in levels and first differences, for many countries it is possible to 
observe behaviours similar to the ones of I(2) variables, with growth rates 
                                                          
6 A case of particular interest is when the cointegrating vector satisfies the restriction (1, 1) = −
that describes the log of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the long-run. 
7 Restrictions on   have important implications on the CVAR specification of the model. Given 
the two variables of interest, when 1r =  the test of a zero coefficient in   is equivalent to 
testing whether the associated variable can be considered as weakly exogenous for the long-run 
parameters  , or, in other words, whether it can be considered as a "long-run" forcing variable 
for the determination of the other variable, in the sense that its changes affect the other 
variables but it is not affected by any changes in the cointegration relation. 
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changing over the sample period and with significant mean reversions. Thus, 
starting from a more general specification for ( )f t , I can test whether these 
structural changes are significant. In formal terms, if the deterministic 
variables tD  are just a constant and a linear trend, the CVAR model (2.4) can 
be rewritten as: 
(2.5) ∆𝑧𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽
′?̃?𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑗𝛥𝑧𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑘−1
𝑗=1  
where 𝛽′ = (𝛽′, 𝛽0, 𝛽1) and ?̃?𝑡−1 = (𝑧
′
𝑡−1, 1, 𝑡)′ show the double role that the 
constant and the trend play in the model, both in the cointegration relation and 
in the equation for tz . When 1 0 =  and 𝜇1 = 0, the linear trend cancels in the 
cointegration space but, given the unrestricted constant, there can be linear 
trends in the variables in levels. When 1 0   and 𝜇1 ≠ 0, the linear trend does 
not cancel in the cointegration space but there are no linear trends in the 
differenced variables. Within this case, if we allow for broken linear trends in 
the cointegrating relation, to the trend component must be added interaction 
terms of the form (𝑡 − 𝑡∗)𝐷𝑠𝑡∗, where 𝑡
∗ is the time of the break and 𝐷𝑠𝑡∗ stands 
for a shift dummy taking value 1 for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡∗ and 0 for 𝑡 < 𝑡∗, while tD  will contain 
also the differenced broken trend. 
Because of different times for the breaks and different results emerging from 
the testing procedures, the CVAR model (2.5) specification will change for each 
country. This means that different findings are possible, and that the countries 
in my dataset can be grouped according to the econometric properties that they 
show.  
 
3.1.2. Estimation results 
I initially applied two sets of tests: unit-root tests, to determine whether the 
time series represent realizations of non-stationary I(1) variables, and 
cointegration tests, to find out whether a long-run relationship between them 
exists. The analyses have been performed with Matlab R2016b and CATS 2.0 
within RATS 6.2. 
The unit-root analysis has been used to establish the order of integration of 
debt and GDP for each country. Since the time period covered by the analyses 
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is undoubtedly characterised by one or more breaks, the Lee-Strazicich (2003) 
unit-root test8 with two endogenous breaks has been adopted. The test statistics 
has confirmed that both GDP and public debt can be considered as non-
stationary I(1) series9 with breaks (see Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.3. Public debt, Lee-Strazicich unit-root test with two structural breaks, results. 
Level Break 1 Break 2 t-test Difference Break 1 Break 2 t-test 
1. Austria 2009Q2 2013Q2 -4.617 Austria 2004Q1 2008Q2 -10.161*** 
2. Belgium 2007Q2 2009Q1 -5.477* Belgium 2008Q2 2012Q4 -8.747*** 
3. Bulgaria 2007Q1 2012Q2 -2.137 Bulgaria 2007Q4 2010Q4 -8.047*** 
4. Croatia 2006Q3 2010Q1 -4.093 Croatia 2008Q2 2011Q2 -8.067*** 
5. Cyprus 2008Q3 2012Q1 -2.137 Cyrpus 2003Q2 2008Q3 -7.381*** 
6. Czech R. 2009Q1 2012Q1 -3.808 Czech R. 2008Q3 2012Q4 -10.961*** 
7. Denmark 2008Q3 2011Q3 -3.544 Denmark 2005Q2 2009Q1 -9.406*** 
8. Estonia 2007Q3 2012Q2 -1.979 Estonia 2007Q3 2011Q4 -7.624*** 
9. Finland 2008Q3 2012Q1 -1.331 Finland 2004Q3 2009Q3 -13.660*** 
10. France 2003Q2 2009Q1 -3.650 France 2006Q1 2009Q4 -7.942*** 
11. Germany 2004Q1 2010Q3 -4.209 Germany 2007Q2 2011Q1 -9.066*** 
12. Greece 2003Q3 2010Q2 -1.840 Greece 2008Q3 2011Q3 -9.644*** 
13. Hungary 2008Q1 2011Q1 -1.146 Hungary 2004Q1 2012Q3 -13.667*** 
14. Ireland 2003Q1 2009Q3 -2.614 Ireland 2006Q1 2009Q1 -10.913*** 
15. Italy 2004Q4 2008Q3 -4.572 Italy 2004Q4 2008Q3 -9.798*** 
16. Latvia 2003Q4 2008Q3 -2.257 Latvia 2006Q3 2009Q3 -8.701*** 
17. Lithuania 2005Q1 2008Q2 -2.044 Lithuania 2008Q3 2012Q2 -9.463*** 
18. Luxembourg 2004Q1 2008Q3 -0.860 Luxembourg 2007Q3 2010Q3 -9.794*** 
19. Malta 2005Q4 2008Q3 -4.334 Malta 2005Q4 2008Q2 -10.791*** 
20. Netherlands 2003Q2 2009Q1 -1.050 Netherlands 2004Q1 2008Q2 -7.922*** 
21. Portugal 2008Q3 2011Q3 -0.588 Portugal 2006Q1 2011Q2 -9.376*** 
22. Romania 2005Q1 2008Q4 -3.227 Romania 2008Q3 2011Q3 -10.803*** 
23. Slovak R. 2003Q2 2007Q4 -1.650 Slovak R. 2008Q2 2011Q3 -8.403*** 
24. Slovenia 2008Q4 2011Q4 -1.351 Slovenia 2008Q4 2012Q2 -11.063*** 
25. Spain 2006Q4 2010Q2 -4.801 Spain 2008Q2 2011Q3 -8.172*** 
26. Sweden 2008Q4 2012Q4 -1.763 Sweden 2006Q4 2009Q4 -10.732*** 
27. the UK 2007Q4 2011Q1 -3.946 the UK 2005Q3 2010Q1 -10.366*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
For critical values see Lee and Strazicich (2003), p. 1084, Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 The advantage of Lee-Strazicich test is that it allows for endogenously determined breaks in 
the level and in the trend under both the null and the alternative hypotheses, increasing the 
power of the test function in the presence of structural breaks in the deterministic components 
of the series, which appear to be the case.  
9 The test includes a time trend and a number of lags automatically chosen from 0 to 4; results 
show that the null-hypothesis (unit-root) cannot be rejected at 5 percent level. This test allows 
me to deal with the loss of power from ignoring one or more breaks, but in fact some countries 
may require the inclusion of a third break, in particular for the debt series. These countries are, 
indicatively: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK. It 
seems plausible and useful to consider all the time series as I(1), also because the application 
of the same test has excluded a sheer I(2) behaviour. In any case, as a robustness check, I carried 
out the unit-root analysis also by employing panel techniques. Both the Harris-Tzavalis unit-
root test with the small-sample correction and the Breitung test with the correction for the 
cross-sectional dependence confirms the I(1) nature of the time series of the analysis. 
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Table 2.4. GDP, Lee-Strazicich unit-root test with two structural breaks, results. 
Level Break 1 Break 2 t-test Difference Break 1 Break 2 t-test 
1. Austria 2006Q1 2009Q4 -4.180 Austria 2008Q1 2009Q3 -7.082*** 
2. Belgium 2006Q2 2009Q3 -4.331 Belgium 2008Q1 2009Q4 -6.560*** 
3. Bulgaria 2003Q4 2008Q4 -4.861 Bulgaria 2007Q3 2009Q2 -9.026*** 
4. Croatia 2008Q3 2011Q2 -5.399 Croatia 2007Q4 2009Q2 -12.87*** 
5. Cyprus 2007Q1 2012Q3 -4.328 Cyrpus 2008Q2 2012Q4 -8.139*** 
6. Czech R. 2003Q4 2008Q2 -3.609 Czech R. 2008Q3 2011Q2 -8.111*** 
7. Denmark 2005Q3 2008Q4 -4.192 Denmark 2007Q4 2009Q2 -8.526*** 
8. Estonia 2008Q2 2011Q3 -4.592 Estonia 2007Q3 2009Q3 -9.172*** 
9. Finland 2008Q3 2011Q4 -4.168 Finland 2007Q4 2009Q2 -9.086*** 
10. France 2008Q2 2011Q3 -3.764 France 2007Q2 2009Q2 -6.150** 
11. Germany 2003Q3 2008Q3 -4.004 Germany 2008Q2 2009Q4 -7.064*** 
12. Greece 2007Q3 2011Q3 -4.068 Greece 2008Q1 2010Q1 -9.773*** 
13. Hungary 2005Q4 2009Q2 -4.368 Hungary 2008Q2 2010Q2 -7.760*** 
14. Ireland 2008Q2 2012Q2 -4.065 Ireland 2006Q3 2008Q4 -12.643*** 
15. Italy 2002Q4 2007Q4 -4.026 Italy 2007Q4 2009Q2 -6.125** 
16. Latvia 2006Q1 2009Q2 -4.353 Latvia 2007Q1 2009Q3 -11.278*** 
17. Lithuania 2007Q3 2010Q4 -4.524 Lithuania 2007Q3 2009Q2 -12.151*** 
18. Luxembourg 2002Q4 2008Q3 -4.822 Luxembourg 2006Q4 2009Q1 -9.235*** 
19. Malta 2002Q2 2013Q1 -4.989 Malta 2005Q2 2008Q2 -12.164*** 
20. Netherlands 2002Q4 2008Q2 -3.723 Netherlands 2007Q4 2009Q2 -7.044*** 
21. Portugal 2009Q3 2011Q4 -4.344 Portugal 2008Q1 2010Q4 -7.551*** 
22. Romania 2007Q1 2009Q3 -4.047 Romania 2008Q4 2010Q2 -7.249*** 
23. Slovak R. 2003Q1 2008Q3 -4.025 Slovak R. 2008Q3 2010Q1 -9.377*** 
24. Slovenia 2006Q4 2011Q4 -4.969 Slovenia 2001Q4 2008Q1 -5.262*** 
25. Spain 2006Q1 2011Q4 -3.742 Spain 2002Q2 2008Q2 -4.890*** 
26. Sweden 2005Q1 2008Q2 5.049 Sweden 2008Q3 2010Q4 -10.401*** 
27. the UK 2008Q1 2010Q3 -4.992 the UK 2007Q3 2009Q1 -9.420*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
For critical values see Lee and Strazicich (2003), p. 1084, Table 2. 
 
Given these results, I have carried out a cointegration analysis; detailed 
results are reported in Table A2.2 in the Cointegration Appendix, to which I 
refer in the following part. The columns corresponding to the heading "Model 
Specification" show the number of lags, whether there are one or more breaks, 
and whether exogenous variables have been considered. This piece of 
information relates to the specification chosen by selecting the maximum 
number of lags and then adjusting it by looking at the tests on residuals 
("Autocorrelation" − LM(1) test − and "Normality" columns) and by including, 
eventually, appropriate dummy variables and time breaks. The columns "Test 
on restricted model" show the p-values and the corrected p-values associated to 
the test for the imposed restriction on  , while the columns labelled "Variable 
Exclusion" confirm that no variable can be excluded from the relation within 
the cointegration framework. Finally, the p-values in the last column, labelled 
"Stationarity", confirm that neither GDP nor debt are stationary, in line with 
the results of the unit-root test presented above. 
The fundamental results of the analysis are represented by the two columns 
labelled with "Cointegration rank", where the p-values and the corrected p-
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values10 of the Johansen trace test are reported. At the significance level of 5 
percent, 19 countries show no cointegration: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the 
UK. 
However, on the basis of the values of the roots of the companion matrix, four 
countries have been classified as showing cointegration: Romania, Slovenia, 
Sweden, and the UK.11 For the remaining countries, one cointegration 
relationship has clearly been detected: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Malta, and Netherlands. 
Therefore, countries can be divided into at least two groups, those that show 
cointegration and those that do not show cointegration, though on the basis of 
different specifications for the lags and the deterministic components.  
In a first attempt to identify and statistically interpret the cointegration 
relationship for each country in the dataset, the coefficients of 𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡) and 
𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃) have been restricted to take the values to 1 and -1 respectively, in order 
to find evidence of the debt-to-GDP ratio,12 i.e. 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
), perhaps the most 
widespread and commonly adopted measure of debt burden. Therefore, this 
restriction allows to check whether the debt-to-GDP ratio corresponds to the 
long-run stationary relationship between government debt and GDP, and thus 
whether the debt-to-GDP ratio can be appropriately applied to describe and 
evaluate public debt. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table A2.2, this restriction is rejected13 at the usual 
5% significance level for all countries showing evidence of cointegration. 
Accordingly, the long-run relationship cannot be generally described as the 
                                                          
10 The p-values based on the Bartlett correction for small sample sizes. See Johansen (2002). 
11 The two greatest roots for Romania are 0.9 and 0.596; for Slovenia 0.997, 0.525; for Sweden 
0.941, 0.392; and for the UK 0.99, 0.694. Therefore, the roots of the companion matrix suggest 
the presence of cointegration beyond the results of the Johansen test. 
12 In other words, whenever the corrected p-values do not allow to reject the imposed restriction 
on the cointegration vector, the cointegration relationship can be interpreted as the debt-to-
GDP ratio; on the contrary, whenever this restriction is statistically rejected, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio does not correspond to the long-run relationship between debt and GDP. 
13 By considering the Bartlett correction, it is not rejected at 5 percent level for Austria, Italy, 
Romania, and Sweden, and at 1 percent level for Belgium, Denmark, and Slovenia. 
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"pure" debt-to-GDP ratio, with noticeable implications in terms of the 
applicability of such a measure to the historical evaluation of the debt burden: 
if the long-run relationship between debt and GDP does not correspond to the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, any implication derived from it should be interpreted with 
due caution.  
Finally, I have considered whether either public debt or GDP can be 
considered as weakly exogenous variables. Though weak exogeneity has 
emerged for some countries, public debt cannot be considered as an independent 
(exogenous) variable for each country.14 
Even at this point in the analysis it can be noted that the existence of a 
cointegration relationship between debt and GDP cannot be generalised for 
every country in my dataset, as well as the existence of a unique model 
describing it. In fact, on the basis of the Johansen test15 and without relying 
upon the debt-to-GDP thresholds, it is possible to identify five groups of 
countries: 
• Group 1, cointegration, debt is weakly exogenous: Belgium, France; 
• Group 2, cointegration, GDP is weakly exogenous: Denmark, Malta, 
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK; 
• Group 3, cointegration, neither GDP nor debt is weakly exogenous: 
Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovenia; 
• Group 4, no cointegration, debt is weakly exogenous: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia; 
• Group 5, no cointegration, neither GDP nor debt is weakly exogenous: 
Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain. 
                                                          
14 At the 5 percent significance level, debt can be considered as weakly exogenous for Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and France, while GDP is weakly exogenous for Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. For the remaining countries, neither debt nor GDP can be 
considered as weakly exogenous. 
15 I also employed the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test, which extends the ADF test to the 
cointegration analysis allowing for the inclusion of one level shift in the intercept and one 
regime shift in the cointegration coefficient and in the time trend. However, while some 
breakpoints coincided with the breaks reported in Table A2.2, this cointegration test, in general, 
was unable to confirm the results of the Johansen test and to detect cointegration. This is 
probably a consequence of the fact that it does not allow for the same level of details of the 
Johansen test and, in particular, for more than one break. 
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Figure 2.5. Cointegration analysis, groups of countries. 
 
Group 1 (yellow), Group 2 (green), Group 3 (red), Group 4 (blue), Group 5 (grey). 
 
It seems possible to give groups a geographical and a historical interpretation. 
In fact, Group 1 includes two close EMU countries; Group 2 includes four North 
European countries, three of them outside the EMU; Group 3 includes 
bordering countries, with strong economic relationship, though with clear 
different histories and traditions; Group 4 includes three Eastern European 
countries that, however, do not have any border in common; and, finally, Group 
5 includes three sub-groups of countries, i.e. three central European countries 
that did not heavily suffered the Sovereign Debt Crisis (Finland, Luxembourg, 
Germany), three Eastern European countries with two Baltic Republics (Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia), and five countries that experienced a harsh period of debt 
crisis and austerity, beyond Italy (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain). 
These groups of countries are geographically depicted in Figure 2.5. Therefore, 
groups from 1 to 4 include comparable and/or geographically close countries, 
while countries in group 5 are remarkably heterogeneous, thus suggesting 
further differentiation.  
Three aspects deserve particular attention. First, the time breaks have not 
been exogenously chosen but they are the result of a preliminary analysis of the 
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time series and of the cointegration residuals, country by country. Therefore, it 
is possible to say that I have let the data speak and that the breaks reflect the 
behaviour of the time series and the impact of exogenous occurrences. The 
distribution of the selected breaks, depicted in Figure 2.6, shows that most of 
them occurred between 2008Q1 and 2009Q2 and are due to the 2008 financial 
crisis. Several breaks are located after 2010 and they are scattered between 
2010Q4 and 2014Q3, during the Greek crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis and austerity period. Finally, 9 breaks are located before the financial 
crisis. 
As a result, whilst the majority of breaks is clearly due to worldwide shocks 
and in particular to the financial crisis, a number of them cannot be connected 
to worldwide phenomena. Moreover, even the time of the reaction to the 
financial crisis, a worldwide shock that affected all countries, is not identical 
for all countries, thus highlighting further that a homogenous cointegration 
analysis would be inadequate.  
 
Figure 2.6. Distribution of the time breaks. 
 
 
Second, for countries showing cointegration, special attention must be paid to 
whether an equation is equilibrium correcting or not with respect to the 
cointegration relation; or, in other words, whether the variables of interest 
reacts with respect to the disequilibrium long-run relationship. Table A2.3 in 
the Cointegration Appendix reports the estimates of 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛼𝑖 with the 
corresponding t values for each country. 
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It is to be noted that the statistical non-significance of the 𝛼𝑖s directly reflects 
the weak exogeneity of the corresponding variables. Therefore, the 𝛼𝑖 associated 
to public debt for the countries within the group "cointegration, debt is weakly 
exogenous" is not significant, while, within the group "cointegration, GDP is 
weakly exogenous", the non-significant 𝛼𝑖 is the one associated to GDP. 
Similarly, both 𝛼𝑖s are not significant for the group "cointegration, neither debt 
nor GDP is weakly exogenous". In addition, to interpret the results one should 
consider that if the estimated 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 show opposite signs, the variable of 
interest behaves in an equilibrium-correcting manner; otherwise, it is not 
equilibrium correcting. 
Considering the first group of countries, the long-run relationship can be 
interpreted as a GDP relationship. Indeed, the ?̂?𝑖s suggest that GDP rather 
than public debt can be considered as equilibrium correcting to the 
cointegration relationship. This also means that the public debt variable has 
been pushed by GDP (the pulling variable), rather than adjusting to it. On the 
contrary, the long-run relationship of the second group of countries can be 
defined as a debt relationship: the GDP has been pushed to the long-run 
relationship, instead of adjusting to it. Finally, for the third group of countries 
that show cointegration, both public debt and GDP adjust to the equilibrium 
relationship in an equilibrium-correcting manner. 
All in all, the estimated equations are definitely equilibrium correcting but 
they differ in terms of pulling and pushing forces, along which the long-run 
relationship can be categorised. 
Finally, a comment on the interpretation of cointegration is necessary. First 
of all, cointegration is not informative per se for what concern debt 
sustainability. The evidence of cointegration between public debt and GDP is 
undoubtedly the preliminary requirement for any subsequent analysis based on 
the relationship between the two variables, but it does not provide any 
information about past, current or future debt sustainability. The evaluation of 
debt sustainability on the basis of cointegration should be carried out, instead, 
by following Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Greiner and Fincke (2016) according 
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to which sustainability requires the quasi-difference stationary16 of the 
government debt and the presence of cointegration between public debt and 
primary surpluses. Therefore, the attention should be on the primary surpluses 
and not on GDP, an element that further limits inference that can be drawn 
from the debt threshold literature about sustainability. 
In the following part I will exploit this result to consider the panel dimension 
of the data. 
 
3.2. Pooled dynamic panel data analysis 
3.2.1. Methodology 
Having determined, on the basis of the time series properties of data, the five 
groups within which countries can be considered as forming a homogeneous 
panel with respect to the model for their data generating process, we can go 
ahead with the second step of the analysis. 
What I estimated in the preceding section for those countries in which 
cointegration between the variables of interest emerged was a stationary 
variable measuring the disequilibriums from the long-run relation. More 
precisely, this stationary variable is defined as 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖′𝑅𝑖𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 are found 
by concentrating out the short-run effects ∆𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 and the determinist effects, 
from 𝑧𝑖𝑡−1. The panel data CVAR specification described by equation (2.2) can 
thus be rewritten as follows: 
(2.6) ∆𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + α𝑖𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑖𝑙𝛥𝑧𝑖𝑡−𝑙 + Φ𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖−1
𝑙=1  
where, at first, I consider 𝛼𝑖, 𝛤𝑖 and Φ𝑖 as homogeneous coefficients (𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼, 𝛤𝑖 =
Γ, and Φ𝑖 = Φ ∀𝑖), and thus heterogeneity between countries is accounted for the 
fixed-effect component 𝜇𝑖 only. This homogeneity restriction will then be relaxed 
in Section 3.5. 
Considering the composition of the vector 𝑧𝑖𝑡 given above, model (2.6) for those 
countries showing cointegration can extensively be written as: 
(2.7) 𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇1𝑖 + 𝛾11𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾12𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙1𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                                                          
16 Denoting by 𝐷𝑡 public debt and 𝑟 the interest rate on government bonds, quasi-
difference stationarity implies the stationarity of 𝐷𝑡 − 𝜗𝐷𝑡−1, with 0 ≤ 𝜗 < (1 + 𝑟). 
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                 𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇2𝑖 + 𝛾21𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾22𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
while, for those countries that do not show cointegration, it becomes: 
(2.8) 𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇1𝑖 + 𝛾11𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾12𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙1𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                 𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇2𝑖 + 𝛾21𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾22𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
All the estimated models include the lagged GDP growth rate (𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) and the 
lagged debt growth rate (𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑡−1),17 a constant, a dummy variable ,i tEuro  that 
captures the entrance in the monetary union, and the stationary cointegration 
variable 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 when countries show cointegration. 
Since my dataset is characterised by a limited number of countries and a much 
longer number of time periods,18 equation (2.6) cannot be estimated with the 
usual GMM techniques adopted for dynamic panel models (i.e. Arellano-Bond 
and Arellano-Bover estimators). For this reason, the estimation procedures will 
be based on the fixed-effect estimator, which is biased but consistent for 𝑇 → ∞. 
Estimation results are presented in the next section. 
 
3.2.2. Estimation results 
The existence of a cointegration relationship implies a long-run relationship 
between debt and GDP but it does not say anything about the nature of such a 
relationship and about the sign of the short-run adjustments. To compare the 
groups of countries and in an attempt to derive general implications, five models 
have been estimated on a set of stationary variables.  
With respect to the within-country analysis, the panel analysis introduces a 
problem of cross-sectional dependence that may arise as a result of worldwide 
events affecting all countries contemporaneously (like the financial crisis, as 
observed in the previous section). Therefore, I have also introduced a common 
risk factor, the natural logarithm of the CBOE VIX Index (see the Data 
Appendix for further details). The dynamics of such a variable, depicted in 
Figure 2.7, shows a slow mean-reverting process that can be considered 
stationary for the given frequency and time horizon according to both the KPSS 
                                                          
17 More lags did not lead to any improvement in the empirical analysis. 
18 This situation depicts a panel of time-series data. 
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unit root test (with and without trend) and the Phillips-Perron unit root test 
(with and without trend).  
Estimation results are displayed in Table 2.5. Panel (a) reports the estimation 
results of those groups of countries that show cointegration between debt and 
GDP (Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3 respectively), while panel (b) reports the 
estimation results of those groups of countries that do not show cointegration 
(Group 4 and Group 5). 
 
Figure 2.7. The logarithm of the VIX Index (black) and its mean (grey). 
 
 
By focussing on panel (a) of Table 2.5, two coefficients are particularly 
significant for the analysis. First, the statistical significance of the 
homogeneous coefficient   associated to the cointegration variable implies the 
relevance of the disequilibrium errors in explaining the dependent variable. 
This can be observed for all groups with the only exception of the second 
specification of Group 2, which, however, is characterised by a very limited 
number of countries. Indeed, it must be remarked that causation cannot be 
inferred from CVAR estimation, therefore the significance of such a coefficient 
does not imply causality. 
Second, the sign of the short-term relationship between the GDP growth rate 
and the debt growth rate is always negative, as (intuitively) expected since it 
reflects the negative correlations found at the beginning of this chapter, besides 
the findings of all those works that describe a negative relationship between 
debt and GDP. However, it should be noted that these terms are not always 
statistically significant, thus implying that the short-term effect vanishes. In 
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particular, it seems that gD adjusts towards gY (a reduction in gD is followed 
by a reduction in gY) in Group 1, Group 2, and Group 4, that both adjustments 
(gD towards gY and gY towards gD) in Group 5, but also that no adjustment 
occurs in Group 3.  
Finally, for each group the dummy Euro ― that captures the effect of being 
part of the monetary union ― is statistically significant, highlighting the 
presence of significant differences between countries inside and outside EMU. 
 
Table 2.5. Panel estimation: basic specifications. 
(a) Groups of countries that show cointegration. 
Group 1 2 3 
Dep. Var. gD gY gD gY gD gY 
 
gY(-1) -0.3313* -0.1662 -0.5523* 0.3855*** -0.4792 0.2897*** 
 (0.1574) (0.1555) (0.0613) (0.0030) (0.2368) (0.0449) 
gD(-1) -0.0261 -0.0273 0.1276 -0.0493 -0.1130 -0.0078 
 (0.0231) (0.0196) (0.1140) (0.0250) (0.0801) (0.0105) 
CR(-1) 0.0288*** -0.0008*** -0.0064** 0.0095 -0.2411** 0.0500** 
 (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0637) (0.0169) 
Euro 0.0036*** 0.0056*** - - 0.0199*** -0.0060*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) - - (0.0039) (0.0004) 
Const. 0.0421* -0.0157** 0.0232** -0.0024 0.0269 0.0020 
 (0.0188) (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0237) (0.0033) 
 
LnVIX 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
#Countries 5 5 2 2 5 5 
#Obs 320 320 128 128 320 320 
Overall R2 0.2696 0.0412 0.2322 0.3204 0.1419 0.3111 
CD test (p-value) 0.1820 0.0000 0.093 0.0000 0.7680 0.0000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.1950 0.2827 0.6457 0.1654 0.0985 0.6178 
 
(b) Groups of countries that do not show cointegration. 
Group 4 5 
Dep. Var. 
 
gD gY gD gY 
gY(-1) -0.6619* 0.1789*** -0.8077** 0.0478 
 (0.1696) (0.0168) (0.2752) (0.0731) 
gD(-1) 0.1431 -0.0368 -0.0043 -0.0572*** 
 (0.0833) (0.0139) (0.0625) (0.0167) 
CR(-1) - - - - 
 - - - - 
Euro 0.0164 -0.0036 0.0009 -0.0095*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0014) (0.0100) (0.0014) 
Const. 0.0142 -0.0265 0.0810* -0.0081 
 (0.0330) (0.0153) (0.0244) (0.0059) 
 
LnVIX 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
#Countries 3 3 12 12 
#Obs 192 192 768 768 
Overall R2 0.0953 0.1198 0.0794 0.0864 
CD test (p-value) 0.9940 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.2600 0.1301 0.6655 0.0481 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
3.2.3. Model validity: robustness and goodness of fit 
First of all, the results of the previous section could be affected by the omitted 
factors bias. In order to check the robustness of the previous results, the 
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following variables have been added to the estimations of models (2.7) and (2.8): 
the lagged inflation rate (infl(-1)), the lagged growth rates of the general 
government revenues (gR(-1)), and the lagged first differences of the long-term 
average bond yield19 (Dr(-1)), maintaining the logarithm of the VIX Index. 
Results are shown in Table 2.6 and they do support the previous results. In fact, 
the sign and the significance of the cointegration variable do not change, while 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of CRit-1 changes only slightly. In 
general, it is also confirmed the negative relationship between the growth rates 
of debt and GDP for cointegrated countries (Table 2.6, panel (b)), whereas the 
short-run adjustment completely disappears in cointegrated countries (Table 
2.6, panel (a)). This is no surprise since the relationship was already weak in 
Table 2.5. 
Moreover, the added explanatory variables do not consistently improve the 
explanation of the dependent variables, i.e. 𝑔𝑌 and 𝑔𝐷: they are almost always 
not statistically significant, they do not consistently improve the explanatory 
power of the model (in two cases the R2 is lower while in the other cases it is 
comparable to Table 2.5), and there are no improvements in terms of cross-
sectional dependence. Given these results and in order to keep the specifications 
as simple as possible, I will use and develop the five basic specifications for the 
rest of the analysis.20 
Second, the Arellano-Bond panel test has been applied to test for the presence 
of second order serial correlation in the residuals, which may bias the standard 
errors and affect the other statistical tests. Though the asymptotic distribution 
of this test statistic requires 𝑁 → ∞, which is evidently not satisfied in this 
analysis, the application of the test might still give an indication of the presence 
of serial correlation. Nevertheless, at a significance level of 5 percent, the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected for all groups of countries.  
 
                                                          
19 These variables are treated as exogenous and they have been individually tested for 
stationarity. 
20 Models in Table (2.5) and Table (2.6) have also been reestimated by using the maximum-
likelihood estimator and, though inadequate in term of standard errors, the Arellano-Bond 
estimator. No substantial differences have been detected, thus confirming the consistency of 
the estimations. 
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Table 2.6. Panel estimation, alternative specifications. 
(a) Groups of countries that show cointegration. 
Group 1 2 3 
Dep. Var. gD gY gD gY gD gY 
 
gY(-1) -0.3201 -0.0412 -0.6269 0.3836* -0.5437 0.2900*** 
 (0.2499) (0.0809) (0.1161) (0.0243) (0.2886) (0.0547) 
gD(-1) -0.0218 -0.0272 0.1444 -0.0538 -0.1319 0.0029 
 (0.0256) (0.0182) (0.0913) (0.0388) (0.0787) (0.0112) 
CR(-1) 0.0288*** -0.0008 -0.0065*** 0.0092 -0.2087** 0.0512* 
 (0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0603) (0.0188) 
infl(-1) 0.6229 -0.4761 0.5123 -0.1905 -0.0665 0.1797 
 (0.6275) (0.1750) (0.1886) (0.2379) (0.4817) (0.1372) 
gR(-1) -0.0659 0.0249 0.0653 0.0079 -0.1464 0.0379 
 (0.1149) (0.0226) (0.0467) (0.0089) (0.1666) (0.0292) 
Dr(-1) -0.0030 0.0026 -0.0010 0.0019 -0.0029 0.0007 
 (0.0200) (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0119) (0.0020) 
Euro 0.0059*** 0.0054 - - 0.0168* -0.0052*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0004) - - (0.0066) (0.0006) 
Const. 0.0362* -0.0124 0.0230** -0.0020 0.0384 0.0004 
 (0.0169) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0308) (0.0033) 
 
LnVIX 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
#Countries 5 5 2 2 5 5 
#Obs 320 320 128 128 320 320 
Overall R2 0.2724 0.0389 0.2483 0.3240 0.1541 0.3308 
CD test (p-value) 0.1280 0.0000 0.1210 0.0000 0.6480 0.0000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.2165 0.0850 0.6796 0.1604 0.1197 0.6961 
 
(b) Groups of countries that do not show cointegration. 
Group 4 5 
Dep. Var. 
 
gD gY gD gY 
gY(-1) -1.0930** 0.1229 -0.7712 0.0754 
 (0.0654) (0.0839) (0.2742) (0.0806) 
gD(-1) 0.1890 -0.0246 -0.0162** -0.0505*** 
 (0.1874) (0.0234) (0.0683) (0.0118) 
CR(-1) - - - - 
 - - - - 
infl(-1) -0.3593 0.4546 -0.6609 -0.0773 
 (2.3332) (0.0936) (0.5768) (0.1052) 
gR(-1) 0.1251*** -0.0080 -0.1134 0.0255 
 (0.0000) (0.0162) (0.0644) (0.0191) 
Dr(-1) 0.0015 -0.0019 0.0295* -0.0129** 
 (0.0232) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0058) 
Euro - - -0.0021 -0.0094*** 
 - - (0.0105) (0.0013) 
Const. 0.0406 -0.0204* 0.0937** -0.0082 
 (0.0477) (0.0017) (0.0300) (0.0063) 
 
LnVIX 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
#Countries 3 3 12 12 
#Obs 192 192 768 768 
Overall R2 0.1527 0.1125 0.1013 0.1423 
CD test (p-value) 0.4100 0.0210 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.1892 0.2393 0.8790 0.1608 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Third, since macroeconomics time series are often characterized by 
contemporaneous correlation, residuals have been tested for cross-sectional 
dependence with the panel test proposed by Pesaran (2015), and cross-sectional 
dependence has in fact been detected. I will deal with this problem in Section 
3.5. 
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In conclusion, differences in the specifications and in the results for the 
cointegration analysis and differences in the estimated coefficients, and in the 
behaviour of the residuals of the dynamic panel models, fully reflect the 
heterogeneity of the country in each group: a unique model would be 
inadequate. Therefore, even if it is possible to derive general conclusions, it is 
also possible to claim that they cannot be applied to any country. In next section, 
I will include the impact of the crisis and of the austerity periods in the basic 
specifications. 
 
3.3. Financial crisis and austerity: development of the basic 
specification 
It is undeniable that the financial crisis has represented an important change 
in the macroeconomic regime of many countries, a change that is fully reflected 
in the dynamics of both public debt and GDP and that has been followed by the 
widespread implementation of austerity measures. In order to account for these 
aspects, the econometric models described by equations (2.7) and (2.8) have 
been extended to incorporate the following variables, and the estimation results 
are shown in Table 2.721: 
• 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡, a dummy equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q4, whose aim is to 
capture the impact of the financial crisis. 
• 𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡, a dummy equal to 1 from 2010Q1 to 2015Q4. The timing and 
intensity of the application of the austerity measures in Europe varies 
from country to country (see Chapter 4), but this temporal dummy should 
capture the effect of the post-crisis period, which coincides with the 
generalized austerity period that affected all countries. 
• Two interaction terms between the previous dummy variables and the 
main explanatory variables (gY(-1) and gD(-1)). 
 
Considering at first Group 1, the estimated coefficients of 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 are 
comparable to those in Table 2.5, but gY(-1) in the gD-equation is no more 
                                                          
21 Tests for serial correlation and normality have been carried out again; results are similar to 
the basic models. 
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significant. Instead, the interaction term between gY(-1) and Austerity is 
negative and significant, so that it is possible to state that the feedback of gY(-
1) on gD is now incorporated by this variable and is negative. In addition, the 
coefficients of the variables 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 and 𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 are significant and positive, 
thus implying that both time periods are characterised, on average, by higher 
debt growth rates with respect to the previous period. 
As regards the gY-equation, both the interaction terms are not significant, as 
well as the estimated coefficient of Austerity, whereas the coefficient of Crisis is 
significant and negative, underlying that this time period is characterised by 
lower GDP growth rates with respect to the previous and subsequent periods. 
Turning to Group 2, the inclusion of the dummy variables and of the 
interaction terms has made the short-run relationship between the growth 
rates of debt and GDP no more significant. Moreover, the significance level of 
the 𝐶𝑅’s coefficients have changed and, at the same time, none of the included 
dummy variables and interaction terms are significant. As ntoed above, this 
group is formed by two countries only and results may be affected by this. 
For the first equation of Group 3, Crisis, Austerity, and the interaction terms 
are not significant, but the coefficient of the gY(-1) becomes statistically 
significant. At the same time, the 𝐶𝑅′s coefficients are not fundamentally 
affected. Considering the gY-equation, the coefficients of Crisis and Austerity 
are both significantly negative, reflecting the impact of the two sub-periods on 
the growth rate of the GDP; at the same time, the interaction term between 
gD(-1) and Crisis is positive and slightly significant, therefore offsetting the 
negative short-run relationship observed during the crisis period.  
For what regards Group 4, all coefficients are not significant within the gD-
equation, with the only exception of the interaction term between gY(-1) and 
Crisis, that captures the negative relationship between the debt growth rate 
and the lagged GDP growth rate. Conversely, the estimated coefficients of 
Crisis and Austerity are negative and significant for the gY-equations as well 
as the short-run adjustment, but no interaction term is significant. 
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Table 2.7. Panel estimation, extended basic specifcations: crisis and austerity. 
(a) Groups of countries that show cointegration. 
Group 1 2 3 
Dep. Var. gD gY gD gY gD gY 
       
gY(-1) -0.0208 -0.2721** -0.1579 0.2799* -0.3754** 0.1783*** 
 (0.1203) (0.0942) (0.5006) (0.0370) (0.1043) (0.0371) 
gD(-1) -0.0951** -0.0137 -0.0498 0.0095 -0.1283 -0.0190 
 (0.0219) (0.0293) (0.2260) (0.0381) (0.0648) (0.0129) 
CR(-1) 0.0286*** -0.0007** -0.0056 0.0105** -0.2417** 0.0426* 
 (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0025) (0.0006) (0.0646) (0.0155) 
Euro -0.0475** 0.0217*** - - 0.0128 -0.0023 
 (0.0133) (0.0018) - - (0.0113) (0.0016) 
Crisis 0.0446** -0.0167*** 0.0185 -0.0031 0.0032 -0.0140** 
 (0.0114) (0.0028) (0.0063) (0.0038) (0.0152) (0.0044) 
Austerity 0.0161** -0.0010 0.0054 -0.0027 0.0080 -0.0054* 
 (0.0054) (0.0015) (0.0065) (0.0020) (0.0109) (0.0019) 
gD(-1)*Crisis - 0.0053 - -0.1022 - 0.0472* 
 - (0.0417) - (0.1375) - (0.0218) 
gY(-1)*Crisis 0.2183 - -0.2169 - -0.4841 - 
 (0.2363) - (0.7591) - (0.3824) - 
gD(-1)*Austerity - 0.0367 - 0.0619 - 0.0382 
 - (0.0423) - (0.1677) - (0.0254) 
gY(-1)*Austerity -0.6423** - -0.0782 - 0.7883 - 
 (0.2316) - (0.3958) - (0.7269) - 
Const. 0.0331 -0.0069 0.0075 0.0011 0.0281 0.0087** 
 (0.0181) (0.0057) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0261) (0.0023) 
 
LnVIX 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
#Countries 5 5 2 2 5 5 
#Obs 320 320 128 128 320 320 
Overall R2 0.2192 0.0390 0.3053 0.3583 0.1920 0.3942 
CD test 0.2670 0.0230 0.6370 0.0000 0.4730 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.1330 0.7286 0.3470 0.1643 0.0896 0.4805 
 
(b) Groups of countries that do not show cointegration. 
Group 4 5 
Dep. Var. gD gY gD gY 
     
gY(-1) -0.2830 0.0192 -0.5939*** -0.0845 
 (0.4818) (0.0721) (0.1656) (0.0697) 
gD(-1) 0.1223 -0.0245* -0.0449 -0.0273 
 (0.0468) (0.0083) (0.0671) (0.0285) 
CR(-1) - - - - 
 - - - - 
Euro 0.0050 0.0015 -0.0037 -0.0050** 
 (0.0261) (0.0030) (0.0084) (0.0017) 
Crisis 0.0041 -0.0271** 0.0257* -0.0184*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0031) (0.0120) (0.0041) 
Austerity 0.0163 -0.0077** 0.0046 -0.0060** 
 (0.0330) (0.0016) (0.0057) (0.0020) 
gD(-1)*Crisis - 0.0322 - -0.0255 
 - (0.1853) - (0.0393) 
gY(-1)*Crisis -0.8162** - -0.4242 - 
 (0.1529) - (0.4275) - 
gD(-1)*Austerity - -0.0132 - 0.0033 
 - (0.0228) - (0.0374) 
gY(-1)*Austerity 0.2023 - 0.4952* - 
 (0.0559) - (0.2356) - 
Const. 0.0112 -0.0030 0.0551** 0.0040 
 (0.0559) (0.0098) (0.0190) (0.0051) 
 
LnVIX 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
#Countries 3 3 12 12 
#Obs 192 192 768 768 
Overall R2 0.1136 0.2551 0.1149 0.1932 
CD test 0.8890 0.1670 0.0000 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.2972 0.1690 0.5832 0.2831 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Considering, eventually, Group 5, the short-run coefficients within the gD-
equation remain highly significant, but the negative effect is diminished by the 
positive effect of the interaction term between gY(-1) and Austerity. The 
negative short-run relationship that has emerged in Table 2.5 disappears, 
instead, in Table 2.5, in which only the dummies Crisis and Austerity are 
significant.  
 
Figure 2.8. Short-term temporal dynamics of gD(-1) for the five 
basic specifications with gY as dependent variable. 
 
 
Indeed, the short-run component seems severely affected by the new added 
variables. In order to better describe the temporal dynamics of this component, 
a dummy variable for each year before and after22 2008Q3 and its interaction 
with the lagged value of the debt growth rate have been added to the five gY-
equations.23 In such a way, it is possible to depict the dynamics of the gD(-1)’s 
coefficient. 
Evidently, the short-run adjustment has followed a cyclical dynamics, similar 
in the five groups, with a decrease around the gloabl crisis that has lasted a 
period going from one to three years and that reflects the negative sign emerged 
                                                          
22 For many countries in my dataset, it represents the first quarter of economic crisis. 
23 Thus, 1 indicates the year 2008Q3-2009Q2, -1 indicates the year 2007Q3-2008Q2, and so on. 
Euro has been excluded from the estimations. See Figure 2.6. 
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in the previous analysis, while the period before and, above all, after the crisis, 
are primary characterised by higher and sometimes positive coefficients. 
Finally, it must be noticed that residuals are still affected by cross-sectional 
dependence: the new variables have not overcome this problem. I will return to 
this aspect in Section 3.5. 
Recapitulating, the inclusion of temporal dummies variables and appropriate 
interaction terms to account for the financial crisis and the subsequent 
austerity period has changed the conclusions reached in the previous section on 
the basis of models (2.7) and (2.8): the negative short-run relationship between 
public debt and GDP has been considerably revisited. 
Furthermore, the distinction between "crisis" and "austerity" periods allows 
seeing that in both periods some groups experienced a fall in their GDP growth 
rates and a positive (or, at least, non-significant) impact on their debt growth 
rates. This is confirmed by the detailed temporal dynamics that shows a 
downturn around 2008Q3 and for the subsequent two-three years. A possible 
explanation for this fact may be found in the adopted fiscal policies and, in 
particular, in the expansionary and then austerity measures implemented in 
those periods. Nevertheless, a causal linkage cannot be assumed and would 
require further research. 
 
3.4. Group 5, accounting for countries’ heterogeneity 
Group 5 is formed by a considerable number of different countries, a fact that 
undoubtedly introduces a high degree of heterogeneity. This finding suggests 
that this classification is perhaps not sufficient to comprehensively include all 
the aspects determining the debt-GDP relationship. Indeed, it is implausible 
that countries like Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, that experienced heavy debt 
crises, share the same properties of, for instance, Finland. 
To account for the countries’ diversity and to observe if any difference emerges 
between core and peripheral countries, the effects of the three core-countries of 
Group 5, i.e. Germany, Finland, and Luxembourg, have been captured by a 
dummy variable used to construct an interaction term (CC) with either the 
lagged growth rate of debt or GDP. Such a term has been included in both the 
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basis model for Group 5 and in their extended versions in order to account for 
the crisis and austerity periods (see Table 2.8). In both cases, estimation results 
do not dramatically change. Two aspects should be remarked: a) the interaction 
term is significant in three cases and is borderline non-significant in only one 
case, and b) its sign is always positive, thus indicating that the short-run 
negative adjustment in Table 2.5 is significantly lower or even positive for these 
countries. 
 
Table 2.8. Panel estimation, Group 5 models with core-European countries interaction term. 
Group 5 Group 5 
Dep. Var. gD gY Dep. Var. gD gY 
      
gY(-1) -0.9475** 0.0437 gY(-1) -0.7487*** -0.0886 
 (0.3269) (0.0751)  (0.2122) (0.0712) 
gD(-1) -0.0037 -0.0737*** gD(-1) -0.0438 -0.0357 
 (0.0611) (0.0212)  (0.0644) (0.0311) 
Euro -0.0005 -0.0094*** Euro -0.0046 -0.0050** 
 (0.0102) (0.0015)  (0.0087) (0.0017) 
CC 0.7740* 0.0507** Crisis 0.0266* -0.0179*** 
 (0.3919) (0.0202)  (0.0126) (0.0040) 
Const. 0.0806** -0.0076 Austerity 0.0037 -0.0059** 
 (0.0236) (0.0057)  (0.0059) (0.0020) 
 
LnVIX Yes Yes gD(-1)*Crisis - -0.0349 
#Countries 12 12  - (0.0344) 
#Obs. 768 768 gY(-1)*Crisis 0.0266 - 
R2 0.0878 0.0941  (0.0126) - 
CD 0.0000 0.0000 gD (-1)*Austerity - -0.0014 
AR(2) 0.7367 0.0597  - (0.0352) 
   gY(-1)*Austerity 0.4979* - 
    (0.2581) - 
   CC 0.7784 0.0403** 
    (0.4391) (0.0141) 
   Const. 0.0534* 0.0042 
    (0.0190) (0.0051) 
      
   LnVIX Yes Yes 
   #Countries 12 12 
   #Obs. 768 768 
   R2 0.1230 0.1961 
   CD 0.0000 0.0000 
   AR(2) 0.6519 0.4057 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
On the one hand it is possible to say that the new sub-group of core-countries 
is characterised by a different short-run coefficient, which reflects a weaker 
negative relationship between debt and GDP, and, on the other hand, that the 
same conclusion can potentially be reached for the other sub-groups of 
countries. In fact, repeating this analysis to account for further differences 
would lead to consider each country individually, a fact that should remark the 
key role played by heterogeneity and the improbability of observing one general 
debt-GDP relationship. When cointegration arises, the debt-to-GDP ratio may 
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represent the long-run relationship between the two variables, but there is no 
evidence that suggests the existence of a general debt-to-GDP threshold. When, 
instead, cointegration is not detected, the debt-GDP relationship is more 
severely affected by heterogeneity; hence, a unique threshold is even less 
justified. The analysis in the next section will consider heterogeneity in depth. 
 
3.5. Heterogeneity, cross-sectional dependence, and 
 small-samples correction 
This last section is devoted to the analysis of three aspects that have emerged 
above: the relatively limited number of countries in the groups, the presence of 
cross-sectional dependence not solved by adding the logarithm of the VIX to the 
previous specifications, and the heterogeneity of countries; I have dealt with all 
these aspects by adopting the Dynamic Common Correlated Effects estimator 
in Stata 13 (see Ditzen, 2016). In particular, for what concern the first point, 
the package developed by Ditzen (2016) allows to exploit the jackknife small 
sample bias corrections, the mean-group estimator that considered 
heterogeneity, and it allows to implement the technique initially proposed by 
Pesaran (2006) consisting in the approximation of the unobserved common 
factors responsible for the unobserved dependencies and the contemporaneous 
correlation between countries with the cross-section means of the dependent 
and independent variables. Moreover, results are robust to non-stationarity of 
such common factors.24 
Results are reported in Table 2.9, from which three facts emerges. First, the 
CD test shows no cross-sectional dependence in the residuals. Second, all the 
short-run adjustments are not significant, and also the significance of the CR 
coefficients is reduced. Third, the results are in line with Section 3.3: the 
negative short-run adjustments are captured by the interaction terms, which 
give rise to more complex interaction effects between the growth rates of debt 
and GDP.  
Therefore, accounting for heterogeneity has reduced the significance of many 
estimated coefficients but has not diminished the validity of the previous 
                                                          
24 Further details about this methodology are presented in Chapter 3, Section 5.1, p. 120. 
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conclusions, i.e. that the debt-growth relationship is to some extent determined 
by the time period of the analysis. 
 
Table 2.9. Panel estimation, Dynamic Pooled Common Correlated Effects, 
extended basic models. 
(a) Groups of countries that show cointegration. 
Group 1 2 3 
Dep. 
Var. 
gD gY gD gY gD gY 
       
gY(-1) 0.0518 -0.2373 -0.5842 -0.0216 1.0029 -0.1328 
 (0.2817) (0.1853) (0.8361) (0.0624) (0.8373) (0.3258) 
gD(-1) 0.0760 -0.0215 -0.3268 0.2470 -0.1800* -0.0592 
 (0.1666) (0.0206) (0.3549) (0.3313) (0.1015) (0.0657) 
CR(-1) -0.2939* 0.0211 -0.0422 0.0633* -0.2190* 0.0667 
 (0.1560) (0.0384) (0.0249) (0.0385) (0.1226) (0.0469) 
Euro - - - - -0.0137 0.0059 
 - - - - (0.0127) (0.0053) 
Crisis 0.0607*** -0.0439** 0.0173 -0.0064*** 0.0073 -0.0354*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0187) (0.0132) (0.0007) (0.0234) (0.0086) 
Austerity 0.0371*** -0.0115** 0.0046 -0.0043 0.0262 -0.0145* 
 (0.0116) (0.0058) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0188) (0.0084) 
gD(-1)*Crisis - -0.0834 - -0.3222 - -0.0375 
 - (0.3265) - (0.7040) - (0.1352) 
gY(-1)*Crisis 0.6736 - -0.3049 - -0.1697 - 
 (1.7242) - (1.1175)  (0.2708) - 
gD(-1)*Austerity - -0.2118 - 0.0785 - 0.1257 
 - (0.1434) - (0.3646) - (0.1206) 
gY(-1)*Austerity -3.8397* - 0.2802 - -0.1883* - 
 (2.1215) - (0.1051) - (0.0890) - 
Const. -0.0109 0.0056** 0.0016 0.0057 0.0491*** 0.0411* 
 (0.0066) (0.0024) (0.0097) (0.0035) (0.0189) (0.0242) 
       
#Countries 4 4 2 2 5 5 
#Obs. 244 244 126 126 309 309 
CD Test 0.8279 0.8191 0.4429 0.1525 0.2965 0.3143 
 
(b) Groups of countries that do not show cointegration. 
Group 4 5 
Dep. 
Var. 
gD gY gD gY 
     
gY(-1) -0.5179 -0.1275 0.1621 -0.1586* 
 (0.8565) (0.2002) (0.3432) (0.0913) 
gD(-1) -0.0118 -0.0215 -0.1189* 0.0261 
 (0.2110) (0.0280) (0.0691) (0.0240) 
CR(-1) - - - - 
 - - - - 
Euro -0.0410 - -0.0749 0.0101 
 (0.0410) - (0.1310) (0.0079) 
Crisis -0.0308 -0.0246** 0.1887 -0.0120 
 (0.0645) (0.0106) (0.1440) (0.0122) 
Austerity 0.0386 -0.0160*** 0.3033 -0.0085 
 (0.0555) (0.0051) (0.1882) (0.0055) 
gD(-1)*Crisis - -0.3896 - 0.0792 
 - (0.2656) - (0.1516) 
gY(-1)*Crisis -1.3566 - -2.9819** - 
 (2.9710) - (1.1863) - 
gD(-1)*Austerity - 0.0319 - -0.0767* 
 - (0.0989) - (0.0430) 
gY(-1)*Austerity -0.0321 - -1.6596 - 
 (1.3957) - (1.6423) - 
Const. 0.0203 0.3058*** 0.0059 0.0024 
 (0.0467) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0027) 
     
#Countries 3 3 11 11 
#Obs. 183 183 675 675 
CD Test 0.6536 0.2406 0.8705 0.0247 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I have implemented a two-steps methodology aiming at 
finding and describing a long-run relationship between public debt and GDP by 
analysing a slightly unbalanced panel dataset including 27 Western and 
Eastern European countries with quarterly data from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4. 
In the first step, I have carried out a time-series cointegration analysis that 
allowed for the maximum degree of heterogeneity across countries, to ascertain 
whether a long-run relationship between (the growth rate of) public debt and 
(the growth rate of) GDP growth exists. On the basis of my findings, I can 
conclude that a long-run equilibrium relationship exists for some countries, but 
it is not generalisable. Moreover, such a relationship does not always entail the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, thus suggesting that the use of this measure might not be 
always appropriate. 
In the second step, I have divided the countries in my dataset according to a 
search for the proper econometric model to be estimated, and I have exploited 
this strategy to compare the five identified groups. Results show that there is a 
negative short-run relationship between public debt and GDP, but this is weak, 
not always significant, and changes over the period of the analysis. 
Moreover, the cointegration analysis and the subsequent panel estimations 
highlight that, despite the limited number of observations, a high degree of 
heterogeneity remains as an overwhelming feature of the phenomena in 
consideration. Because of heterogeneity, a unique equation describing the GDP-
debt relationship may not be appropriate, thus sustaining the impossibility to 
derive a meaningful general debt-to-GDP threshold.  
The econometric models that I have estimated in this chapter are the starting 
point towards future analyses. Following the approach "specific-to-general" 
described in Juselius (2006), the cointegration space could be extended to 
incorporate other variables that may lead to more comprehensive long-run 
relationships ― even when cointegration has not been found ― thus capturing 
other peculiarities of the relationship between public debt and economic growth. 
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The conclusions reached in this chapter should, in my view, redirect the debt-
growth analysis from the pursuit of universal debt-to-GDP thresholds to 
indepth investigation that may explain why, when and how accumulation of 
public debt is associated to a decline in economic growth. This line of research 
is still undeveloped.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Data Appendix 
The primary data source for my analysis is the Eurostat Database, from which 
I take the quarterly time series of the nominal GDP at current prices; the price 
index (GDP implicit deflator, 2010=100); the general government gross debt i.e. 
the sum of liabilities, at the end of year, of all units classified within the general 
government sector; the inflation rate, based on the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP, 2010=100); the general government expenditure; the 
interest rates for long-term government bonds denominated in national 
currencies. 
By dividing the nominal GDP at current prices by the price index, I obtain the 
real GDP, which corresponds to the chain linked volumes (2010=100) time 
series available on Eurostat. Likewise, I obtain the real general government 
gross debt and the real general government expenditure. I subsequently 
deseasonalise these time series by applying the X-13 ARIMA technique. 
This methodology allows me to obtain fully comparable real time series, 
avoiding the data availability (the "seasonally but not calendar adjusted" and 
the "seasonally and calendar adjusted" data on Eurostat are not available for 
all quarterly variables and all countries, though the unadjusted time series are 
usually available).  
A second and last database is Thomson Reuters Eikon, from which I take the 
quarterly time series of the VIX i.e. the CBOE market volatility index derived 
from real-time, mid-quote prices of S&P 500 Index call and put options. 
According to the CBOE website (http://www.cboe.com/vix), the VIX Index "is a 
calculation designed to produce a measure of constant, 30-day expected 
volatility of the U.S. stock market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices of 
S&P 500® Index (SPXSM) call and put options. On a global basis, it is one of 
the most recognized measures of volatility, widely reported by financial media 
and closely followed by a variety of market participants as a daily market 
indicator." Moreover, the VIX Index "is designed to reflect investors' consensus 
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view of future (30-day) expected stock market volatility. The VIX Index is often 
referred to as the market's fear gauge". 
The final sample, slightly unbalanced, contains approximately 1700 
observations for each variable from 1999Q1 to 2015Q4 from 27 countries, thus 
on average 68 quarters per country. I limit my analysis to countries with GDP 
and debt data available from at least 2000Q1 (a minimum of 64 observations 
for the cointegration analysis), and for this reason Poland is excluded. 
Table A2.1 summarises the data sources of the mentioned variables. 
 
Table A2.1. Employed variables and data sources. 
Variable Source Type of variable 
CBOE volatility index (VIX) Thomson Reuters Quarterly data 
GDP at current prices Eurostat Quarterly data 
Government consolidated gross debt Eurostat Quarterly data 
Government revenues Eurostat Quarterly data 
Inflation rate Eurostat Quarterly data 
Long-term government bond yield Eurostat Quarterly data, average of 
monthly data 
Price index (GDP implicit deflator) Eurostat Quarterly data 
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Cointegration Appendix 
 
Table A2.2. Johansen trace test with Bartlett Correction (BC), tests on residuals, for weak exogeneity, for variable exclusion and for stationarity. 
 
Continue on next page. 
 
Country Cointegration rank Cointegration rank (BC) Autocorrelation Normality Weak exogeneity Restriction Restriction (BC) 
 r=0 r=1 r=0 r=1 LM(1)  GDP Debt   
Austria 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.088 0.93 0.89 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.098 
Belgium 0.001 0.049 0.002 0.077 0.30 0.12 0.000 0.883 0.003 0.020 
Bulgaria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.19 0.94 0.000 0.236 - - 
Croatia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.52 0.10 0.000 0.000 - - 
Cyprus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.13 0.24 0.000 0.000 - - 
Czech R. 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.01 0.44 0.19 0.000 0.248 - - 
Denmark 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.033 0.98 0.28 0.224 0.000 0.006 0.027 
Estonia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.40 0.00 0.000 0.001 - - 
Finland 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.17 0.26 0.001 0.000 - - 
France 0.001 0.588 0.003 0.612 0.12 0.17 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.000 
Germany 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.22 0.45 0.000 0.000 - - 
Greece 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.12 0.87 0.004 0.000 - - 
Hungary 0.007 0.985 0.015 0.987 0.20 0.19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ireland 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.034 0.63 0.19 0.000 0.000 - - 
Italy 0.004 0.773 0.005 0.775 0.41 0.10 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.051 
Latvia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.99 0.17 0.000 0.000 - - 
Lithuania 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.19 0.72 0.000 0.000 - - 
Luxembourg 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.45 0.20 0.001 0.000 - - 
Malta 0.001 0.346 0.002 0.350 0.33 0.66 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands 0.000 0.505 0.000 0.508 0.50 0.35 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Portugal 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.56 0.96 0.017 0.009 - - 
Romania 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.054 0.43 0.86 0.018 0.000 0.471 0.589 
Slovak R. 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.57 0.55 0.002 0.012 - - 
Slovenia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.16 0.43 0.000 0.042 0.026 0.047 
Spain 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.69 0.10 0.000 0.000 - - 
Sweden 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.91 0.72 0.194 0.000 0.019 0.052 
the UK 0.097 0.786 0.106 0.788 0.15 0.11 0.596 0.000 0.000 0.007 
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Country Model Specification Variable Exclusion Stationarity 
 #L Model Breaks Exog. V. GDP DGG Dummy B1 B2 B3 B4 Trend GDP DGG 
Austria 1 Drift 2007Q4, 2009Q1 2009Q4 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 - - - 0.000 0.000 
Belgium 2 Drift 2008Q4, 2009Q2 - 0.002 0.004 - 0.000 0.000 - - - 0.004 0.002 
Bulgaria 1 Cidrift 2008Q1, 2009Q2, 2014Q3 - 0.000 0.003 - 0.000 0.000 0.027 - 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Croatia 2 Drift 2008Q1, 2009Q1, 2013Q4 2009Q4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 - - 0.000 0.000 
Cyprus 2 Drift 2009Q1 - 0.058 0.000 0.051 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.058 
Czech R. 2 Cidrift 2008Q4, 2012Q1 - 0.000 0.003 - 0.003 0.100 - - 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Denmark 1 Drift 2008Q3, 2009Q1 2006Q2 0.001 0.015 0.064 0.000 0.000 - - - 0.015 0.001 
Estonia 1 Drift 2004Q1, 2007Q2, 2008Q4, 2012Q2 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 
Finland 2 Cidrift 2008Q3, 2009Q2, 2011Q4 - 0.001 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.001 - 0.002 0.000 0.000 
France 2 Drift 2005Q4, 2008Q4 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.017 0.002 - - - 0.000 0.000 
Germany 1 Cidrift 2005Q4, 2008Q3, 2009Q1, 2010Q4 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Greece 2 Cidrift 2008Q1, 2010Q1, 2012Q1 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hungary 2 Drift 2007Q2, 2009Q1 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.008 0.001 - - - 0.000 0.000 
Ireland 2 Drift 2003Q4, 2007Q3, 2008Q2, 2013Q3 - 0.002 0.004 - 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.007 - 0.037 0.002 
Italy 1 Drift 2008Q2, 2009Q2 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 - - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Latvia 1 Drift 2001Q2, 2008Q4, 2013Q3 2008Q3 0.038 0.000 0.087 0.024 0.015 - - - 0.000 0.038 
Lithuania 1 Cidrift 2008Q1, 2009Q1 2000Q4 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.039 - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Luxembourg 1 Drift 2001Q2, 2008Q4, 2013Q3 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.061 0.000 0.000 - - 0.000 0.000 
Malta 1 Cidrift 2006Q2 - 0.001 0.000 - 0.001 - - - 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Netherlands 1 Cidrift 2008Q4, 2009Q2, 2014Q1 - 0.026 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.041 - 0.03 0.000 0.026 
Portugal 1 Cidrift 2008Q4, 2010Q4 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Romania 1 Drift 2003Q1, 2008Q3, 2009Q3 - 0.054 0.000 - 0.003 0.000 0.000 - - 0.000 0.054 
Slovakia 2 Cidrift 2008Q4, 2013Q2 2009Q1 0.007 0.008 0.013 0.001 0.003 - - 0.000 0.008 0.007 
Slovenia 1 Drift 2008Q1, 2009Q1 2012Q2 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 - - - 0.000 0.002 
Spain 2 Cidrift 2008Q2, 2009Q1, 2012Q4 - 0.040 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.04 
Sweden 1 Drift 2005Q4, 2008Q3 2009Q3 0.032 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 - - - 0.000 0.032 
the UK 1 Drift 2008Q3, 2009Q3 - 0.000 0.000 - 0.002 0.002 - - - 0.000 0.000 
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Table A2.3. β structures for countries showing cointegration. 
Country Par. GDP DGG Dummy B1 B2 B3 Trend 
Austria 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-0.739 
(-9.128) 
0.102 
(2.216) 
0.055 
(5.864) 
-0.053 
(-5.556) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.088 
(-3.891) 
0.467 
(7.518) 
- - - - - 
Belgium- 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
1.967 
(9.871) 
- -0.338 
(-5.499) 
0.324 
(5.273) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.114 
(-6.389) 
-0.006 
(-0.186) 
- - - - - 
Denmark 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
0.161 
(5.572) 
-0.092 
(-1.987) 
-0.582 
(-13.321) 
0.582 
(13.318) 
- - 
𝜶 0.020 
(1.236) 
-0.787 
(-14.955) 
- - - - - 
France 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-0.322 
(-12.011) 
- -0.003 
(-3.142) 
0.004 
(4.983) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.360 
(-8.128) 
0.158 
(1.483) 
- - - - - 
Hungary 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-0.467 
(-16.951) 
- 0.012 
(2.829) 
-0.015 
(-3.570) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.235 
(-4.916) 
0.884 
(5.112) 
- - - - - 
Italy 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-1.778 
(-6.013) 
- 0.101 
(6.549) 
-0.087 
(-5.628) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.096 
(-4.857) 
0.146 
(4.227) 
- - - - - 
Malta 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
1.155 
(6.241) 
- -0.007 
(-5.731) 
- - -0.010 
(-5.277) 
𝜶 -0.108 
(-1.525) 
-0.397 
(-6.343) 
- - - - - 
Netherlands 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
1.241 
(5.777) 
- 0.286 
(3.751) 
-0.299 
(-3.959) 
0.016 
(2.168) 
-0.005 
(-6.323) 
𝜶 -0.021 
(-1.770) 
-0.339 
(-10.978) 
- - - - - 
Romania 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-0.627 
(-5.050) 
- -0.030 
(-7.961) 
0.216 
(5.259) 
-0.180 
(-4.650) 
- 
𝜶 -0.059 
(-2.542) 
0.547 
(5.902) 
- - - - - 
Slovenia 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-1.475 
(-9.235) 
0.445 
(2.850) 
0.287 
(6.057) 
-0.234 
(-4.873) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.057 
(-10.431) 
0.099 
(2.367) 
- - - - - 
Sweden 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-2.300 
(-6.549) 
0.407 
(2.698) 
-0.060 
(-5.334) 
0.082 
(5.808) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.028 
(-1.555) 
0.254 
(6.108) 
- - - - - 
The UK 𝜷 1.000 
(NA) 
-0.466 
(-7.925) 
- 0.074 
(3.777) 
-0.073 
(-3.769) 
- - 
𝜶 -0.012 
(-0.573) 
0.608 
(5.673) 
- - - - - 
Notes: t-values are in parenthesis. 
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Chapter 3 
Analysis of the Determinants of Austerity in 
a Panel of European Countries 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter aims at explaining what has driven the adoption of austerity policies 
within a panel of 28 European countries, both members and non-members of the 
Eurozone, and over the period 2010-16. Determinants of austerity can be brought back 
to four main sets of variables: fiscal discipline, market discipline, fiscal consolidation, 
and macroeconomic stabilisation. 
The first part of the chapter develops a correlation analysis that describes the 
relationship between austerity ― measured as the first difference of the cyclically 
adjusted structural primary balance ― and each considered explanatory variable, 
whereas the second part implements a panel econometric analysis. I first employ 
principal component factor analysis (PCFA) to reduce the number of explanatory 
variables and to retain the aggregate factors that might affect austerity, and second I 
estimate a panel model adopting the pooled common-correlated effect estimator 
(PCCE). Results show that the more important contributions to austerity are provided 
by the Excessive Deficit Procedure and by the Euro dummy. This effect is partially 
counterbalanced by the cyclical position of the economy. Nonetheless, the considered 
variables and common factors are not able to comprehensively explain austerity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: austerity, fiscal reaction functions, correlation analysis, principal 
component factor analysis, dynamic panel data analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Austerity, the word that indicates the adoption of fiscal consolidation measures, 
has become part of everyday language. After the adoption of such measures 
within the European Monetary Union (EMU) with the aim to curb government 
budget deficits and outstanding debts with respect to the GDP, newspapers, 
policymakers, and common people have begun to talk daily about austerity, 
often with a negative meaning. In fact, it is indubitable that a great number of 
people within the most affected countries still see it in the same way as a 
"punishment" imposed by an external ruler, and whose effects on the economic 
system are definitely negative.1 
Research on the relationship between fiscal consolidations and economic 
activity is vast, varied, and still unsettled. On the other hand, what has 
determined the adoption and the intensity of austerity policies in Europe has 
not yet been thoroughly investigated: were austerity policies primarily driven 
by European rules or were they the necessary answer to excessive and 
increasing public debts and deficits? Moreover, were they influenced by market 
and fiscal pressures or by the cyclical position of the economy? In other words, 
was their adoption and intensity dictated by the economic and financial 
circumstances? These questions describe the purpose of this chapter, in which 
I aim to find what has driven austerity in Europe from 2010 to 2016. 
Specifically, I will assess the impact of four sets of explanatory variables that 
are introduced and described below: fiscal discipline, market discipline, fiscal 
consolidation, and macroeconomic stabilisation. Because of the limited time 
span of the analysis, I will first inspect each variable individually through a 
correlation analysis, and then I will consider a dynamic pooled-panel setting. 
The econometric analysis, aiming at formally finding and comparing the 
determinants of austerity, consideres both the variables of interest detected 
through the correlation analysis, and four aggregate common factors (one for 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, the debate arose in Italy in 2017 between the two former Prime Ministers 
Matteo Renzi and Mario Monti:  
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2016-09-23/pil-renzi-ripresa-fatto-oggettivo-austerity-
dannosa-162328.shtml?uuid=ADtnU5PB&refresh_ce=1 
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each set of explanatory variables) identified by employing the Principal 
Component Factor Analysis (PCFA). 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces and describes the 
employed austerity measure; Section 3 presents the four sets of explanatory 
variables; Section 4 performs a correlation analysis for each variable, while 
Section 5 briefly outlines the econometric methodology and presents the 
estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A MEASURE OF AUSTERITY 
 
The main variable of my analysis should be a measure of fiscal consolidation, 
but several different alternatives are available in the literature. The relevant 
fiscal variables are usually corrected by taking out the cyclical component and 
the interest payments, as for the "cyclically adjusted primary balance" (CAPB) 
and the "cyclically adjusted structural primary balance"2 (STPB). This is the 
case of the ratio between STPB and potential GDP (PGDP), which is the official 
measure adopted by the European Commission (EC) to assess member 
countries’ underlying fiscal position for fiscal surveillance and for the adoption 
of a formal Excessive Deficit Procedure3 (EDP). 
                                                          
2 To understand the difference, consider that the components of the primary budget can be 
classified into two broad categories: those that are somehow related to the business cycle and 
those that are not. The former can in turn be distinguished between the automatic stabilisers 
(e.g. unemployment subsidies) and discretionary counter-cyclical measures (e.g. one-off changes 
in tax rates). Those unrelated to the business cycle are instead the result of discretionary and 
"structural" interventions in the sense that they are taken in view of other policy objectives and 
are, at least ex-ante, meant to be permanent (e.g. a change in the pension transfers). Thus, the 
STPB is obtained by subtracting form the CAPB also the discretionary counter-cyclical 
measures and other one-off operations. 
3 Defined as "an action launched by the European Commission against any European Union 
(EU) Member State that exceeds the budgetary deficit ceiling imposed by the EU's Stability and 
growth pact legislation." For further details, see the website of the European Commission 
(https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) and the Eurostat Glossary: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-xplained/index.php/Glossary:Excessive_deficit_ 
procedure_(EDP) 
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In light of these considerations, I have measured the fiscal adjustment – or 
austerity, Ait ― in year t as the positive change in the STPB/PGDP over the 
previous year t-1, that is: 
(3.1) 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃
> 0 
Yet the STPB has been adopted, and the official EC data are available, from 
2010, which implies that Ait is calculable only from 2011. Therefore, whenever 
it is necessary to consider the period before 2011, I will resort to the CAPB and 
I will denote this measure of austerity4 as A'it (further details are presented in 
the Data Appendix). 
The analysis is performed on a balanced panel dataset containing yearly data 
over the period 2010–2016 of 28 European countries,5 both members and non-
members of the Eurozone, and four groups are considered. The primary 
distinction is between the Eurozone countries6 (EZ henceforth), namely the 
countries that adopted the single currency before 2017, and the non-Eurozone7 
countries (NoEZ), the countries that have never adopted the Euro. Additionally, 
a qualitative preliminary analysis allows to distinguish between two subgroups: 
the first includes the most fiscally sound countries8 (EZ7), while the second 
includes the countries that undoubtedly experienced either debt or bank crises 
and programmes of financial assistance9 (EZ5).  
I will now proceed to examine the characteristics, analogies and differences in 
austerity in the sample of countries under consideration, with particular focus 
on the timing and intensity of the adopted policies. As will emerge, austerity 
has been most severely enacted in the EZ5 countries. 
 
                                                          
4 As can be expected, the two indicators follow similar paths, but CAPB is quite more variable 
than STPB. 
5 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the UK. 
6 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
7 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the 
UK. 
8 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Netherlands. 
9 Cyprus, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Spain. 
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2.1. Timing and intensity 
Within the austerity literature, the first two critical characteristics are timing 
and intensity, that should go hand in hand. The first key ingredient in the 
recipe for successful austerity is an "ambitious", front-loaded restoration of 
sustainable public finances that stops speculative attacks, regenerates 
investors’ confidence, and regains access to the debt market at lower interest 
rates. According to the evidence analysed by Buti and Pench (2012), gradual 
consolidations seem more likely to be successful, but gradualism may be 
harmful for countries starting with high debt levels and major financial 
distress. From this point of view, the austerity indicator given by equation (3.1) 
and depicted in Figure 3.1 allows for the following considerations. 
 
Figure 3.1. Average Ait dynamics by group of countries, 2011-16. 
 
 
As to timing, almost all the countries in my dataset took the austerity stance 
in 2011 which peaked in 2012. The adoption of these fiscal adjustments was in 
part due to the 2010 generalized partial recovery that followed the massive 
fiscal stimuli of 2009; it was, however, a short-lived spring followed by further 
slowdown in the subsequent years. Nonetheless austerity was continued after 
2012, though at a declining pace which petered out in 2014-15. Looking at 
groups of countries, it is worth noting that the EZ and the NoEZ groups enacted 
roughly the same average amount of austerity in 2011 (1.20% and 0.72%), but 
they followed a slightly different time path: the EZ group shows a "front-
loading" pattern peaking in 2011-2012, whereas the NoEZ group displays a 
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smoother pattern with austerity between 2012 and 2013 which was abruptly 
reversed in 2014. 
Nevertheless, there are other interesting differences within the groups. In the 
EZ group, the austerity turn was largely driven by the most financially 
distressed group (EZ5, and notably Greece and Portugal) averaging around 
3.19% of GDP in 2011. The EZ7 group (0.52% in 2011) of the more fiscally sound 
countries followed a smoother path. Therefore, large and "front-loaded" 
austerity within the Eurozone has been concentrated in the EZ5 countries. 
 
Table 3.1. Means, standard deviations, and the coefficients of variation of Ait for 
groups of countries, 2011-16. 
Group EZ NoEZ EZ5 EZ7 
Mean 0.61% 0.46% 1.35% 0.27% 
SD 0.63% 1.25% 1.86% 0.57% 
CV 2.06 2.73 1.37 2.07 
 
Table 3.1 reports the means, the standard deviations (SD), and the coefficient 
of variation (CV) of Ait for each group in order to quantify the heterogeneity of 
policies. By looking at the coefficient of variation, i.e. the ratio between the 
standard deviation and the mean, heterogeneity appears not surprisingly lower 
in the EZ group, where each government may pursue a fully independent policy, 
and higher in the NoEZ group, where governments share the same fiscal 
regulations. Nonetheless, it is true that the differences within the group are 
between the five countries under either financial or economic assistance on the 
one hand, and those under no external treatment on the other. In fact, the EZ5 
group is characterised by a lower coefficient of variation than the EZ7 group, 
thus underlying that the first has experienced less variability in the 
implementation of the austerity programmes than the latter. 
To complete this first overview of the data with the intensity of austerity, it 
should be considered that austerity is usually viewed as a medium-term policy. 
Hence, I also take into consideration an additional indicator, the cumulated 
austerity from 2011 to 2016, that is: 
(3.2) 𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑡
2016
𝑡=2011   
This indicator represents the overall intensity of the successive austerity 
injections whether front- or back-loaded. 26 countries have cumulated a fiscal 
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restriction from 2011 to 2016 (CAit > 0 ― see Figure 3.2). Only Sweden and 
Finland have cumulated a zero or negative fiscal adjustment. Moreover, for 22 
countries, CAit has been larger than 1%, and the EZ group has been more 
restrictive than the NoEZ group (2.98% and 2.08% respectively). Yet it is 
already known that the most severe restrictions have been realized in the EZ5 
group (7.85% on average, which includes the countries on the top of the list: 
Greece 12.86%, Portugal 7.74%, Ireland 7.5%, Cyprus 6.40%, and Spain 4.49%). 
This is equivalent to say that the average EZ5 country has cut its STPB at a 
year pace of about 2% of GDP for four years. Among the other EZ countries, one 
case stands out: Slovakia, involved in a debt crisis and asked to adopt large 
fiscal consolidations. 
The EZ7 group, instead, has cumulated substantially less austerity (1.59%, 
with France, however, reaching 2.81% and Netherlands 3.47%). Within the 
NoEZ group there are no significant differences on average, but it is worth 
pointing out a few exceptions of countries with CAit well above the average like 
Croatia (5.75%), Czech Republic (4.15%), and Poland (4.98%). 
 
Figure 3.2. CAit indicators by country over the period 2011-16. 
 
 
In the light of this first overview of the data, I may draw two conclusions. First, 
the "Euro dummy" per se does appear important, but austerity has been "freely" 
pursued across the whole European area. Are there common cogent reasons or 
maybe that austerity has been perceived, or advertised, as the right policy for 
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the aftermath of the crisis throughout the developed Western countries (see e.g. 
Blyth, 2013)? Second, austerity has been implemented and then relaxed in 
different ways as to its timing and overall intensity. This holds true especially 
among EZ countries, despite their being subject to the same rules and to 
common surveillance institutions. As argued by EC officials, diversification and 
flexibility have in fact been actively pursued in application of the recent 
modifications of the relevant fiscal rules (Buti and Carnot, 2013, p. 3). 
Under all dimensions, austerity has been most severely enacted in the EZ5 
group under the worst public finance distress, which clearly stands out as the 
epicentre of the European austerity. On the one hand, this evidence may appear 
justified by their financial threats; on the other hand, one may wonder why 
almost all other countries were also pushed into austerity to a non-negligible 
extent. Thus, I would qualify the EZ experience as one of "uncoordinated 
austerity", which may have created unfavourable conditions for the countries 
facing stronger pressure for fiscal consolidation.10  
In historical perspective, the presented figures depict a unique sequence of 
large, simultaneous fiscal restrictions across the whole Western and Eastern 
Europe. However, significant differences have also emerged, and it is therefore 
important to try to characterize them. Therefore, a deeper analysis is required 
to find out what has driven the adoption of austerity measures between 2011 
and 2016. 
 
3. IN SEARCH OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
In search of explanatory variables of Ait, I have sorted out four groups that can 
be found, whether positively or normatively, in the literature.  
The first relates to "fiscal consolidation" and includes public deficits and debt 
stocks, two variables that are commonly adopted for fiscal sustainability 
analyses. The relationship between budget policy and sustainability is the main 
purpose of the estimation of the so-called "fiscal reaction functions" (FRFs 
                                                          
10 On the problem of uncoordinated fiscal adjustment plans in the Eurozone, see Tamborini 
(2013), Berti et al. (2013), in't Veld (2013). 
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henceforth) introduced by the seminal works of Bohn (1995, 1998).11 For 
instance, Afonso and Jelles (2011) employ FRFs in a set of OECD countries 
showing that primary balances have been increased to deal with the raise in 
public debt levels. This result is in line with Berti et al. (2016), who shows that 
most of the European countries included in their analysis positively adjusted 
their fiscal balances to rising levels of public debt, though with great 
variability,12 and with Gosh et al. (2013), who shows evidence of fiscal fatigue 
within a set of 23 advanced countries.13 Another application is provided by 
D’Erasmo et al. (2016), who adopts, among other techniques, FRFs to assess 
debt sustainability in USA and Europe, rising some concern about fiscal 
sustainability, while Legrenzi and Milas (2013) find clear evidence of fiscal 
fatigue for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In addition, it seems that all 
countries adjusted fiscal imbalances only in the higher debt regime. 
In contrast with these findings, more recent works have found that the fiscal 
fatigue hypothesis may not hold or may not hold for all countries (see, among 
others, Checherita-Westphal and Žďárek, 2017; Everaert and Jansen, 2017; 
Weichenrieder and Zimmer, 2014), thus casting some doubts on the validity of 
the previous results.  
The second group relate to "market discipline", which includes the interest 
rate spread and the sovereign bond rating. Indeed, yield spreads and credit 
ratings are commonly considered as procyclical devices that can incentivise the 
adoption of sound fiscal policies. However, departures from this idea have been 
found in the literature: Zuccardi (2015), for instance, observes that, within the 
Eurozone, the relationship of spreads with the economic fundamentals (fiscal 
                                                          
11 Bohn (1995, 1998) introduced the analysis of the response of primary balance to changes in 
the public debt caused by economic shocks. According to Proposition 1 in Bohn (2008), the basic 
FRF equation consists of the following linear relationship between the two variables: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝜌 ∙ 𝑑
∗
𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑠𝑡 is the primary balance of period t as a fraction of GDP, 𝜌 is a constant, 𝑑
∗
𝑡 is the initial 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and 𝜀𝑡 is a composite of other determinants. If 𝜀𝑡 is bounded as a share of 
GDP and the present value of GDP is finite, then 𝜌 > 0 satisfies the economy’s intertemporal 
budget constraint and the no-Ponzi game condition, thus indicating fiscal sustainability.  
12 This fact, as the authors suggest, highlights the advantages of estimating country-specific 
FRFs.  
13 According to Gosh (2013), fiscal fatigue is the situation in which the increase in public debt 
is not compensated by an equivalent growth in the primary balance. 
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balance, public debt, and GDP growth rate) is weaker than in other areas, a fact 
that is also recognised by Ullrich (2006) who claims that "the confidence that 
financial markets are able to discipline the debt behaviour of governments is 
not very high" and that "the EU's Stability and Growth Pact has replaced 
market discipline". In the same line, Favero and Missale (2012) justify the 
issuing of Eurobonds on the basis of the fact that the role played by the 
government bond spreads on domestic bonds as a fiscal discipline device is 
weakened when contagion effects and market irrationality are more relevant 
than the fiscal fundamentals of the countries. All in all, the role of government 
bond spreads and credit ratings as discipline devices seem week for the EZ 
countries, but they may have played a role for the adoption and the intensity of 
the austerity policies between 2011 and 2016. 
The third group, EZ "fiscal discipline", comprises, beyond the EZ membership, 
the excessive deficit procedures and the public finance forecasts of the EC. 
These variables capture the actions of the EC in its role to safeguard sound 
public finances within the framework devised by the EU's Stability and Growth 
Pact, and the macroeconomic forecasts that the EC makes available for the EU 
and its member countries concerning the STPB. The excessive deficit procedure 
and the Stability and Growth Pact have attracted much attention in the 
literature ― into which I do not enter ― aiming at assessing their impact and 
evaluating the possible alternatives (see, for instance, Eichengreen, 1997; Artis 
and Winkler, 1998; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2004; Giudice and Buti, 2017).  
Finally, the fourth and last group, "macroeconomic stabilisation", includes the 
GDP growth rate, the output gap, and the unemployment rate as 
counterbalancing factors derived from the literature about countercyclical 
macroeconomics policies (see, among others, Gordon and Leeper, 2005; N'Diaye, 
2009) and from the debate about the macroeconomic stabilisation (see, among 
others, Cooper and Kempf, 2000; Tamborini, 2003; Agénor and Montiel, 2015).  
Hence, for each country, I will denote with 
• DEFit: the current (year t) total deficit-to-GDP ratio of country i; given the 
3% ceiling of the deficit-to-GDP ratio, the variable of interest is EDEFit = 
(DEFit − 3%), used by the EC; 
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• Dit: the current gross debt-to-GDP ratio, whose growth rate is indicated by 
gDit; 
• Sit: the current year average of monthly spreads of long-term government 
bonds relative to German bonds14. The first difference will be indicated with 
dSit; 
• RAit: the average Standard and Poor’s rating of government bonds. The first 
difference will be indicated with dRAit. 
• Euroit: a dummy variable for the Eurozone membership; 
• EDPit: a dummy variable for the presence of an Excessive Deficit Procedure; 
• FFit|t-1: the EC average fiscal forecast in period t-1 of the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance of period t15; 
• OGit: the current output gap; 
• gYit: the current real GDP growth rate; 
• URit: the current unemployment rate. The first difference will be indicated 
with dURit. 
 
Data sources and employed variables are described in detail in the Data 
Appendix at the end of this chapter.  
Since the aim of this analysis is to extract austerity drivers from the data, and 
at the same time ascertain their explanatory role of differences in austerity, the 
empirical methodology develops in two steps. First, I will run a statistical 
correlation analysis for each explanatory variable and for each group of 
countries. Then, I will present the results of a panel dynamic estimation with 
austerity as the dependent variable and by adopting the Principal Component 
Factor Analysis for the independent variables. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Ratings are translated from letters to numbers between 0 and 1. See the Data Appendix for 
further details. 
15 See below Section 4.4 for further details. 
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4. STEP 1: CORRELATION ANALYSIS. 
WHAT EXPLAINS DIFFERENCES IN AUSTERITY? 
 
In the following, each explanatory variable is analysed individually, and two 
indicators are presented: the interpolation function and the R2 statistics. These 
indicators are sufficient for my purpose, that is to quantify 1) the correlation 
between the austerity indicator and the explanatory variable to justify the 
subsequent analysis, and 2) how much of within-group differences in Ait are 
explained by differences in the explanatory variable. At the same time, by 
comparing the results across groups, I can gain insight where each explanatory 
variable has exerted its effect more significantly.  
 
4.1. Fiscal consolidation: public deficits and debts 
In the first place, let me examine the evolution of the deficit-to-GDP ratios.  
 
Figure 3.3. Deficit-to-GDP ratios, groups of countries, 2010-16. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 reports the dynamics of the deficit-to-GDP ratio for each group of 
countries from 2010 to 2016. As austerity has been a generalized policy, so all 
countries have progressively brought their deficit-to-GDP ratio under control. 
In the EZ group, the average indicator has fallen from 6.83% to 0.83% in 2016. 
While in 2010 all EZ countries (except Finland, Malta, and Luxembourg) were 
above the 3% ceiling, in 2016 only two (France and Spain) were above that 
threshold. Interestingly, even countries with no formal deficit-to-GDP target 
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have moved in tandem with the EZ group: the average NoEZ deficit has been 
cut from 4.96% to 1.16% in 2016, though the UK and Romania still have deficits 
three times larger than the average. 
In order to examine the effect of previous deficits on austerity, or the "budget 
smoothing principle", I investigate two hypotheses. The first is that deficits are 
promptly corrected year by year. The second is that the adjustment takes a 
medium-term perspective.  
The two panels of Figure 3.4 display the correlation graphs of Ait vis-à-vis 
EDEFit-1 for the EZ and the NoEZ groups. Both present a negative correlation 
(though very weak for the NoEZ group), which is consistent with the budget-
smoothing principle. This principle, however, has been applied with different 
strength in different countries and groups. As a matter of fact, the NoEZ 
countries’ austerity measures appear largely disconnected from their deficits. 
On the other hand, the EZ countries display a stricter correlation between their 
respective austerity measures and deficits, as one may expect given the fiscal 
rules of the EMU.  
Interestingly, the best interpolation functions are quadratic and concave to 
the origin (even with the exclusion of the single outlier referred to Ireland in 
panel (a) of Figure 3.4). This pattern indicates that the restrictive fiscal 
consolidations have been decreasingly correlated to the deficit’s dimension. This 
evidence supports the so-called "fiscal fatigue" hypothesis that I have 
introduced in Section 3, according to which the government reactiveness 
decreases as the required adjustment grows (in fact, it should be observed a 
convex function). Moreover, as can be seen from the correlation graph, there are 
significant differences within the EZ group. Actually, in the EZ7, Ait is not 
strongly correlated with deficits, and differences in deficits explain a small 
amount of differences in Ait. The bulk of the correlation between Ait and deficits 
― and its concavity ― in the EZ group is due to the EZ5 countries, which may 
not be a surprise given their worse public finances and the "Troika" treatment 
for three of them.  
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Figure 3.4. Correlation between Ait and deficit-to-GDP ratios. 
EZ (panel a) and NoEZ (panel b) groups, 2011-16. 
(a) EZ5 (black) and other EZ countries (grey) 
 
(b) 
 
 
The second hypothesis is that budget smoothing has taken place over the 
whole period 2008-2016, in particular that the cumulated austerity 2010-2016 
has been activated to rebalance progressively the expansions of 2008-09. Since 
the STPB data are not available for 2008-09, I have adopted the CAPB-based 
measure of austerity, A'it, obtaining CA'i08-09 = A'i08+A'i09. The result is negative 
for most of countries, indicating a cumulated fiscal stimulus in response to the 
Great Recession. The same calculation for the years 2010-16 yields the 
subsequent cumulated fiscal adjustment CA'i10-16. The result is consistent with 
the analogous STPB-based indicator presented in Figure 3.2, i.e. positive for 
almost all countries. With these data, two evaluations can be made in terms of 
the budget smoothing principle. 
 105 
 
The first concerns the net overall entity of the fiscal manoeuvres, i.e. NFA'i08-
16 = CA'i08-09 + CA'i10-16. Budget smoothing would imply NFA'i08-16 ≈ 0, whereas 
NFA'i08-16 > 0 indicates over-adjustment, i.e. cumulated austerity in 2010-16 
exceeding the initial cumulated stimulus, and vice versa NFA'i08-16 < 0. 
 
Figure 3.5. NFA indicator over the period 2008-2016, groups of countries. 
 
 
From Figure 3.5, it is possible to discover essential differences among the 
groups of countries: whereas both the NoEZ group (1.60%) and the EZ group 
(1.96%) have slightly over-adjusted, the higher NFA indicator for the EZ group 
can be explained by looking at the EZ5 countries, which have largely over-
adjusted by a cumulated 3.35% of GDP, whereas the EZ7 countries have 
remained in line with budget smoothing (-0.21%). These data shed further light 
on a result that underlying the strong and prolonged austerity that Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal have experienced.  
A second evaluation of these data can be offered by correlation analysis 
between CA'i08-09 and CA'i10-16. Under budget smoothing, CA'i08-09 < 0 should 
trigger CA'i10-16 > 0 by almost equal amount tracing a correlation line with 
negative unit coefficient. As Figure 3.6 shows, the sign of the relationship across 
countries is consistent with this principle, but statistically the differences in 
initial fiscal stimuli provide a limited account (about 34%) of differences in 
subsequent cumulated austerity. 
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Figure 3.6. Correlation between CFA08-09 and CFA10-16, all countries. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Debt-to-GDP ratios, groups of countries, 2010-16. 
 
 
The other key variable for fiscal consolidation is the evolution of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. As depicted in Figure 3.7, on this front the austerity effects have 
been poorer than in the case of deficits in all groups of countries. Starting from 
2010, debt-to-GDP ratios have consistently been rising everywhere. The EZ and 
NoEZ groups have followed very similar paths, but it should be noted that the 
EZ includes the strongest debt accumulators, that is EZ5 (in particular, Greece). 
For this group of countries, a considerable decrease in the average debt-to-GDP 
ratio can be observed starting from 2014, but this tendency has reversed again 
in 2016. 
In spite of the increasing policy pressure on public debt consolidation, its 
evolution does not seem to provide much information about fiscal adjustments. 
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Figure 3.8. Correlation between Ait and the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
EZ (panel a) and NoEZ (panel b) groups, 2011-16. 
(a) EZ5 countries (black) and other EZ countries (grey) 
 
(b) 
 
 
Consider Figure 3.8. On the one hand, larger Ait are associated with larger 
variations in the debt-to-GDP ratios, but in both the EZ group (12.74%) and 
NoEZ group (11.25%) the correlation is very weak, and differences in gDit 
account for a thin fraction of differences in Ait. On the other hand, for the EZ5 
group only, the R2 does reach 36.35%, in line with the idea that most severe 
fiscal adjustments in these countries have been dictated by debt crises. 
Moreover, the EZ5 group itself ― particularly Greece and Ireland ― 
contributes to the largest dispersion of Ait vis-à-vis debt-to-GDP growth rates, 
and this fact may have different explanations. One may be that the Ait in the 
EZ5 group have characterised by large over-reactions with respect to the entity 
of these countries’ debt-to-GDP growth rates relative to those of the others. A 
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reason may be that the governments, and the EMU authorities, have been 
caught by surprise by the violence of the debt crisis in the transition from fiscal 
rules almost entirely focused on current deficits rather than to medium-term 
debt control. Or, otherwise, that for most countries the fiscal adjustment 
required by curbing the evolution of debt was deemed unsustainable.16 
 
4.2. Market discipline: government bonds, ratings and 
spreads 
After the outbreak of the Greek crisis, "market discipline", exerted by means of 
widening sovereign risk premia, has been a predominant concern for most 
governments. It is therefore reasonable to consider the evolution of risk premia 
as a major driver of austerity policies. 
 
Figure 3.9. Year average of monthly spreads of yields of government long-term bonds, 
groups of countries. 
 
 
Risk premia are usually measured as the spread Sit of a specific interest rate 
over the benchmark interest rate. In this context, the benchmark is the yield 
rate of the German ten-year government bond17. As shown in Figure 3.9, the 
surge of spreads has been confined within the EZ group; outside the Eurozone, 
                                                          
16 This hypothesis has been tested by Passamani et al. (2015). 
17 As described in the Data Appendix at the end of this chapter, the spread is obtained from 
the yield on the government bonds denominated in national currency, and it inevitably reflects 
the expected depreciation of the domestic currency of the NoEZ countries against the euro. Even 
so, it captures the sovereign risk premia (and thus the market pressure) to which the 
government is expected to react and is suitable for the purposes of the current analysis. 
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only a few European countries have recorded spreads above say 300 basis points 
(remarkably Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania), a fact that De Grauwe and Ji 
(2012) ascribe to the "Euro dummy". However, the truly dramatic escalation of 
spreads has occurred within the EZ5 group of countries under public debt 
attack, and in particular in Greece, the absolute outlier reaching 13.1% in 2011 
and 21% in 2012. The EZ7 group (Germany excluded) show a limited impact of 
spreads, whereas higher average spread of the EZ group is mainly due to EZ5 
and a few cases such as Estonia and Slovakia.  
 
Figure 3.10. Correlation between Ait and spreads, 2011-16. 
EZ5 countries without Greece (black), Greece and the interpolation function of 
EZ5 countries with Greece (dark grey), and other EZ countries (light grey), 
 
 
Consistently with this picture, the correlation analysis in Figure 3.10 shows a 
co-movement of Ait with spreads, particularly for the EZ5 countries. For these 
countries, the best interpolation function is quadratic with differences in 
spreads being associated with 43.36% of differences in Ait, against the 34.56% 
of the NoEZ countries. The convexity of the interpolation function suggests the 
presence of fiscal fatigue, that is decreasing correlation of Ait with spreads as 
the latter increases above a certain level (about 5%).  
Since Greece is a large outlier, and has undergone debt restructuring and 
forced fiscal consolidation, it may be interesting to restrict the analysis to the 
remaining four countries. In fact, the explanatory power of their spreads 
improves (46.45%) whereas the fiscal fatigue effect is weaker. It should be noted 
that, if R2 indicators should be taken at face value, spreads so far provide the 
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highest explanatory power of differences in Ait together with deficit-to-GDP 
ratios. To some extent, this finding may also explain the poor explanatory power 
of the debt-to-GDP growth rates in that the latter have actually affected fiscal 
policies, not so much through formal rules, but in force of the market discipline 
of risk premia. This hypothesis, however, leaves the question open whether risk 
premia have in turn been driven by correct fiscal fundamentals or by other non-
fundamental or irrational factors. 
 
Figure 3.11. Correlation between Ait and S&P ratings 2011-16, EZ countries. 
 
 
Spreads go hand in hand with another variable in my dataset: government 
bond ratings. I have employed the annual weighted average of the Standard 
and Poor’s ratings, converted into numbers between 0 and 1 so that the highest 
rating (AAA) corresponded to the highest value (1), and the lowest rating (D - 
default) corresponded to the lowest value (0). Ratings, as spreads, capture the 
market pressure on sovereign yields: the negative correlation between the two 
variables (-0.26) states that the higher the rating, the lower the spread. This 
fact reflects into the negative relationship between Ait and ratings for EZ 
countries depicted in Figure 3.11, which has the opposite sign of the 
relationship shown in Figure 3.10. Nevertheless, ratings account for a lower 
amount of austerity (14.65%) than spreads, in line with the fact that ratings 
usually include other elements that affect solvency, beyond the risk premia. 
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4.3. Fiscal discipline 
As mentioned above, the European Commission has the task and the 
responsibility to monitor the application of the Preventive Arm included in the 
Stability and Growth Pact, a set of rules that, according to the website of 
European Commission itself, aim to "prevent fiscal policies from heading in 
potentially problematic directions" and "to correct excessive budget deficits or 
excessive public debt burdens".18 Whenever a member State breaches the 
deficit threshold of 3% of GDP, or is going to breach it, or has a public debt level 
above 60% of GDP that is not diminishing at a satisfactory pace19, the EC can 
first send an Early Warning and then it can open an Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP). Early Warnings are recommendations that the European Commission 
can send to a country when a deviation from the established objectives is 
detected. It gives the authorities the opportunity to take corrective actions in 
advance. If actions are not taken or are insufficient to reverse the situation, a 
formal EDP is opened. In particular, the Commission imposes a sanction to the 
member State ― a non-interest-bearing deposits in percentage of the GDP ― 
and sets a deadline within which the government should take appropriate 
actions. Once the deadline has passed, the Commission and the Council assess 
the actions taken, and they can either stop it if they are enough, or they can 
speed them up if the member State has not done enough. In case of exceptional 
conditions, the country can ask for an extension of the deadline. Finally, when 
the excessive deficit is corrected in a "durable manner", the non-interest-
bearing deposits are returned to the member States and the EDP is abrogated. 
In order to account for this circumstance, I have introduced a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 from the year of the EDP opening to the year of its abrogation. 
According to the European Commission website, only three States have an 
                                                          
18 See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-
economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact/applying-
rules-stability-and-growth-pact_en 
19 This means that the gap between a country’s debt level and the 60% threshold needs to be 
reduced by 1/20th annually (on average over a perio d of three years). 
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ongoing EDP in 2017 (Spain, France, and the United Kingdom), but between 
2009 and 2014 almost every country in my dataset has experienced such a 
procedure (the only exceptions are Sweden and Estonia). Of course, EDPs might 
have a positive impact on austerity, and Figure 3.12 sustains this hypothesis.  
 
Figure 3.12. Distributions for Ait over the period 2011-2016. 
EPD=0 (panel a) and EDP=1 (panel b) 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
A second variable that I have considered whereby the EZ governments can 
perceive pressure for fiscal adjustment is the forecast by the EC of the ongoing 
evolution of their budget. In Spring and Autumn each year the EC releases 
forecasts on the main budget items relevant to the EDP. Suppose that forecasts 
predict a deterioration of the budget deficit, hence the government may 
Ait 
Ait 
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implement a correction in order to prevent the EDP.20 Therefore, I have 
constructed the following fiscal forecast variable:  
(3.3) 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡|𝑡−1 = (
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖𝑡|𝑡−1
− (
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖𝑡−1
 
where (
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖𝑡|𝑡−1
 is obtained from the average of the two EC forecasts 
presented in Spring and Autumn. For some years/countries, the STPB is not 
available and is replaced by the CAPB. Recall that 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖𝑡
− (
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖𝑡−1
, 
i.e. the actual fiscal adjustment between t and t-1. Hence if Ait is conditioned by 
FFit|t-1 as explained above, a negative correlation between the two variables 
should be expected. Figure 3.13, however, shows neither a strong correlation 
nor the expected sign. The positive sign of the correlation may suggest a good 
fit of the forecasts, but it also suggests that the governments are insensitive to 
them.21  
Figure 3.13. Correlation between Ait and FFit|t-1. 
 
 
Finally, I consider an "Euro dummy", a dummy variable that captures the 
effect of being (Euro = 1) or not being (Euro = 0) part of the Eurozone. 
 
 
                                                          
20 The most recent literature argues that in measuring the effect of ﬁscal policy on other 
macroeconomic aggregates, most researchers do not take into account the effects on the same 
aggregates due to potential news anticipating future ﬁscal actions (e.g. Leeper et al. 2013, 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, Fragetta and Tamborini 2017). The same principle may 
then be extened to governments themselves. 
21 Paradoxically, if governments were sensitive to forecats, these would appear poor ex-post. 
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4.4. Macroeconomic stabilisation 
To complete the analysis, let me now turn to the factor that may countervail 
the other pressures towards austerity, namely the cyclical position of the 
economy. Though central to modern macroeconomics, the measurement of the 
business cycle remains difficult and controversial. I consider here two basic 
measures. The first is simply the year growth rate of GDP (gYit) this measure 
can be justified for being simple, "objective", widely adopted and, therefore, of 
direct concern of governments as they should decide their policies. The other 
measure is the official output gap (OGit). Though controversial as to their 
measurement, official output gaps, inherited from the theoretical framework of 
New Keynesian Macroeconomics, are meant to capture the deviations of GDP 
from its potential level. In that framework, potential output is dictated by 
structural supply-side factors (such as factor endowments, technology, and 
relative prices), whereas output gaps are mostly driven by aggregate demand 
factors. Output gaps are therefore used as indicators of the need for active 
stabilisation policies on the demand side.22 However, they are non-observable 
directly, and have more a "normative" content, hence one may expect that fiscal 
policy decisions are less connected with them than with actual GDP 
fluctuations. 
To begin with, Figure 3.14 recalls the evolution of the two business cycle 
indicators. As regards GDP fluctuations, all groups of countries show a similar 
pattern. The recession of 2008-09 was followed by rather sustained recovery in 
2010. Alas, the latter was short-lived and was followed by either stagnation or 
a "double dip" recession altogether.  
There are, however, notable quantitative differences across groups. The 
impact on the EZ and NoEZ groups was of equal and intermediate intensity. 
The GDP paths of the early Euro-members begun to diverge afterwards, when 
also their fiscal policies became divergent. Indeed, the EZ5 group has been the 
                                                          
22 It is important to recall this basic notion because a widespread narrative on austerity blurs 
this distinction and tends to convey the idea, inherited from the neoclassical Real Business 
Cycle theory, that low or falling GDP is always and exclusively a supply-side structural problem 
about which little can be done from the demand side. 
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worst GDP performer since 2010, whereas the fall is relatively small for the EZ7 
group. 
As regards output gaps, on average all groups have been able to close negative 
output gaps (very low before 2014) with the exception of EZ5 countries. This 
indicates a global lack of aggregate demand stabilisation (also confirmed by low, 
and tendentially decreasing, inflation rates). The epicentre of this phenomenon 
is again in the EZ5 group. 
 
Figure 3.14. Year rate of change of GDP (panel a) and official output gap (panel b), 
2011-16, groups of countries. 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 
How do austerity policies correlate with the two measures of business cycle? 
In the first place, Figure 3.15 provides the correlation graphs between Ait and 
gYit and between Ait and OGit for the EZ and the NoEZ groups of countries 
separately.  
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Figure 3.15. Correlation graphs between Ait and gYit and OGit, 2011-16. 
EZ (panel a) and NoEZ (panel b) groups 
(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
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Overall, the correlation sign is negative, but most of all the R2 indicator is 
rather limited. These data suggest that differences in Ait have occurred with 
little connection with the business cycle, though the negative correlation sign 
indicates a tendency to procyclicality, that is, the association of fiscal 
restrictions (Ait>0) with recessions (gYit<0) and negative output gaps23 (OGit<0) 
(90 observations out of 168). Hence, though correlation is not causation, it is 
possible to say that austerity has been procyclical in 53.6% of cases, in the sense 
that it occurred in negative cyclical conditions. 
It is also possible to notice that the interpolation function of Ait with gYit for 
EZ countries, and the interpolation function of Ait with OGit for NoEZ countries 
are quadratic and convex to the origin. The countries entrapped in the south-
west region below the curve are France, Italy and Spain in various years.  
Furthermore, it is worth considering this evidence in greater detail (see the 
group frequency data of procyclical occurrences of fiscal restrictions in Table 
3.2). Of the global 168 Ait observations, 110 (65.5%) are restrictions, Ait > 0. Of 
these, 29.1% are concomitant with gYit < 0, and 52.7% with OGit < 0. Hence, 
globally, fiscal restrictions have been realized during actual recessions in a 
minority of cases, whereas the signal given by output gaps has been 
systematically ignored. However, this global result covers sharp differences 
across groups with regard to the actual GDP. The frequency of fiscal restrictions 
has been slightly lower in the EZ group (64.9%) than in the NoEZ group (66.7%). 
                                                          
23 Negative output gaps do not necessarily indicate a recession, but they are nonetheless official 
indicators of cyclical downturn. 
R² = 0,0943
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Though the frequency of fiscal restrictions of the EZ7 group (66.7%) is equal to 
the EZ5 group (66.7%), it is possible to claim that in the EZ5 group, more than 
elsewhere, austerity has been pursued ignoring the business cycle almost 
totally: 65.0% percent of observations has been concomitant with gYit < 0, and 
95.0% of observations has been concomitant with OGit < 0. 
 
Table 3.2. Group frequency of procyclical occurrences of Ait. 
 # observations 
Ait > 0 
of which 
concomitant 
with (%): 
gYit < 0 OGit < 0 
All data 65.5%  29.1% 52.7% 
EZ 64.9%  19.3% 53.5% 
NoEZ 66.7%  27.8% 80.6% 
EZ5 66.7%  65.0% 95.0% 
EZ7 66.7%  17.9% 85.7% 
 
A last variable that I consider in this analysis is the unemployment rate (URit). 
Commonly employed in the FRF literature, unemployment is one of the main 
concerns for governments, and policies are usually adjusted according to its 
level. Unemployment can also be an indicator of the business cycle; in my 
dataset is negative correlated both with the output gap (-0.71) and the GDP 
growth rate (-0.25).  
 
Figure 3.16. Correlation graphs between Ait and dURit, 
EZ (panel a) and NoEZ (panel b) groups. 
(a) 
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(b) 
 
 
Figure 3.16 depicts the correlation between Ait and the differences in the 
unemployment rate (dURit) for the EZ and the NoEZ group: the R2 is higher for 
the EZ group than for the NoEZ group but, overall, the relationship is weak. 
In conclusion, the available data deliver a fuzzy picture. Some evidence can be 
found that austerity has to some extent been driven by compliance with EMU 
rules ― in particular, the deficit rule ― as well as by market discipline. In the 
majority of cases, austerity policies have been procyclical; some countries have 
afforded some cyclical sensitivity of austerity, others have not. Yet no 
systematic patterns emerge. For instance, not all countries overreacting to 
excess deficits, or being cycle insensitive, are also high debt countries or high 
spread countries, as one might expect. 
Overall, differences in austerity seem rather erratic, or perhaps determined 
by specific local factors not considered here, possibly introduced into the 
bilateral negotiations of governments with the European Commission. 
Tailoring fiscal policy to local conditions may be sensible, but what is the 
rationale for advertising strict, non-discretionary, common rules in the EMU? 
If it is to provide a yardstick for coordination and equity, the result seems rather 
poor. 
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5. DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. Methodology 
In order to estimate the impact of the four sets of variables on austerity, the 
chosen estimator is the Dynamic Common Correlated Effects (DCCE) 
introduced by Pesaran (2006) and developed by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) that 
allows to analyse a panel model by considering a dynamic approach, 
heterogeneous slopes, forms of cross-correlation between the explanatory 
variables (i.e.  cross-sectional dependence), and small-sample corrections. Given 
the dependent variable, the austerity measure 𝐴𝑖𝑡, the econometric model can 
be written as: 
(3.4) 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑡−1+𝛽𝑖
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾
′
𝑖𝑓𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 is the number of panel units and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 is the number of 
time periods, 𝛼𝑖 is a N-dimensional vector of intercepts, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a (NT×K) matrix 
of K general explanatory variables, 𝛽𝑖 is a (N×K) matrix of heterogeneous panel 
coefficient, 𝑓𝑡 is an unobserved common factor and 𝛾𝑖 is a heterogeneous factor 
loading. In this specific case, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the eight explanatory variables 
introduced in the previous section. The model in equation (3.4) is then estimated 
through: 
(3.5) 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖𝐴𝑖𝑡−1+𝛽𝑖
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿
′
𝑖,𝑘?̅?𝑡−𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=0 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 ?̅?𝑡 = (?̅?𝑡, ?̅?𝑡−1, ?̅?𝑡) 
with the bar indicating the cross-sectional means and 𝑝 = √𝑇
3
, as suggested by 
Chudik and Pesaran (2015). In fact, the cross-sectional averages of the 
dependent and independent variables included in ?̅?𝑡 allows to approximate a 
limited number of strong factors affecting all the panel units and an infinite 
number of weak factors affecting a subset of the panel units. The mean-group 
panel estimations are then computed as a simple mean of the heterogenous 
estimations: 
(3.6) ?̂?𝑀𝐺 =
1
𝑁
∑ ?̂?𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  
where ?̂?𝑖 = (𝜆?̂?, 𝛽?̂?). 
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The version of the DCCE estimator that I adopt here is, however, its pooled 
version with 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽 ∀𝑖, the so-called Pooled Dynamic Common Correlated 
Effects estimator (PCCE). This choice does not allow me to consider the slope-
heterogeneity that the literature on FRFs suggests but, due to the not-so-large 
number of temporal observations, DCCE (which requires 𝑇 → ∞) cannot be 
properly applied. Moreover, as a robust analysis, I also estimate the 
econometric models by adopting the fixed effects estimator. Nevertheless, it 
must be stressed that the limited number of observations is the result of the 
choice to study and to focus the attention on the austerity period, undoubtedly 
began in 2010.  
Furthermore, in order to reduce the number of explanatory variables, I 
summarise their joint behaviour by exploiting the correlations between them. 
The methodology is called Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCFA), and it 
allows for the extraction of meaningful linear combinations by decomposing the 
correlation matrix of a set of observed variables that may jointly explain a 
certain phenomenon and provides the so-called common factors and the 
corresponding factor loadings. The common factors are in fact latent variables 
which are described through their relationship with the variables of interest, 
while the factor loadings show the weight of each variable in explaining the 
factors. In details, given the observation on the j-th variable relative to the i-th 
unit, 𝑦𝑖𝑗, the common factors 𝑧𝑖𝑞 relative to the same i-th unit contribute to 
explain it through the following relationship:  
(3.7) 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖1𝜆1𝑗 + 𝑧𝑖2𝜆2𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝑧𝑖𝑞𝜆𝑞𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 
where 𝜆𝑖𝑗 is the factor loading and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is a unique factor proper of the j-th 
variable. The appropriate number q of unobserved factors, necessarily smaller 
than the number of observed variables, depends on their observed correlations, 
and can be chosen either on the basis of the eigenvalues obtained from the 
decomposition of the correlation matrix, or on the basis of the percentage of 
explained variance.  
In summary, the applied methodology consists of two steps: the application of 
PCFA to extract some meaningful indicators from the considered variables of 
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the dataset, thus reducing their number, and the estimation of a panel model 
with the PCCE estimator.24 
 
5.2. Estimation results 
The first step consists in the implementation of the PCFA, that aims to reduce 
the number of explanatory variables and to summarise the behaviour of each 
set of variables in one common factor. This procedure has been applied to all 
groups with the only exclusion of the "fiscal discipline" group, which include one 
continuous variable (the austerity EC forecast − FFit|t-1) and two dummy 
variables (one for Eurozone membership and one for the EDPs) that cannot be 
appropriately included within a factor. While the effects of the latter variables 
will be studied separately, FFit|t-1 has not been considered given the limited 
number of observations, the fact that FFit|t-1 was not helpful to explain Ait in 
the previous statistical correlation analysis, and that this variable may not be 
exogenous if the fiscal correction is anticipated. 
With the only exceptions of the dummy variables, all the considered variables 
have been differentiated or expressed in terms of growth rates to guarantee 
stationarity, and then standardised in order to compare their estimated 
coefficients. PCFA is justified by their correlation structure: as shown in Table 
A2, A3, and A4 in Appendix, the absolute values of the correlation coefficients 
are around or above 0.5. The only exception is the correlation between the 
growth rate of the public debt and EDEFit, the deviation of the public deficit 
from the 3% threshold. Nevertheless, eigenvalues definitely led to retain one 
factor for each group, and thus three stationary factors have been obtained: the 
"market discipline" factor (FMD) whose increase describes a worsening in the 
spread/rating of the country; the "macroeconomic stabilisation" factor (FMS), 
that describes the cyclical position of the economy (an increase is associated to 
either a reduction in the unemployment rate, an increase in the GDP growth 
rate, or an improvement in the output gap); and the "fiscal consolidation" factor 
(FFC), representing either an increase or a decrease in the debt and deficit of 
the country. 
                                                          
24 This two-steps methodology follows Passamani et al. (2015). 
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The second step of the analysis consists in the estimation of the dynamic panel 
model described in equation (3.5) by employing the PCCE estimator. This 
technique allows for three essential facets: small sample corrections, 
heterogenous intercepts, and corrections for the cross-sectional dependence. In 
particular, I have adopted the jackknife correction to avoid small-sample biases, 
I have allowed for heterogeneous slopes, and I have corrected the three factors 
FMD, FMS and FFC for the cross-sectional dependence arising according to the 
CD test statistics reported in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3. Pesaran (2015) panel cross-sectional dependence test, results. 
Variable Pesaran CD statistics p-value 
FMDit * 3.21 0.000 
FMSit 13.86 0.000 
FFCit 14.53 0.000 
*Germany excluded. 
 
By applying the Pesaran (2015) test25, that works well even in small panels 
and, differently from other tests, does not require variables with expected 
values equal to 0, I found that Ait and the three factors are affected by cross-
sectional dependence at the usual 5% significance level. 
Table 3.4 presents the estimations of three different specifications. 
Specification 1 includes the Euroit dummy that captures the effect of being in 
the Eurozone or of adopting the Euro. Specification 2 replaces the Euroit dummy 
and the constant with four dummy variables that represent the EZ5 group 
(EZ5it), the EZ7 group (EZ7it), the other EZ countries that are not part of EZ5 
and EZ7 (OEZit), and the NoEZ countries (NoEZit). Finally, specification 3 
excludes all the dummy variables. 
Starting with the first specification of Table 3.4, the main contribution to Ait 
is provided by Euro, whose positive and highly significant coefficient captures 
the fact that austerity has been more severe in the Eurozone, above all within 
the EZ5 countries. Likewise, recalling the correlation analysis, it is no surprise 
                                                          
25 Described as a test for weak cross-sectional dependence in Pesaran (2015). 
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that the estimated coefficient of EDP is positive and significant since it captures 
the effect of the EC adoption of an Excessive Deficit Procedure. These positive 
influences are partially offset by the negative coefficient of the first lag of FMS, 
the macroeconomic stabilisation factor, a result that reflects a general 
countercyclical behaviour, and is in line with the "fiscal fatigue" view: austerity 
has been reduced in response to better economic performances. Instead, the 
estimated coefficients of the lagged FMD and FFC are not significant. This 
result is interesting: neither the spreads/ratings nor the deviation of deficit 
from the 3% threshold and the public debt growth rate seem to have played a 
discriminant role for the austerity level. Therefore, austerity seems principally 
determined by regional and political factors.  
 
Table 3.4. PCCE estimation results. 
Specification: 1 2 3  
Dep. Var. Austerity Austerity Austerity  
A(-1) 
-0.5529*** 
(0.1614) 
-0.4080*** 
(0.0919) 
-0.5635*** 
(0.1699) 
 
FMD(-1) 
-0.1131 
(0.2482) 
-0.1726 
(0.2593) 
-1261 
(0.2800) 
 
FMS(-1) 
-0.6712*** 
(0.1906) 
-0.2667 
(0.2067) 
-0.5766*** 
(0.2155) 
 
FFC(-1) 
0.0440 
(0.1909) 
-0.0649 
(0.0839) 
0.0570 
(0.2001) 
 
EDP 
0.5220** 
(0.2291) 
- -  
Euro 
1.1434*** 
(0.1629) 
- -  
EZ5 - 
0.4955 
(0.3163) 
-  
EZ7 - 
-0.3167*** 
(0.1119) 
-  
OEZ - 
-0.1462 
(0.1818) 
-  
NoEZ - 
-0.2434 
(0.1571) 
-  
Mean Group 
Constant 
-1.1851*** 
(0.1313) 
- 
-0.1190 
(0.0956) 
 
     
# countries 28 28 28  
CD test 0.4902 0.1505 0.0384  
AR(2) 0.7275 0.6959 0.6959  
R2 0.87 0.54 0.85  
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables are standardised. 
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the first lag of the dependent variable is 
negative and significant, thus capturing a smoothing effect over time, and that 
residuals are not affected neither by cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran (2015) 
cross-sectional dependence test) nor by second-order autocorrelation (Arellano-
Bond serial correlation test statistics). These results confirm the goodness of 
the estimated model. 
The previous conclusions do not vary if the estimation results of the second 
specification are considered. Nonetheless, this specification highlights the 
weight of the EZ7 countries: the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable 
EZ7it is negative, as expected, thus compensating the effects of the other 
dummy variables. Conversely, the coefficient of EZ5it is positive but non-
significant, as well as the two estimated coefficients of OEZit and NoEZit. 
These results are quite robust since they do not change if all dummy variables 
are removed (see column 3 of Table 3.4), but residuals are marginally affected 
by cross-sectional dependence. 
As a robustness analysis, Table 3.5 reports the estimation results for the three 
specifications introduced above without common aggregate factors. Taking 
advantage of the correlation analysis of Section 3, I replace the three common 
factors with the most important variables of each group in explaining Ait. 
Therefore, I consider the first difference of spreads (dSit), the GDP growth rate 
(gYit), and the public debt growth rate (gDit), beyond the dummy variables. 
The first column of Table 3.5, specification 1b, corroborates the main 
conclusions reached in Table 3.4. First of all, the estimated coefficient of gYit-1 
is negative and statistically significant, in line the estimated coefficient of 
FMSit-1. This variable depicts the negative effect on Ait of an increase in the 
GDP and thus the countercyclical behavior of austerity. At the same time, the 
estimated coefficients of Ait-1 and of EDPit are in line with their counterparts in 
Table 3.4. Secondly and differently from Table 3.4, the coefficient of dSit-1 is 
positive and significant: it captures the market pressure on Ait of an increase in 
the government spreads, though its contribution is relatively lower in 
comparison to the other significant variables. 
 126 
 
The results displayed in the second column confirms these findings. 
Specification 2b is meant to highlight the weight of the several groups of 
countries. Two dummy variables are here statistically significant: the positive 
estimated coefficient of EZ5it and the negative estimated coefficient of EZ7it. 
While the first reproduces the higher level of Ait associated to the EZ5 countries, 
the second captures the lower level associated to the EZ7 countries, in line with 
Table 3.4 and with the figures of Section 2.  
As before, these results are quite robust since they do not change if all dummy 
variables are removed (see specification 3b in Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5. Estimation results without PCFA. 
Specification: 1b 2b 3b 
Dep. Var. Austerity Austerity Austerity 
A(-1) 
-0.6257*** 
(0.2100) 
-0.2865* 
(0.1580) 
-0.5944*** 
(0.2029) 
dS(-1) 
0.2467** 
(0.1021) 
0.1650* 
(0.1002) 
0.2514** 
(0.1250) 
gD(-1) 
0.2820 
(0.3418) 
0.1393 
(0.1690) 
0.2269 
(0.3667) 
gY(-1) 
-0.5332*** 
(0.1500) 
-0.2610* 
(0.1528) 
-0.5509*** 
(0.1493) 
EDP 
0.5240*** 
(0.1801) 
- - 
Euro 
-0.2051 
(0.1386) 
- - 
EZ5 - 
0.5010** 
(0.2356) 
- 
EZ7 - 
-0.3301*** 
(0.1180) 
- 
OEZ - 
-0.0717 
(0.1304) 
- 
NoEZ - 
-0,1304 
(0.1457) 
- 
Mean Group 
Constant 
-0.2126** 
(0.0909) 
- 
-0.0547 
(0.1038) 
    
# countries 28 28 28 
CD test 0.0000 0.0001 0.0384 
AR(2) 0.3458 0.3484 0.3484 
R2 0.79 0.39 0.78 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variables are standardised. 
 
Two aspects deserve particular attention. First, since the dependent variables 
are exactly equal, as well as the number of included explanatory variables, the 
 127 
 
R2s of Table 3.4 and 3.5 are directly comparable: as it is possible to notice, the 
R2s of Table 3.4 are all higher than the R2s of Table 3.5, thus showing that the 
models with the common aggregate factors are able to capture a higher fraction 
of the variability of Ait and are more parsimonious to those in Table 3.5. Second, 
the residuals of the estimated models in Table 3.5 are all affected by cross-
sectional dependence, despite the correction.  
Finally, the first specification of Table 3.4 has been used to estimate the level 
of austerity explained by the factors and variables included into the analysis. 
Figure 3.17 compares the observed standardised average level of Ait for all 
countries with its estimated level: the explained part of Ait is rather low and far 
below 50%. In other words, austerity is underestimated ― or, from another 
perspective, the average level of austerity is too high to be explained by market 
and fiscal pressures only ― and there is a wide part of Ait that remains 
unexplained. 
 
Figure 3.17. Average standardised austerity and its predicted value, all countries, 2012-16. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the determinants of austerity, 
determinants that have been sought within four groups of explanatory 
variables commonly employed in literature: fiscal discipline, market discipline, 
fiscal consolidation, and macroeconomic stabilisation.  
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The analysis has been divided into two parts. The first part has developed a 
correlation analysis that has described the relationship between austerity 
(measured as the first difference of the cyclically adjusted primary balance) and 
each explanatory variable, finding that the explanatory power of each variable 
is low when considered individually (in most cases around or below 20%). 
In the second part I have performed an econometric analysis, firstly employing 
principal component factor analysis to retain the aggregate factors that might 
affect austerity, and secondly estimating a panel model by adopting the pooled 
common-correlated effect estimator. Results show that one factor can be 
extracted and identified from each set of explanatory variables, but only one of 
them (the lagged macroeconomic stabilisation factor) is then statistically 
significant. Therefore, governments have adjusted austerity according to the 
economic performance of the previous year. The more important contribution to 
austerity is provided by the Excessive Deficit Procedure and by Euro, the Euro 
dummy. Nonetheless, the considered variables and factors are not able to fully 
explain austerity, either individually or jointly.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Data Appendix 
The principle data source for my analysis is the Eurostat Database, from which 
I take the time series of the nominal GDP at current prices; the government 
consolidated gross debt i.e. the sum of liabilities, at the end of year, of all units 
classified within the general government sector; the government deficit as a 
share of GDP; the unemployment rate; the yields on the long-term government 
bonds denominated in national currency. From the latter I obtain the 
government bond spread computed as the difference between the yield on the 
government bond of each country and the corresponding German bond yield, 
both for Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. 
A second source is the Ameco Database, from which I take the output gap, the 
government deficit, and the cyclically adjusted structural primary balance to 
potential GDP (STPB/PGDP). Thus, I obtain the austerity measure in year t as 
the positive change in the STPB/PGDP over the previous year t-1, namely: 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆
𝑆𝑇𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃
> 0 
Another source is the European Commission website, from which I obtain the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and its Spring and Autumn 
forecasts. I computed the average of the two forecasts to derive the yearly 
average of the CAPB forecast. From this website I also obtain the year of 
adoption and the year of abrogation of the Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDPs) 
for each country, used to construct the EDP dummy, equal to 1 for every year 
during which an EDP was open and 0 otherwise.  
Finally, one last source was the website Trading Economics from which I take 
the S&P rating of the government bonds and any change occurred between 2010 
and 2016. I first convert the S&P rating into numbers according to Table A3.1 
below, and then I compute the yearly weighted averages. 
Concluding, my final sample contains, for each variable, approximately 196 
yearly observations from 2010 to 2016 from 28 countries (on average 7 years 
per country). Table A3.2 summarises the data sources. 
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Table A3.1. S&P ratings and associated numbers. 
S&P Rating Associated 
number 
Investment 
grade 
AAA Prime 10 
AA+ Very high grade 9.5 
AA Very high grade 9 
AA- Very high grade 8.5 
A+ Upper-medium grade 8 
A Upper-medium grade 7.5 
A- Upper-medium grade 7 
BBB+ Lower-medium grade 6.5 
BBB Lower-medium grade 6 
BBB- Lower-medium grade 5.5 
Non-investment 
grade or 
speculative grade 
BB+ Speculative 5 
BB Speculative 4.5 
BB- Speculative 4 
B+ Highly speculative 3.5 
B Highly speculative 3 
B- Highly speculative 2.5 
CCC+ Extremely speculative 2 
CCC Extremely speculative 1.5 
CCC- Extremely speculative 1 
CC Substantial risk 0.5 
C Default, little prospect of recovery 0 
D Default 0 
 
Table A3.2. Employed variables and data sources. 
Variable Source Type of variable 
CAPB European Commission Annual data 
CAPB forecast European Commission Annual data, average of Spring and 
Autumn forecasts 
Excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) 
European Commission Dummy variable 
GDP at current prices Eurostat Annual data 
Government bond yield Eurostat Annual data, average of monthly 
data 
Government debt Eurostat Annual data 
Government deficit AMECO Annual data (% of GDP) 
Output gap AMECO Annual data (% of potential GDP) 
S&P Rating Trading Economics Annual data, weighted average of 
daily data 
STPB/PGDP AMECO Annual data 
Unemployment rate Eurostat Annual data 
 
PCFA Appendix 
The Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCFA) methodology allows for the 
extraction of meaningful linear combinations from a set of variables by 
decomposing their correlation matrix and provides the so-called common factors 
and the corresponding factor loadings. The common factors are latent variables 
which are described through their relationship with the variables of interest, 
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while the factor loadings show the weight of each variable in explaining the 
factors. I used this methodology in order to reduce the number of explanatory 
variables, starting from the correlations summarised from Table A3.3 and Table 
A3.5. 
 
Table A3.3. Market discipline variables, correlations between the first difference in 
spreads (dSPREAD) and in ratings (dRA) 
 dSit dRAit 
dSit 1 -0.5354 
dRAit - 1 
 
Table A3.4. Macroeconomic stabilisation variables, correlations between output gap (OG), 
first variations in the unemployment rate (dUR) and the GDP growth rate (gY). 
 OGit dURit gYit 
OGit 1 -0.4598 0.4503 
dURit - 1 -0.5790 
gYit - - 1 
 
Table A3.5. Fiscal consolidation variables, correlations between the debt-to-GDP growth rate 
(gD) and the difference between the deficit-to-GDP and the 3% threshold (EDEF). 
 gDit EDEFit 
gDit 1 -0.3279 
EDEFit - 1 
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Chapter 4 
An Experimental Approach in Search 
of a Confidence Channel 
 
Co-author:  Professor Luigi Mittone 
Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy. 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims at investigating the relationship between public debt and the 
consumption side of economic growth from an experimental macroeconomics point of 
view, by analysing whether consumers’ expectations about public debt are linked to tax 
compliance, consumption, and savings choices, that in turn affect GDP. 
To this end, I have implemented a laboratory experiment in which the participants 
earn an income to be allocated between consumption, savings, and voluntary taxation 
for an unknown number of rounds. Debt’s dynamics arises endogenously within a 
public good game with threshold: taxation is used to cover a given level of public 
expenditure, which is equally distributed to the participants at the beginning of each 
subsequent round. If the collected amount of taxes is lower than required, a deficit is 
generated, and it feeds public debt. Debt can then be unexpectedly reduced by the 
government through accessing subjects’ savings. To check for the role of beliefs, 
participants’ expectations about future debt reduction and perceived debt 
sustainability are elicited during the experiment. 
Results show that this experimental framework is characterized by relatively high and 
often increasing aggregate savings and relatively low and decreasing aggregate 
consumption. An increase in the debt-reduction expectations and a decrease in the 
perceived debt sustainability are also found to explain savings and consumption 
behaviours. 
These conclusions do not change if tax audits are introduced, but the average savings 
level lowers, thus increasing subjects’ exposure to the unexpected shocks. 
 
 
 
Keywords: experimental macroeconomics, public debt, economic growth, 
expectations, intertemporal choices, public-good games, fiscal audits. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In contrast with the findings of the broad literature introduced in Chapters 1 
and 2, the idea that public debt is always harmful to economic growth has 
partially been reconsidered in the last few years. Some works have shown that 
a general debt-threshold above which growth is stifled is unlikely to exist (see, 
among others, Pescatori et al., 2014; Woo and Kumar, 2015). Nevertheless, the 
existence of a linkage between debt and growth has not been rejected: the long-
run relationship between such macroeconomic variables is inevitably and 
broadly affected by heterogeneous economic and behavioural factors. The focus 
of this chapter is on the latter and, in particular, on the behaviour of those 
consumers that faces the uncertainty of having to bear the cost of a public debt 
reduction, a situation that has barely been studied from an empirical 
perspective due to a lack of data. In fact, though some works have studied the 
impact of fiscal policies on the aggregate demand through model simulations 
and event studies (a review is provided in Briotti, 2005), to the best of my 
knowledge the role that debt-related expectations play in uncertain fiscal 
conditions has not yet been developed. 
This was the case of those peripheral countries of the Eurozone that were 
involved in the debt crisis between 2011 and 20121, and by the austerity 
measures implemented in the aftermath that deeply affected the whole 
economic system. In fact, uncertainty about future fiscal policies and about the 
future sustainability of public debts might have amplified the contractionary 
impact that these measures had on growth rates. In the same period, the idea 
of a forced withdrawal from current accounts was retaken in some countries: 
notably, Italy faced this possibility in 2011 (as reported by many Italian 
newspapers), after the remarkable experience of 1992. Between July 9 and July 
10, 1992, Amato’s government actualized an unexpected 6% forced withdrawal 
on all bank accounts in order to respond to the imminent financial crisis and to 
the speculative attacks that led Italy out of the European Monetary System 
                                                          
1 Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland were involved in speculative attacks that had the 
potential to be self-fulfilling; see De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). 
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(EMS). In such situations, uncertainty about future fiscal policies and political 
actions might have influenced consumers’ expectations, thus affecting the 
general economic performance. 
To gain insight into the role of expectations about debt policies and their 
impact on economic growth under uncertainty conditions, I have studied how 
people react in a framework in which public debt may be unexpectedly reduced 
by implementing a laboratory experiment in which the debt dynamics arises 
endogenously: within a public good game, taxes are collected from all 
participants and are used to cover a given level of public expenditure, which is 
then equally distributed to the same participants at the beginning of each 
experimental round. If the collected amount of taxes is lower than what the 
public expenditure would require, a public deficit is generated. Moreover, 
reproducing a forced withdrawal, the outstanding amount of public debt can be 
reduced upon accessing subjects’ savings. 
Within this setting, expectations are directly elicited by asking subjects if they 
believe that public debt is going to be reduced, and if they think that the other 
subjects believe that public debt is sustainable. Therefore, I can identify 
whether and how agents’ allocations and expectations are affected by the public 
debt path. The main goal is to study whether and when direct and indirect 
consumers’ beliefs about public debt affect their choices about consumption, 
savings, and tax compliance2 with a direct impact, at the aggregate level, on 
economic growth, interpreted as the GDP growth rate. 
As mentioned above, a peculiarity of this approach is the endogenous 
dynamics of public debt: not only it avoids introducing predetermined dynamics, 
but also increases the ecological validity of the experiment. Participants are 
indeed more psychologically involved in the debt mechanism and they might 
feel responsible for the raise in debt, as they might feel when, for instance, the 
party for which they voted increases deficit spending. On the other hand, an 
exogenous dynamics might depict public debt and tax compliance as irrelevant. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 I review the 
literature involving public debt and economic growth with particular attention 
                                                          
2 To keep the framework as simple as possible, I did not considered investments. 
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to expectations. Though it recalls the literature review of Chapter 1, this section 
is useful to provide a theoretical background for the following experimental 
hypotheses. In Section 3 I introduce the experimental literature, my research 
questions, my experimental design and the strategic analysis. The 
experimental data are discussed in Section 4, and general implications are 
inferred though panel models and robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
Findings clearly support the existence of a confidence channel, namely a 
linkage between debt and growth based on and determined by expectations: a 
worsening in the perceived debt sustainability is associated with an increase in 
aggregate savings and a decrease in aggregate consumption, regardless the 
level of the public debt.  
 
1.1. Expectations within standard economic theories 
Implications about consumers’ behaviour are to be found within the existing 
economic approaches, each of which provides different implications as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. In the standard Neoclassical theory, the focus is on the 
crowding-out effect entailed by public deficits. On the consumption side and 
under the assumption of perfectly rational agents, with a finite lifespan and 
with access to perfect markets, the government borrowing allows to increase 
the predetermined consumption level of the current generation, as taxes are 
indefinitely postponed to next generations. Nevertheless, given fully employed 
resources, the raise in consumption must go hand in hand with a decline in 
savings, thus implying, on the investment side, an increase in the interest rate 
towards the new equilibrium, with the result that private capitals are crowded-
out3 (see Bernheim, 1989). Therefore, the typical impact of an increasing public 
debt on the long-run economic growth can be assumed to be negative, because 
of the crowding-out effect and because of the taxes required to finance the future 
interest payments, a point on which is hinged the so-called burden view 
(Modigliani, 1961). 
This conclusion has also found support within the endogenous growth 
approach (for instance, Barro 1990, and Saint-Paul 1992), according to which 
                                                          
3 All these aspects are included in the seminal model proposed by Diamond (1965). 
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the growth rate may be jeopardised by the direct and indirect influence of fiscal 
policies and outstanding debt. Noteworthy, as shown by recent studies, the 
negative consequences may be larger if government debt creates uncertainty, 
and if it generates expectations of future higher taxes (Cochrane, 2011), or if it 
affects the productivity of public expenditure (Teles and Cesar-Mussolini, 
2014). Upon including different elements of analysis, some Neoclassical 
developments have allowed for broader results that show that public deficits 
may have a positive impact on growth. Nonetheless, since people are perfectly 
rational, they react to permanent income changes only, directly or indirectly 
determined by variations in the taxation level and in the public expenditure, 
though the final consequence may not be unfavourable. 
The Keynesian theory, instead, assumes that a deficit financed fiscal 
expansion can have an expansionary impact on the aggregate demand. Indeed, 
if the resources are not fully employed, national income rises, generating the 
Keynesian multiplier effect that stimulates both the national income and the 
consumption level (Hemming et al., 2002), whereas, at the same time, taxes 
entail a short-run contractionary effect. However, as noted by some authors, 
expectations about the contractionary fiscal policies may outweigh the negative 
Keynesian multiplier effect leading to an expansion rather than a contraction 
(Barry and Devereux, 1995). Moreover, if indirect changes in the interest rate 
affect the magnitude of the multiplier, as described by Hemming et al. (2002), 
the Neoclassical crowding-out effect could still arise. 
Last but not least, the Ricardian paradigm is based on the idea that agents 
incorporate the government intertemporal budget constraint, thus implying the 
irrelevance of the timing of taxes and, indirectly, the equivalence between taxes 
and government debt in financing the public expenditure. Besides, the change 
in the taxation level does affect the savings level, which follows the expected 
variation in the future disposable income. In this context, unlike the other 
approaches, a public deficit entails a full crowding-out effect. In Barro (1989) 
the author concluded that the Ricardian Equivalence is a "good first-order 
approximation to reality", supported also by the empirical evidence, but this 
conclusion has been criticized by some authors. For instance, in Bernheim 
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(1989), the Ricardian paradigm is deemed to require unrealistic assumptions to 
hold. 
 
1.2. Further theories 
An unconventional approach named "expansionary fiscal consolidation theory" 
has initially been discussed in the 90s by a group of Italian economists, who 
have proposed that a deficit reduction policy might have an expansionary effect 
on the economic system. In other words, a policy of deficit reduction could be 
associated with an expansion in the aggregate demand. This view was mainly 
introduced and discussed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), and Alesina and 
Perotti, (1995), and then retaken and revisited amid the European public debt 
crisis by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and Alesina and Ardagna (2013) among 
others. However, the importance of this controversial school of thought has 
undeniably faded away, especially after the publication of some works that have 
casted doubts on its empirical relevance. For instance, the work of Perotti (2012) 
has showed that the explanations of four episodes of expansionary fiscal 
consolidations were to be found in exceptional and particularly favourable 
conditions in which they were implemented and not in the implemented 
policies. Yet, a similar expansionary effect may rather arise because of 
expectations: if people expect a future fiscal consolidation, they will save more 
until when the consolidation effectively occurs; as soon as such a consolidation 
has occurred, people increases their consumption (Sutherland, 1997). 
 
1.3. Expectations and fiscal policies in experimental 
economics 
Laboratory experiments are an extremely useful tool for the investigation of 
economic and fiscal policies since they allow the construction of a simplified and 
controlled framework in which to test for their validity, above all when 
empirical data are not available. In fact, though macroeconomic policies have 
been traditionally studied through non-experimental techniques, in the last few 
years experimental macroeconomics has gained wider academic interest4. 
                                                          
4 For a detailed review of experimental macroeconomics, see Duffy, 2014. 
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In the specific field of fiscal policies and expectations, the first experimental 
designs aimed at testing the Ricardian Equivalence within an overlapping 
generations framework. Cadsby and Frank (1991) have supported the empirical 
validity of the Ricardian Equivalence, but subsequent developments have found 
evidence of departures when more articulated experimental designs are 
employed (Slate et al., 1995; Ricciuti and Di Laurea, 2003).  
A group of studies have focused on expectation formation and dates back to 
the 70s. For instance, Bernasconi et al. (2009) has studied the ability of people 
to forecast, either in front of real world data or laboratory data. Other 
experimental designs have studied expectation formation with respect to 
inflation (Arifovic and Sargent, 2003) or with respect to monetary policies 
(Kryvtsov and Petersen, 2013; Pfajfar and Zakelj, 2015; Assenza et al., 2014). 
However, these experiments do not explicitly deal with public debt, the debt-to-
GDP ratio, and its effect on consumption and savings. As regards, only Geiger 
et al. (2016) have explicitly analysed fiscal consolidations, finding that an 
expectations channel linking fiscal policies and consumption exists, thus 
supporting the expansionary effect of Sutherland (1997): 
 
consolidations that occur in an unsustainable fiscal environment exert less 
contractionary effects on consumption, […] and this channel is more pronounced if the 
fiscal authority can convincingly commit to abstain from tax increases in the future. 
(Geiger et al., 2016, p.15) 
 
This design undoubtedly shares some similarities with Geiger et al. (2016), 
but it differs in some important points that I will present in the next sections: 
the earning money task (in contrast with the house money approach of Geiger 
et al., 2016), the direct elicitation of the perceived debt sustainability and debt 
forecasts, and the endogenous dynamics of the public debt, for which all the 
participants are responsible. Therefore, my design is more sophisticated and 
keeps a greater number of variables under control. 
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Similarities are shared also with the vast experimental literature about tax 
evasion5 and with the literature of the public good experiments with thresholds, 
in which subjects provide a freely determined amount to a public fund 
characterized by a given threshold. Within this setup, such a threshold 
represents the total amount of contributions (i.e. voluntary paid taxes) required 
to cover an exogenous level of public expenditure. Since a basic public good 
game does not commonly lead to full coordination between the subjects, it is 
already possible to say that the experimental debt dynamics will generally be 
upward trending, as observed in many developed countries during the last 
decades. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND BEHAVIOURAL HYPOTHESES 
 
The experimental design aims at identifying the possible confidence channel 
that links public debt and economic growth, and whether it has an impact on 
the savings level. According to the economic theories introduced above, people’s 
expectations may be interpreted in a Ricardian sense, may follow the 
Neoclassical theory, or may be in line with Sutherland (1997) and Geiger et al. 
(2016). It would also be possible to observe no influence at all. 
Thus, the first research question aims at disclosing whether public debt 
expectations affect consumers’ choices: 
 
RQ1. Is there a confidence channel linking public debt and the consumption side 
of economic growth? 
 
where the confidence channel is any expectational linkage, a broader concept 
than the expectations channel of Sutherland (1997), Ardagna (2004) and Geiger 
et al. (2016). Indeed, my approach is "to let the experimental data speak", 
without imposing any restrictions on such a channel.  
                                                          
5 Tax payer behaviour is extensively studied from an experimental perspective. See Baldry 
(1987), Bosco and Mittone (1997), Mittone (2006). 
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An expectational channel might arise or might not arise according to the 
individual perception of the fiscal policies, namely, according to the uncertainty 
about the future probability of a debt reduction carried out by the government. 
Moreover, it can play a role in specific situations only, such as when public debt 
is perceived to be unsustainable. The second research question deals precisely 
with this aspect: 
 
RQ2. Does the perceived debt sustainability affect the choices of the subjects? 
 
Since, as said above, people may react according to the perceived debt 
sustainability and to personal beliefs, three behavioural hypotheses can be 
made about the dynamics of the aggregate private consumption and savings 
level observed in the experiment: 
• Hypothesis 1. Given a constant public expenditure level, participants 
react to increasing public debt ― namely, consecutive deficits ― by 
increasing their own consumption level. This result would be explained 
by the Neoclassical theory if subjects believe that required taxes are 
indefinitely postponed and no debt reduction will occur. However, this 
behaviour can also be in line with the Keynesian theory, which attributes 
a multiplier effect on the deficit financed public expenditure in contrast 
with the contractionary effect implied by taxation, or by a debt-reduction 
intervention. If, instead, such a debt-reduction intervention led to an 
increase in consumption, subjects would react according to the 
expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis. 
• Hypothesis 2. Participants react to increasing public debt by reducing, 
on average, their consumption and by increasing savings. Therefore, 
participants behave in a sort of Ricardian way: they expect that debt has 
to be repaid in the future, and they react by increasing the current 
savings levels. Moreover, uncertainty can amplify this result. 
• Hypothesis 3. Given their income level, participants do not adjust their 
own consumption and savings levels to variations or expected variations 
in public debt. In this case, participants do not care about public debt if 
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it does not affect their income permanently through, for instance, an 
explicit increase in the fiscal pressure. 
Evidently, different behaviours can emerge if different time horizons are 
considered; therefore, more than one hypothesis can be satisfied. 
A last research question strictly linked to the experimental design involves tax 
compliance. In particular, it is interesting to understand whether and how the 
answers to the previous research questions are affected by voluntary taxation, 
a fundamental aspect of the experimental design. Given the endowment of the 
subjects, an increase in the fiscal contribution, namely a reduction in tax 
evasion, might intuitively lead to either a lower level of consumption, a lower 
level of savings, or a lower level of both, with different economic implications. 
Therefore, as described in Section 3, I will introduce tax controls and the third 
research question deals with it: 
 
RQ3. Does an increase in fiscal contribution induced by a more severe fiscal 
strategy impact on consumption and/or savings? 
 
It must be underlined that the introduction of fines and fiscal audits mimics an 
increase in fiscal pressure without altering the general experimental 
framework. 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The experimental design is based on the public good games with thresholds, 
with earned-money and voluntary taxation, and without interactions between 
subjects. It does not aim to test a specific macroeconomic model, but to find out 
whether and how people’s expectations about public debt affect their choices 
about consumption and savings in uncertain fiscal conditions, resembling, for 
instance, the situation in which many European countries were involved during 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis and the austerity period. 
I develop two similar experimental designs whose difference is in the absence 
or presence of controls on tax evasion.  
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3.1. Design without tax controls 
The experiment comprises of 1,...,t T=  periods, where T  is a random number 
extracted from a discrete uniform distribution U(10,20): the minimum number 
of possible periods is 10T =  and the maximum is 20T = . Therefore, subjects do 
not know when the experiment ends, and any end-effect is avoided6. Before 
period 1t = , subjects join in an earning task that determines the annuity per 
period. This earning-money strategy should reduce the house-money effect that 
can arise in public-good experiments and that can affect subjects’ preferences 
(see Clark, 2002). Consequently, from period 1t =  to period t T= , subjects 
receive the constant amount ta  per period, and the final gross income of each 
subject i  is: 
(4.1) 
1
T
i it
t
A a
=
=  
Subjects must decide how to allocate ita  between the available private and 
public choices. On the private side, subjects can choose in each period between 
an immediate consumption ( itc ) that, as described below, contributes to the final 
pay-off according to a factor   ( 0 1  ), and positive savings ( its ) that can be 
used for future consumption only. Savings provides a constant interest rate r . 
If the stock of savings accumulated up to time t  is itS , the amount received in 
round 1t +  is thus 
1 (1 )it it itS S r S R+ = + = .  
On the public side, subjects know that the government has to collect a given 
amount of resources in order to cover the public expenditure, say tE . This 
amount will be multiplied by 1   (a public-expenditure multiplier, known to 
all participants) and then equally divided among the participants at the 
beginning of the subsequent round. Therefore, in 1t +  each subject will receive 
the amount ( )tE
N

, where N  is the number of participants. Subjects are told 
the amount that they should contribute to reach the threshold tE , but they are 
                                                          
6 This technical choices is arbitrary; there are no reasons to choose another strategy to 
avoid the end-game effect. 
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free to decide how much to contribute effectively, an amount itT  that remains 
unknown to all the other participants. Subjects might also decide to contribute 
more than what is suggested, a circumstance that would capture the subjective 
aversion to debt creation and the fear of a debt reduction. The collected amount 
in each round is thus: 
(4.2) 
1
N
t it
i
F T
=
=  
If t tF E , the amount tF  is distributed. Instead, if t tF E , a deficit ( )t t td E F= −  
is generated and the amount ( )t t tE F d = +  is distributed. To cope with the 
insufficient amount of collected resources, the government has to resort to an 
exogenous amount of public debt, on which interests accrue according to a 
constant rate i . The dynamics of public debt is described by: 
(4.3) 1
(1 )( ) if 0
(1 ) if 0
t t t
t
t t
i D d d
D
i D d
+
+ + 
= 
+ 
 
where 0td   corresponds to the situation in which, on the whole, participants 
contribute more than what is required to cover the public expenditure. 
At the beginning of period t and before subjects’ choices, the government can 
decide to reduce the outstanding amount of debt and interests, 
1 1[(1 )( )]t t tD i D d− −= + + , to a lower amount tD  (with 0 1  ) by forcedly 
accessing the subjects’ outstanding amount of capitalised savings, and this can 
occur from 0 to 1T −  times7. If subject’s savings is higher than the unknown 
demanded amount ( )tD
N

, subject’s savings is reduced by this amount; 
otherwise, savings is reduced to 0 and the subject is forced to pay a penalty on 
his final pay-off (this can be interpreted as a forced fiscal withdrawal on the 
final individual earnings which avoids affecting the dynamics of the 
experimental variables). The government cannot declare default on its public 
debt. 
                                                          
7 The first period is excluded, no debt reduction can occur. 
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Summarizing, in the case in which 0td  , the government budget constraint 
in each period 1t   represents the balance between revenues (tax income) and 
expenditures (public expenditure), reached through a deficit:  
(4.4) , 0t t t tF d E with d+ =   
while, during the experiment, the subject i’s budget constraint is given by: 
(4.5) 1 1
, 1 , 1, (1 ) ,0{ } {[ ( ) ] }t t tit i t i t it it it
F E D
a max max p S R p S R c S T
N N N
  − −
− −+ + − + − = + +  
with { , , } 0it it itc S T  , and p  being the exogenous probability of bearing a 
reduction in public debt (more details are given in the next section). 
The monetary pay-off of each subject at the end of the experiment is 
determined by the realized consumption levels itc  if itc h  (while levels below 
h  are disregarded), and by the accumulated number of penalties 0m   that 
determines an overall compounded reduction equals to (1 )mk− . Savings and 
public expenditure do not contribute to the final pay-off. In such a way, h  is to 
be considered as the consumption subsistence level. 
Finally, in order to study expectations, in each period participants are asked 
two questions. If the answer is right, the "winning" participant receives g  
tokens at the end of the experiment, otherwise he receives 0 tokens. These 
tokens do not contribute to the endowment of the participants: they cannot be 
spent, and they are provided at the end of the experiment only. Given a general 
conversion factor from tokens to euro of f , the final monetary pay-off of subject 
i accumulated from period 1t =  to period t T=  is thus: 
(4.6) 𝑃𝑖(𝑐𝑖𝑡 , g𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓 (1 − 𝑘)
𝑚  ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑡 + g𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  
where (0, )itg g=  is the forecast-related earning amounts, and 
(4.7) 
if 
0     if 
it it
it
it
c c h
x
c h
 
= 

 
is the discounted total amount of the realized consumption.  
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3.2. Forecasts and final questionnaire 
In each round subjects’ expectations are elicited. Two questions8 are asked after 
the allocation of the endowment and for which subjects receive a prompt 
response on their accuracy: 
• Forecast 1: Do you believe that public debt will be reduced by the 
government in the next round? 
• Forecast 2: How many participants do you believe that think that the 
actual level of public debt is sustainable? 
For the first question, subjects enter "1" if they believe that public debt will be 
reduced and "0" otherwise. For the second question, subjects enter a number 
from 0 to the number of participants according to their perceived degree of debt 
sustainability, whose intuitive definition was provided in the intructions (see 
the Appendix at the end of the chapter). For each correct9 prediction, subjects 
receive a prize at the end of the experiment. 
Therefore, subjects are simultaneously asked to provide their expectations 
about a future debt reduction (a short-term forecast) carried out by the 
government and the related perception of the current debt sustainability (a 
long-term forecast), which reflect the ability of the current and future 
government revenues to cover the current level of public debt. These questions 
aim to directly elicit subjects’ expectations, and to relate them to the current 
and past levels of consumption and public debt. 
The analysis is then reinforced and linked to real world by a series of questions 
reported in table 4.1 to be asked through a questionnaire at the end of the 
experiment which allows to get insight into the subjects’ general knowledge of 
the topic. 
 
                                                          
8 This methodology is commonly adopted in experimental economics to elicit expectations. For 
a review of experiments on expectations, see Assenza et al. (2014) and Duffy (2014). For 
applications, see Kryvtsov and Petersen (2013), and Duffy and Fisher (2005). Participants are 
trained through a training round. 
9 The tokens earned from forecasta are determined according to a beauty-contest game: the 
winner is the subject that provides the closest answer to the group average (it is possible to 
have more than one winner simultaneously). Subjects are not aware of such a mechanism but, 
since they are not competing against each other, this is not relevant for the experimental 
results. 
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Table 4.1. Questionnaire, final questions. 
Question Possible answers 
1. In which slot does the actual (2017) Italian 
debt-to-GDP ratio fall? 
60-100%, 100-120%, 120-140%, >140% 
2. In your opinion, will the debt-to-GDP ratio 
go up or down during the next 5 years? 
Up, Down 
3. Do you believe that the current level of the 
Italian public debt is sustainable? 
Yes, No 
4. Do you believe that the level of public debt 
directly or indirectly affects private 
consumptions? 
Yes, No, I do not know 
 
3.3. Laboratory implementation, calibration, subject pool 
The structure of the laboratory experiment can be divided into four parts, as 
depicted in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1. Experimental steps. 
 
 
In the first part, subjects join an earning task in which they have to correctly 
count the number of "1"s included in random tables for six times without time 
limits. This part is only meant to avoid the house-money effect and is carried 
out at the beginning of the experiment. Then, each subject receives the same 
amount of tokens per round. 
In the second part, subjects must decide how to allocate their endowment 
between consumptions, savings, and voluntary taxation. 
In the third part, the public debt level is updated, and subjects must provide 
their two forecasts by observing the available data (the public debt level, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, the total amount of collected taxes, and the related public 
deficit). At the beginning of the subsequent round, subjects discover whether 
public debt is reduced or not and whether their forecasts are correct. Then, part 
two and three are repeated for each round until the end of the experiment. 
 148 
 
The fourth and last part at the end of the experiment includes the Holt and 
Laury (2002) task to measure risk aversion. 
The values of the many parameters are calibrated for 18 and 20 participants 
to each laboratory session, and they are reported in Table 4.2. The number of 
rounds (T ) is fixed to 15, unknown to the participants in order to avoid an end-
effect; as described above, they only know that the experiment will finish 
between period 10 and 20 (the fixed number of rounds made the comparison of 
data easier). Tokens are the unit of measure of the whole laboratory 
experiment: in each round the endowment is composed by an income ita = 10 
tokens and a public transfer of 9 tokens, given by the public expenditure amount 
multiplied by 1.2 =  (arbitrarily chosen) and divided by the number of subjects. 
The minimum consumption level required to avoid penalties is h = 6 tokens, 
while the interest rate on savings is r = 10% . The conversion factor from tokens 
to euro ( f ) is 1 euro=25 tokens and the tokens spent for consumption enter the 
final payment with a 0.8 weight ( ). 
For what regards the public sector, the initial debt level ( 0D ) is 150 tokens for 
20 participants and 135 for 18 participants respectively, and it equals the public 
expenditure amount of each round, so that the required amount of taxes is 
always 7.5 tokens. The debt interest rate is fixed and equal to i = 15% . Public 
debt can be reduced from the second round on by a random amount   included 
between 60%  and 90%  but, to directly compare different treatments, the rounds 
of the debt reductions are accurately chosen, although the participants are not 
aware of it. Finally, 2 tokens are paid at the end of the experiment for each 
correct forecast10 ( itg ). In addition, €3 are paid as a presence contribution to 
everyone. 
The experiment is programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and the main 
computer screens are reported in Appendix (see Figures from A4.1 to A4.4). The 
participants are Italian-speakers graduate and undergraduate students from 
University of Trento, who cannot participate to more than one laboratory 
session. All of them are provided with detailed instructions and experienced 
                                                          
10 The maximum number of extra tokens that can be gained by a subject in such a way is 60. 
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with a trial session for each task. Laboratory instructions are reported in 
Appendix. 
 
Table 4.2. Experimental parameters, calibrated values for 20 (18) participants 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
N 20 (18) R 10% 
ta  10 
  0.8 
T 15 h 6 
te  7.5 
  1.2 
0D  150 (135) i 15% 
  From 60% to 90% R 1.1 
f 1/25 Presence 3 euro 
 
3.4. Strategic analysis 
Can an optimal strategy be identified? To study the rational choices from the 
participant’s perspective, this section focuses on two generic subsequent rounds 
(t, t+1) after round 9, when the experiment can finish, and I exclude the 
forecasts’ prize. To comprise these two aspects of my framework that are of 
interest for the participants, i.e. the future experimental endowment and the 
consumed tokens that determine the final monetary payment, let me define 
1
1
1
t
it ij
j
C c
−
−
=
=  as the amount of consumed tokens accumulated up to round 1t − , 
tD  as the outstanding amount of debt at round t , and itW  as the sum of the 
stock of consumed tokens that contributes to the final payment and the subject’s 
income at round t . itW  is thus given by: 
(4.8) 
1 1 1 1( )it it it it it it
E
W C a S R C Y S R
N

− − − −= + + +  + +  
where 
it
E
Y a
N

 +  is the sum of the individual income and of the individual 
public transfer, which is constant if the total contribution is assumed to be at 
most equal to the public expenditure ( tE E t=  ). A representative subject, say 
subject i , should decide how to allocate 1itY S R−+  optimally to maximise his final 
monetary pay-off, which is entirely determined by the stock of consumption.  
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At round t , a further round 1t +  can be reached with probability q , while 
with probability 1 q−  the experiment ends. If this is the case, each subject 
should consume all the endowment (savings and taxes do not contribute to the 
final payment), and itC  is just: 
(4.9) 1 1 1( )it it it it itC C Y S R C c− − −= + +  +  
If, on the contrary, the experiment continues, participants face an uncertain 
situation in which public debt can be reduced with probability p  at the 
beginning of round 1t + , thus affecting their savings. At the same time, the new 
flow of income and the flow of interests on savings are received. In formulas, if 
public debt is not reduced, 1itW +  can be written as: 
(4.10) 1 1it it it itW C c Y S R+ −= + + +  
itS  being period t ’s savings, namely 
(4.11) it it itS Y c T= − −  
If, instead, public debt is reduced, equation (4.10) becomes: 
(4.12) 
1 1
t
it it it it
D
W C c Y S R
N

+ −= + + + −  
where it should be recognised that, given 1tD − , tD  is an endogenous variable 
determined by the individual contributions at round t . Indicate with tT   the total 
amount of subjects j ’s collected taxes, i.e. 
1
N
t jt
j j i
T T
= 
  , and with *tT   the 
collected amount if everyone pays exactly the required amount of taxes. Two 
extreme cases can be identified according to the overall contribution level: 
a) Subject i  is the only participant who pays taxes at round t . Hence, 0tT =  
and equation (4.12) becomes: 
(4.13) 1
1 1
( )(1 )t it
it it it it
D E T i
W C c Y S R
N
 −
+ −
+ − +
= + + + −  
b) Everyone pays the required amount of taxes: 
(4.14) 
*
1
1 1
( )(1 )t it t
it it it it
D E T T i
W C c Y S R
N
 −
+ −
+ − − +
= + + + −  
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The actual contribution level tT   is likely to be included within these two 
extremes. The strategic tree depicting these outcomes is shown in Figure A4.5 
in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. 
Considering that savings is given by equation (4.11), the expected value of 1itW +  
to be maximised is, without penalties: 
(4.15) 1 1 1 1[ ] (1 )( ) (1 )( ( ) )t it it it it it it itE W q C Y S R q p C c Y Y c T R+ − − −= − + + + − + + + − − +  
1
1
( )(1 )
( ) ,0( { })t itit it it it
D E T i
qp C c Y max Y c T R
N

 −−
+ − +
+ + + + − − − +  
*
1
1
( )(1 )
(1 ) ( ) ,0( { })t it tit it it it
D E T T i
qp C c Y max Y c T R
N

 −−
+ − − +
+ − + + + − − −  
where   is the subjective probability associated to case (a) and 1 −  is the 
subjective probability associated to case (b). 
On the one hand, the strategic component of the experiment can be seen by 
computing 
1[ ]t it
it
dE W
dT
+
. In the most general case in which tT   is included between 
the two extremes, the partial derivative is: 
(4.16) 
1[ ] (1 )(1 ) ( ) 1 ,0{ ( ) }t it t
it it
dE W dTi
q p R qp max R
dT N dT
+ += − − + − + +  
where [0,1]
t
it
T
T



 captures the strategic relationship between the choice of i  and 
the choices of the other participants11 or, in other terms, the correlation 
between the choice of i  and the choices of all the others. Equation (4.16) can be 
either positive or negative but, given the calibration presented in the previous 
section with 20N = , the {}max  term in (4.16) is 0; thus, equation (4.16) reduces 
to: 
(4.17) 
1[ ] (1 ) 0t it
it
E W
q p R
T
+ = − − 

 
which is clearly negative. Therefore, it is always convenient to pay less taxes, 
until 0: taxes are not paid in the Nash equilibrium. 
                                                          
11 If 0, subject i is the only one who pays taxes; if 1, everyone pays taxes. 
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On the other hand, the analysis of itc  and itS  does not allow to precisely 
identify how much to save and how much to consume, beyond the imposed 
consumption subsistence level. Nonetheless, equation (4.15) can be evaluated: 
since 1 1
1,
( ) ( )
N
t it t it jt
j j i
D E T D E T T− −
= 
+ −  + − −  , three scenarios can be detected with 
respect to the savings level itS : 
• Scenario 1: the amount of itS , say 1S , can cover the worst reduction in 
public debt: 
*
1 1( )(1 ) ( )(1 ),0 0, ,0 0{ } { }t it t t t itit it
D E T T i D E T i
max S R max S R
N N
 − −+ − − + + − +−  −   
• Scenario 2: the amount of itS , say 2S , can cover the reduction in public 
debt only if everyone pays taxes: 
*
1 1( )(1 ) ( )(1 ),0 0, ,0 0{ } { }t it t t t itit it
D E T T i D E T i
max S R max S R
N N
 − −+ − − + + − +−  − =  
• Scenario 3: the amount of itS , say 3S , cannot cover any reduction in 
public debt: 
*
1 1( )(1 ) ( )(1 ),0 0, ,0 0{ } { }t it t t t itit it
D E T T i D E T i
max S R max S R
N N
 − −+ − − + + − +− = − =
 
Starting from Scenario 1, equation (4.15) becomes: 
(4.18) 
1 1 1
(1 )
[ ] (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )t it it it it it
p i
E W C q S R Y qR c q R T q R
N

+ − −
+
= + − + + + − − − +  
*
1( (1 ) )(1 )( )t tD E T iqp
N

 −
+ − − +
−  
which corresponds to the equation of a straight line in the plane 1( [ ], )t it itE W c+ , 
with intercept 
*
1
1 1 1
( (1 ) )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )[ ( ) ( )]t tit it it
D E T ip i
h C q S R Y qR T q R qp
N N

 −− −
+ − − ++
= + − + + − − −  and 
slope 1 (1 )l q R= − . 
Penalties can now be introduced into the analysis: if savings is not sufficient 
to cover the debt reduction, Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 entail a penalty on the 
amount 1it itC c− + , that is reduced by a factor k  to 1(1 )( )it itk C c−− + . Thus, 1[ ]t itE W +  
for Scenario 2 is given by: 
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(4.19) 1 1 1[ ] (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ( ))t it it it itE W C qp k q S R Y qR c q R p k R + − −= − + − + + + − − − +  
*
1( )(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ( )t tit
D E T ip i
T q R p qp
N N

    −
+ − ++
− − − − − −  
and, again, it corresponds to the equation of a straight line with intercept 
*
1
2 1 1
( )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ( )t tit it it
D E T ip i
h C qp k q S R Y qR T q R p qp
N N

     −− −
+ − ++
= − + − + + − − − − − −  and slope 
2 (1 ( ))l q R p k R= − − − . Finally, 1[ ]t itE W +  for Scenario 3 can be written as:  
(4.20) 𝐸𝑡[𝑊𝑖𝑡+1] = 𝐶𝑖𝑡−1(1 − 𝑞𝑝𝑘) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑆𝑖𝑡−1𝑅 + 𝑌(1 + 𝑞𝑅) + 
+𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑞(1 − 𝑅 − 𝑝(𝑘 − 𝑅)) − 𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑞(𝑅 − 𝑝𝑅) 
and the intercept is 3 1 1[ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( )]it it ith C qpk q S R Y qR T q R pR− −= − + − + + − −  while 
the slope is 3 (1 ( ))l q R p k R= − − − . 
As can be seen, the three intercepts depend not only on 1itC − , itT  and the 
amount of the others’ contributions, but also on the unknown  ; by comparing 
them, one can see that three situations are feasible: either 1 2h h  or 1 2h h
12, 
either 1 3h h  or 1 3h h
13, and either 2 3h h  or 3 2h h
14. On the contrary, the 
three slopes depend on parameters only. By comparing them, it is 
straightforward to see that 3 2l l  and 3 1l l , but 1 2l l  if and only if k R , 
which depends on the subjective weight  . An example is given in Figure 4.2, 
where 2 3 1h h h   and 3 1 2l l l  . 
Although there is no unique solution, an intuitive strategy would be to save as 
much as possible (accounting for h) until the second to last round, and then to 
consume the whole endowment in the last round, thus avoiding penalties and 
obtaining the maximum amount of interests to spend. However, the experiment 
comprises important sources of uncertainty: simultaneous choices with an 
                                                          
12 If 
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
( )( )itit t
T i i
C R D E
k N Nk
 
− −
+ +
 − + + . 
13 If 1 1
1,
(1 ) (1 )
( (1 ) )( )
N
it
it t jt
j j i
T i i
C R D E T
k N Nk
 
− −
= 
+ +
 − + + − −  . 
14 If 1 1
1,
(1 ) (1 )
( )( )
N
it
it t jt
j j i
T i i
C R D E T
k N Nk
 
− −
= 
+ +
 − + + −  . 
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unknown ending. Moreover, the unknown reductions in debt make the 
comparison with the cost of a penalty impossible. In fact, this amount depends 
on the choices of the other subjects, implying that the exact optimal allocations 
from round 10 to the end of the experiment cannot be found without allowing 
for full coordination between the participants. Obviously, no optimal strategy 
exists for the forecast part.  
 
Figure 4.2. Expected value of Wit+1 for three values of savings, S1, S2, and S3 (example). 
 
 
3.5. Design with tax controls 
One of the primary aspects of the experimental design that can influence the 
debt dynamics and thus subjects’ behaviour is the level of tax compliance: since 
subjects’ contribution is free, the total contributed amount depends not only on 
the fear of a debt reduction, but also on the individual’s predisposition to 
honesty and the related moral cost (see Rosenbaum et al., 2014).  
To control for tax evasion, I reformulate the first treatment with the addition 
of an exogenous probability of tax auditing: subjects are aware of the fact that 
if their individual contribution is below the required amount of taxes, they have 
to pay a fine. In details, the known auditing probability is 25%  in each round 
and, following the structure of the penalties, the fine corresponds to a 5 %  
reduction in the final pay-off. In this case, the formula for the final monetary 
pay-off becomes: 
(4.21) 𝑃𝑖(𝑐𝑖𝑡 , g𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓 (1 − 𝑘1)
𝑚1(1 − 𝑘2)
𝑚2  ∑ (𝑥𝑖𝑡 + g𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  
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which is equal to equation (4.6) except for 2k , the fine percentage amount, and 
2m , the total number of fines. 
The difference with the design without tax auditing is in the willingness to 
limit and explicitly punish the free-riding behaviour, incentivising subjects to 
pay taxes. However, this setting includes two more elements into the analysis: 
the risk aversion towards a tax audit and the comparison between the costs and 
the benefits of debt evasion. Jointly with the burden of the debt reduction and 
the propensity to honesty, they determine the amount of paid taxes. 
From the participants’ point of view, the difference between the treatment 
without tax controls and the treatment with tax controls is in the probability to 
get the total pay-off. Whereas without auditing such a probability is 1 
regardless of the contributed amount, with tax auditing it becomes 0.75 if the 
individual contribution is below the amount required to sustain the public 
expenditure. In formal terms, the expected final pay-off with tax evasion up to 
round t  is: 
(4.22) 20.75 0.25(1 0.05)mt it itVA C C= + −  
It is possible to notice that the expected cost of a fine is relatively low: for the 
first fiscal evasion ( 2 1m = ) and given a reference amount of 100 tokens, such a 
cost is just 1.25 tokens; for the second fiscal evasion ( 2 2m = ) is 2.44 tokens, and 
so on. Nevertheless, this structure allows to consider a high auditing 
probability, keeping the results fully comparable with the no-tax controls case. 
In fact, realistic auditing rates are between 1.70%  and 1.80%  according to the 
latest Italian data15, a rate that is too low for a laboratory experiment.  
 
3.6. Treatments 
I implement two treatments: an early-shock treatment (T1) and a delayed-shock 
treatment (T2), both without tax controls and with three exogenous shocks. The 
                                                          
15 For instance, in 2013 there had been 713,000 fiscal controls, down from 741,000 in 2012, and 
over approximately 41 million of taxpayers. See: 
http://www.corriere.it/economia/15_giugno_13/fisco-10-milioni-italiani-versano-55-euro-
anno-446a4af8-118e-11e5-8b3a-62b7e966c494.shtml; 
http://www.economiaepolitica.it/lavoro-e-diritti/diritti/giustizia-e-ordine-
pubblico/fenomenologia-dellevasione-fiscale-in-italia. 
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exogeneity of the three shocks is fundamental since it avoids introducing any 
predetermined ad-hoc relationship between the level of public debt and its 
reduction: it would be misleading to reduce public debt only above a given 
threshold. As a consequence, the debt reductions should be interpreted as an 
exogenous political action.  
In the first treatment, T1, the first public debt reduction occurs at the 
beginning of round 3, while in the second treatment, T2, it occurs at the 
beginning of round 6. The other two shocks are planned at round 9 and 13 
respectively. The scope of this differentiation is to formally check whether 
subjects’ allocations are affected by the time of the first debt reduction. 
Furthermore, treatment T1 is carried out also with the inclusion of a random 
mechanism of audit and fines for tax evasion, in order to control for the free-
riding behaviour in the experiment as explained in Section 3.5.  
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
For T1 and T2, the two treatments without tax controls, I actually carried out 
two experimental sessions collecting data from 38 subjects and 40 subjects 
respectively. For T1 with tax controls, I carried out three experimental sessions 
collecting data from 56 subjects. However, the data collected through one of 
these sessions have been excluded from the empirical analysis because the 
number of participants was low (16) and because the instructions were clearly 
misunderstood at the beginning of the experiment by a group of participants 
that did not read the instructions. Therefore, I considered data from two 
sessions and 40 subjects only. 
Considering at first T1 and T2, I constructed one panel dataset for each 
treatment with the inclusion of the following variables: individual consumption, 
tax compliance, and savings levels, the two forecast variables for debt reduction 
(Forecast 1) and debt sustainability (Forecast 2), in addition to public debt, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and public deficits, which are equal for all subjects. Data 
about consumption, tax compliance, savings, public debt, and the two forecast 
variables have also been aggregated to construct an aggregate panel dataset 
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based on "macroeconomic" variables, in which the panel units are the 
experimental sessions without tax controls. In details, consumption, tax 
compliance, and savings for all participants have been summed up and 
expressed in terms of endowment to make them comparable throughout 
different sessions and rounds, while Forecast 1 and Forecast 2 have been 
averaged to obtain the average market sentiment. The GDP dynamics is 
entirely given by the dynamics of the aggregate consumption since the 
experimental GDP is the sum of individual consumptions and of the constant 
public expenditure16. Therefore, the three main variables are the outstanding 
debt ― that followed, as anticipated, an uprising dynamics (see Figure 4.3) ― 
and the consumption and savings levels, whose dynamics is discussed in the 
next sections. Data have been analysed with Matlab R2016b, while econometric 
panel models have been estimated with Stata 13. 
 
Figure 4.3. Public debt, experimental dynamics. 
 
Legend. T11: first session of the first treatment; T12: second session of the first treatment; T21: 
first session of the second treatment; T22: second session of the second treatment; T1TC1: first 
session of the first treatment with tax audits; T1TC2: second session of the second treatment 
with tax audits. 
 
4.1. Qualitative analysis, no tax controls 
 4.1.1. Treatment 1, results 
I carried out two experimental sessions for each treatment; details are reported 
in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. The first session of T1 was composed by 18 subjects, 
                                                          
16 I am aware of the fact that my artificial GDP measure cannot comprise all the aspects of the 
real-world GDP, but consumption is usually highly correlated with the GDP and my goal is to 
get insight into the consumption’s side of growth. 
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8 males and 10 females, whose mean age was 22.39 years. The average final 
payment was euro 9.06, with a minimum of euro 6 and a maximum of euro 12. 
The second session was composed by 18 subjects, 9 males and 9 females, whose 
mean age was 21.72 years, and the average final payment was euro 9.67, with 
a minimum of euro 6 and a maximum of euro 13. Figure 4.4 shows the dynamics 
and the detailed boxplots of average consumptions, collected taxes, and savings 
for the first session. As one can see, the consumption trend and the savings 
trend are both upward sloping, while the tax compliance trend is clearly 
downward sloping. Moreover, there are some differences in the response of 
these variables to the debt-reduction shocks. The response of consumption is 
unambiguous: after each shock, the average consumption increased. The same 
occurred for the tax compliance level, with the exception of the first early shock, 
while the dynamics of the average savings level increased after the first and the 
third shocks, but it decreased after the second (though the general positive 
trend were never reversed). 
The figures depicting the results of the second session of T1 are shown in 
Figure 4.5. The general after-shock behaviours of consumption, savings, and 
tax compliance are comparable to the dynamics of the first session, but the 
overall dynamics of consumption and savings are rather different. In fact, 
between the first and the second shock, the participants increased their savings, 
giving rise to an outstanding upward trend. After the second shock, however, 
this trend was abruptly reversed, reaching an exceptionally high consumption 
level and an exceptionally low savings level, then promptly adjusted during the 
subsequent round. This behaviour is in line with the intuitive optimal strategy 
for consumption and savings discussed above, even though it must be noticed 
that the savings level reached a local maximum just before the end of the 
experiment, while, at the same time, consumption did not increase during the 
last rounds. Moreover, during the first part of the experiment, savings was 
certainly excessive. 
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Table 4.3. Laboratory sessions, synthesis. 
Treatment Session Participant M F Average 
Age 
Average 
Payment 
T1, no tax controls 1 18 8 10 22.39 9.06 
 2 20 6 14 21.50 8.15 
T2, no tax controls 1 18 9 9 21.72 9.67 
 2 18 9 9 21.94 8.50 
T1, tax controls 1 20 9 11 22.35 8.15 
 2 20 3 17 21.50 8.45 
 Discarded 16 5 11 21.44 8.75 
Total   49 81 / / 
 
Treatment Session From 
economic 
sciences 
Right 
Italian 
DtG 
Italian 
DtG will 
increase 
Italian DtG, 
sustainability 
DtG, 
consumption 
T1, no tax 
controls 
1 8 8 11 4 13 
 2 11 7 16 1 18 
T2, no tax 
controls 
1 13 10 13 6 16 
 2 9 8 8 5 9 
T1, tax 
controls 
1 6 10 11 2 14 
 2 14 7 13 5 13 
 Discarded 12 4 11 1 12 
Total  73 54 83 24 95 
 
Table 4.4. Means and standard deviations of savings (S), tax compliance (T) and 
consumption (C) for each session. 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Treatment Session S T C S T C 
T1, no tax controls 1 13.94 5.12 12.77 22.67 3.28 5.81 
 2 14.69 3.91 13.79 22.13 4.06 7.38 
T2, no tax controls 1 16.15 3.02 14.86 23.02 3.93 13.86 
 2 21.34 2.87 13.96 35.39 3.68 11.33 
T1, tax controls 1 10.68 6.09 12.63 16.59 3.21 10.81 
 2 11.15 6.88 11.41 12.3 2.35 4.29 
 
Figure 4.4. Average consumption, savings, and tax compliance dynamics with boxplots 
without outliers. Treatment 1 without tax controls, Session 1. 
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Figure 4.5. Average consumption, savings, and tax compliance dynamics with boxplots 
without outliers. Treatment 1 without tax controls, Session 2. 
 
 161 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysing the aggregate macroeconomic variables expressed in terms of total 
endowment and depicted in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 for the first and the 
second session respectively, results are even more engaging. For the first 
session of T1, the consumptions-to-endowment ratio (CtE) is clearly downward 
sloping, while the savings-to-endowment (StE) ratio is upward sloping and 
steeper than the former. Furthermore, the CtE ratio strongly increased after 
each shock, but it decreased immediately after. On the contrary, the StE ratio 
remained almost constant or slightly increased in the two rounds that followed 
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the shocks (though to a lower extent than consumption), with the only exception 
of the last shock, that evidently had the largest impact on savings. 
 
Figure 4.6. Aggregate consumptions-to-endowment (CtE) and savings-to-endowment (StE) 
ratios. Treatment 1 without tax controls, Session 1. 
 
Figure 4.7. Aggregate consumptions-to-endowment (CtE) and savings-to-endowment (StE) 
ratios. Treatment 1 without tax controls, Session 2. 
 
 
On the one hand, the behaviour of the two trends is surprising: though savings 
did not contribute to the final payment, and though subjects were aware of the 
fact that the experiment could have finished after round 10, they steadily 
decreased consumptions and increased savings with respect to their total 
endowment, so that the highest StE ratio was reached in the last round. 
On the other hand, the short-term response of consumption after each shock 
can clearly be ascribed to a myopic behaviour, indeed immediately corrected in 
the subsequent round. In general terms, this behaviour is in line with the bomb 
crater effect discussed by Guala and Mittone (2005) and Mittone (2006), and it 
probably reflects the belief that debt could not have been reduced for two 
consecutive rounds. Similar conclusions can be achieved for the second session, 
though the two trends are affected by the break occurred after the second shock.  
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 4.1.2. Treatment 2, results 
The second treatment was implemented in two experimental sessions. The first 
session was composed by 20 subjects, 6 males and 14 females, whose mean age 
was 21.50 years, and the average final payments was euro 8.15, with a 
minimum of euro 7 and a maximum of euro 13. The second session was 
composed by 18 subjects, 9 males and 9 females, whose mean age was 21.94 
years, and the average final payments was euro 8.50, with a minimum of euro 
6 and a maximum of euro 10. 
The patterns discussed for the first treatment emerged also in the two sessions 
of the second treatment (see Figure 4.8 for the first session, and Figure 4.9 for 
the second session). The consumptions average level responded positively to the 
three debt shocks but for one round only, whereas savings responded positively 
too, with only one exception (the second shock of the second session ― see Figure 
4.9). Little can be said for the average contribution level, which seems to 
increase temporarily after the debt-reduction shocks.  
The dynamics of the aggregate StE and CtE ratios (Figures 4.10 and 4.11) are 
also comparable to the first treatment, although the two trends are evidently 
smoother for the first session and steeper for the second session. Note two 
important caveats, however. Firstly, in the first session the level of the StE ratio 
exceeded the level of the CtE ratio after the second shock, which means that 
subjects started to save more when the experiment could have finished. 
Secondly, in the second session the level of the StE ratio is always higher than 
the level of the CtE ratio.  
 
Figure 4.8. Average consumption, savings, and tax compliance dynamics with boxplots 
without outliers. Treatment 2 without tax controls, Session 1. 
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Figure 4.9. Average consumption, savings, and tax compliance dynamics with boxplots 
without outliers. Treatment 2 without tax controls, Session 2. 
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Figure 4.10. Aggregate consumptions-to-endowment (CtE) and savings-to-endowment (StE) 
ratios. Treatment 2 without tax controls, Session 1. 
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Figure 4.11. Aggregate consumptions-to-endowment (CtE) and savings-to-endowment (StE) 
ratios. Treatment 2 without tax controls, Session 2. 
 
 
Finally, T2 has been formally compared with T1 through an ANOVA F-test, to 
check whether the differences among the means of the treatments were 
significantly different. Given a commonly adopted 5 %  significance level, the p-
values shown in Table 4.5 do not allow to reject the null of equal means for 
consumption, savings, and the gross endowment. On the contrary, the null is 
rejected for tax compliance, which, however, depends only on the participants’ 
honesty and free-riding propensity. 
 
Table 4.5. ANOVA, comparison of T1 and T2 without tax controls. 
 F statistics P-value #Obs. Root MSE 
Savings 3.11 0.0782 1110 26.3788 
Consumption 0.01 0.9276 1110 10.0587 
Tax compliance 7.93 0.0049 1110 3.8450 
Endowment 1.94 0.1635 1110 26.2384 
 
 4.1.3. Forecasts, results 
The fundamental part of this experimental design is represented by subjects’ 
expectations, whose average dynamics are depicted from Figure 4.12 to Figure 
4.16. Considering the debt-reduction related expectation (Forecast 1), the 
average number of subjects expecting a debt reduction increased after the first 
and the second shocks, but it decreases after the third shock, probably reflecting 
the belief that a further shock was unlikely. On the contrary, subjects reacted 
differently between the first and the second treatment for what concern 
sustainability-related expectations (Forecast 2). Interestingly, when the 
average perceived sustainability was relatively low, it increased after the shock, 
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but when it was relatively high, it decreased. On the whole, however, the 
dynamics of Forecast2 followed the same decreasing trend throughout each 
session, clearly in opposite direction to the debt dynamics. 
 
Figure 4.12. Aggregate expectations, fraction of "Debt will be reduced in the next round" 
(Forecast1), and average sustainability perception (Forecast2). 
Treatment 1 without tax controls, Session 1. 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Aggregate expectations, fraction of "Debt will be reduced in the next round" 
(Forecast1), and average sustainability perception (Forecast2). 
Treatment 2 without tax controls, Session 1. 
 
Figure 4.14. Aggregate expectations, fraction of "Debt will be reduced in the next round" 
(Forecast1), and average sustainability perception (Forecast2). 
Treatment 1 without tax controls, Session 2. 
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Figure 4.15. Aggregate expectations, fraction of "Debt will be reduced in the next round" 
(Forecast1), and average sustainability perception (Forecast2). 
Treatment 2 without tax controls, Session 2.
 
 
4.2. Research question 1 
According to the first research question ― "Is there a confidence channel linking 
public debt and the consumption side of economic growth?" ― a variation in 
subjects’ expectations should be associated with a significant variation in the 
consumption level (note that nothing is said about its sign). To find evidence 
against or in favour of this argument, I estimated several regression models on 
the basis of the aggregate variables, linking the growth rate of the CtE ratio 
(i.e. the experimental GDP growth rate) to the growth rates of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and of the forecast variables, then adding several other controls. The basic 
panel model is thus: 
(4.23) 1 1 2 3 41it i it it it it itdCtE dCtE dDtG dF DR    −= + + + + +  
where i  refers to the experimental session, t  refers to the round or period, 
itdCtE  is the growth rate of the aggregate consumption-to-endowment, i  is the 
unobserved individual component, itdDtG  is the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP, 
dF1it is the first difference of Forecast 1 (debt-reduction forecasts for the 
following round), itDR  is a dummy variable indicating the rounds of the debt-
reduction shocks, and it  is an error term with the usual statistical properties. 
The other variables that have been considered are itdStE  and itdTtE , the savings 
and the tax compliance growth rates respectively. For all these variables is 
possible to reject the null of "Panels contain unit-root" according to two panel 
unit-root tests, the Harris-Tzavalis test with the small-sample correction, and 
the Breitung test (see Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.6. Panel unit-root tests, p-values. 
 Variable 
 dCtE dDtG dF1 dF2 dStE dTtE 
Harris-Tzavalis* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Breitung 0 0 0.004 0 0.006 0.003 
*with small-sample correction. 
 
Given the limited number of panel units (N = 4) and time periods (T = 15), 
common GMM estimators such as Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover would be 
inappropriate (their asymptotic properties require N→∞). Therefore, I 
estimated the pooled-OLS version of model (4.23) and adopted the 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors17. Results are shown in Table 4.7.  
 
Table 4.7. RQ1, panel estimation for dCtE. 
Specification 1 2 3 CM1 
Dep. Var. dCtE dCtE dCtE dCtE 
dCtE(-1) 0.0595 0.2028 0.1238 0.1953 
 (0.1686) (0.1438) (0.1188) (0.1440) 
dDtG -1.0967** -1.4767*** -1.4859*** -1.4858*** 
 (0.4447) (0.3383) (0.3073) (0.3339) 
dF1 -0.0367* -0.0095 0.0845 - 
 (0.0183) (0.0163) (0.0569) - 
dStE(-1) - -0.5605*** -0.5275*** -0.4902*** 
 - (0.1522) (0.1392) (0.1331) 
dTtE(-1) - 0.1523 0.1119 - 
 - (0.1425) (0.1168) - 
DR -0.2814*** -0.2436*** -0.2496*** -0.2541*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0442) (0.0436) (0.0431) 
dDtG*dF1 - - -0.5809** -0.2321** 
 - - (0.2887) (0.1113) 
Const. 0.3237*** 0.4266*** 0.4109*** 0.4194*** 
 (0.0980) (0.0795) (0.0727) (0.0757) 
     
#Obs. 52 52 52 52 
Adj. R2 0.6007 0.7848 0.8115 0.7969 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The basic specification is shown in column 1, from which three facts emerge. 
First, the consumption growth rate and the debt-to-GDP growth rate are linked 
through a negative significant relationship, entailing that an increase in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a decrease in the consumption-to-
                                                          
17 It must be underlying, however, that the Arellano-Bond and the Arellano-Bover 
estimators approximately led to the same estimated coefficients of the pooled-OLS 
estimator. 
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endowment ratio. Second, the estimated parameter of itDR  is negative and 
significant: it captures the negative impact of the debt-reduction shock on the 
level of the CtE ratio. Third, the coefficient of 1itdF  is negative and significant, 
thus capturing the inverse relationship between the public debt and the CtE 
ratio described above. In other words, if subjects’ expectations about a debt 
consolidation worsen, they react by reducing their consumption level with 
respect to their endowment. 
The second column of Table 4.7 adds two explanatory variables: the savings-
to-endowment (StE) and the taxation-to-endowment (TtE) growth rates. The 
former variable is significant and negative, implying that an increase in the StE 
ratio is associated with a decrease in the CtE ratio in the subsequent round, a 
fact that stems directly from the dynamics of the two variables described in the 
qualitative analysis. The latter, instead, is not statistically significant, thus 
underlying that the dynamics of the TtE ratio is mainly influenced by individual 
behavioural aspects. Noteworthy, the significance and the sign of the other 
variables included in the basic model do not change, with the only exception of 
dF1it, whose estimated coefficient is not significant. The lagged dependent 
variable, instead, is not significant. 
Recalling the analysis performed in Chapter 2, the third column of Table 4.7 
adds an interaction term between the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio and 
dF1 in order to describe their joint impact on dCtE. Estimation results confirm 
the non-significance of dF1, but its negative impact on the dependent variable 
is fully captured by the interaction term. At the same time, the sign and the 
statistical significance of the other variables are not affected. This model can 
reveal the existence of a scale effect between dDtG and dF1, according to which 
a large variation in both the debt-to-GDP ratio and the expectations of a debt 
reduction entails a larger negative impact on CtE.  
On the basis of this analysis, the econometric specification used to describe the 
relationship between the variables of interest is CM1 (Table 4.6, column 4), a 
specification that do not incorporate the lagged dTtE (never significant) and 
dF1. With respect to the model in column 3, the only difference is in the 
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magnitude of the coefficient of the interaction term, which is affected by the 
exclusion of dF1. 
According to this model, the existence of a confidence channel between 
consumption and public debt seems reasonable, a channel that associates a 
worsening in the expectations of a debt reduction ― or, in general, to the 
expectations of worse fiscal measures ― to a reduction in the consumption level. 
 
4.3. Research question 2 
The previous analysis is extended to incorporate the concept of perceived debt 
sustainability, directly elicited during the experiment with the debt-
sustainability expectation in order to answer to the second research question ― 
"Does the perceived debt sustainability affect the choices of the subjects?". The 
variable of interest is thus Forecast 2, whose rate of change is indicated with 
2itdF . The analysis takes two directions: I expand equation (4.23) to incorporate 
the new forecast variable, and I employ the same strategy adopted in Section 
4.2 to describe the behaviour of the aggregate StE ratio and CtE ratio. 
The first part of the analysis aims at identifying the impact of the perceived 
sustainability on the consumption level, alone, and jointly with the debt-
reduction forecast (F1). Therefore, equation (4.23) is developed to incorporate 
2itdF  
(4.24) 1 1 2 3 4 52 * 2it i it it it it it it itdCtE dCtE dDtG dF dDt dF DR     −= + + + + + +  
and then 1itdF  and 2itdF  together: 
(4.25) 1 1 2 3 4 52 ( * 2 )it i it it it it it it itdCtE dCtE dDtG dF dDt dF DR     −= + + + + + +  
where ( * 2 )it itdDt dF  indicates the interaction term between the two variables. 
Estimation results are shown in Table 4.8.  
The first column, which refers to equation (4.24), confirms the negative impact 
of debt on consumption, but 2itdF  is not statistically significant. This result 
changes once the model is expanded to incorporate other explanatory variables. 
Column 2 shows that 2itdF  becomes positive and significant if an interaction 
term is added: a positive variation in the perceived sustainability has a positive 
 172 
 
impact on the consumption level, which is partly compensated by the negative 
sign of the interaction term. 
 
Table 4.8. RQ2, panel estimation for dCtE. 
Specification 1 2 3 4 CM2 
Dep. Var. dCtE dCtE dCtE dCtE dCtE 
dCtE(-1) 0.0795 0.2046 0.2020 0.1307 0.2099 
 (0.1749) (0.1452) (0.1466) (0.1193) (0.1526) 
dDtG -1.0841** -1.4757*** -1.4801*** -1.4974*** -1.4818*** 
 (0.4416) (0.3494) (0.3545) (0.3241) (0.3615) 
dF1 - - -0.0098 0.0780 - 
 - - (0.0149) (0.0579) - 
dF2 0.0916 0.3019** 0.3025** 0.2828** 0.2442** 
 (0.1035) (0.1158) (0.1159) (0.1200) (0.1204) 
dStE(-1) - -0.5755*** -0.5704*** -0.5432*** -0.4795*** 
 - (0.1524) (0.1544) (0.1391) (0.1354) 
dTtE(-1) - 0.2308 0.2315 0.1978 - 
 - (0.1498) (0.1511) (0.1250) - 
DR -0.3084*** -0.2263*** -0.2212*** -0.2308*** -0.2461*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0386) (0.0401) (0.0385) (0.0401) 
dDtG*dF1 - - - -0.5464* -0.2216** 
 - - - (0.2982) (0.1074) 
dDtG*dF2 - -0.8762* -0.8705* -0.6928 -0.7473 
 - (0.4995) (0.5052) (0.5808) (0.5388) 
Const. 0.3163*** 0.4248*** 0.4269*** 0.4151*** 0.4155*** 
 (0.0959) (0.0847) (0.0860) (0.0765) -0.0833 
      
#Obs 52 52 52 52 52 
Adj. R2 0.5967 0.8128 0.8093 0.8331 0.8113 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Column 3 reports the estimation of equation (4.25), and shows that the 
previous results, in terms of sign and significance, are confirmed. In fact, not 
only the coefficients of 2itdF  and of the interaction term are comparable to those 
of the second column, but also 1itdF  is not statistically significant as in Table 
4.8. With respect to 2itdF  and its interaction term, this result is confirmed by 
the model in column 4, in which the significant interaction term of dF1it is 
added. On the basis of these results and out of consideration of the adjusted R2, 
the chosen model is CM2 (column 5), which does not include dF1 and, as before, 
dTtE.  
The second part of the analysis aims at identifying the impact of the perceived 
sustainability on savings. Following the same steps, for brevity only the chosen 
model (CM3) is reported in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9. RQ2, panel estimation for dStE. 
Specification CM3 
Dep. Var. dStE 
dStE(-1) -0.1779 
 (0.1571) 
dDtG 0.8800*** 
 (0.2133) 
dF1 0.0693* 
 (0.0352) 
dF2 0.1213 
 0.1048 
dCtE(-1) -0.2864** 
 (0.1308) 
dTtE(-1) - 
 - 
DR -0.4200*** 
 (0.0702) 
dDtG(-1)*dF1 -0.2012 
 (0.1951) 
dDtG(-1)*dF2 -0.5301* 
 (0.3128) 
Const. -0.0056 
 (0.0545) 
  
#Obs. 52 
Adj. R2 0.5104 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
By looking at the estimation results, a statistically positive relationship links 
dDtGit and dStEit, entailing that an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
associated with an increase in the savings-to-endowment ratio. As expected, the 
same occurs for dF1: if the expectations about a debt reduction worsen, the 
savings level increase. On the other hand, dF2it is not statistically significant, 
but the related interaction term with dDtGit shows a possible non-linear 
(negative) relationship of the perceived sustainability, which depends on dDtGit 
itself.  
The negative sign of itDR  reflects the already recognised bomb crater effect, 
according to which a debt shock is usually followed by a decrease in the savings 
level and an increase in the consumption level. This short-life effect could be 
seen as supporting the expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis, according 
to which a debt consolidation is followed by an expansion in the aggregate 
demand, but in fact it is only an experimental phenomenon (see Guala and 
Mittone, 2005; Mittone, 2006). 
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Finally, it can be observed that the negative relationship in models CM1 and 
CM2 between consumption and savings arises anew between savings and 
consumption, thus confirming the reverse relationship between the two 
variables. Moreover, the relationship between dTtEit and savings within this 
framework is not theoretically defined. For this reason, and since the variable 
was not significant, dTtEit has been excluded from model CM3. 
In conclusion, I have shown that an increase in the perception of a debt 
reduction is associated with a decrease in the consumption-to-endowment level 
and an increase in the savings-to-endowment level, while an increase in the 
perceived sustainability is associated with an increase in the consumption-to-
endowment level, but it appears to have no impact on the savings-to-
endowment level. 
These findings are in line and expand the comprehension of the qualitative 
analysis: a situation of increasing public debt in which people might be forced 
to pay an uncertain amount and to bear the cost of the debt reduction is 
associated with relatively high and increasing aggregate savings and 
decreasing aggregate consumptions. Moreover, an increase in the debt-
reduction expectations and a decrease in the perceived debt sustainability are 
linked to a reduction in the CtE ratio and an increase in the StE ratio, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 2.  
 
4.4. Analysis of residuals 
The residuals of three "chosen models" CM1, CM2, and CM3 have been 
analysed through a couple of tests (see Table 4.10) to evaluate the goodness of 
fit. 
First, the Arellano-Bond panel test has been applied to test for the presence of 
first order and second order residuals autocorrelation, which can bias the 
standard errors and affect the other statistical tests, but the null of no serial 
correlation has not been rejected18. 
                                                          
18 Though the Arellano-Bond test statistic requires N→∞, the results can give an 
indication of the presence of autocorrelation. 
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On the contrary, the p-values of the pooled Shapiro-Wilk test have allowed to 
reject the null of normality. This test, however, has been repeated for the same 
series without the outliers referred to the post-shock reactions and, in this case, 
normality has not been rejected at 5% for CM2 and CM3 and at 1% for CM1. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that, even with DRit, the estimated models are 
unable to capture the impact of the shocks, both in terms of consumption and 
savings. 
Then, the estimation of the specifications in Table 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 have been 
repeated excluding the first two observations for each variable in order to check 
whether the results were influenced by the number of observations and whether 
they were highly determined by the behaviour of the participants at the 
beginning of the experiment, when they are commonly deemed to be still on a 
learning path. The estimation results confirmed the previous findings; in fact, 
the estimated coefficient did not change much, both in terms of significance, 
sign, and value.  
Finally, I have estimated the chosen models without including the constant 
term. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients changed, naturally, but the 
sign and the significance levels were not much affected. Since the constant is 
almost always significant, it interacts with itDR , and it does not affect the 
analysis, I have decided to keep it.  
 
Table 4.10. Tests on chosen models’ residuals (CM1, CM2, CM3): 
autocorrelation and normality. 
 
 Autocorrelation 
Test CM1 CM2 CM3 Result 
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0806 0.0529 0.8310 No autocorrelation 
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.7829 0.8128 0.0827 No autocorrelation 
 
 Normality 
Test CM1 CM2 CM3 Result 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Non-normality 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.0271 0.1389 0.8625 Normality 
 
4.5. Qualitative analysis, tax controls 
Despite being freely possible to avoid paying taxes, during the four 
experimental sessions without tax controls it was observed a positive average 
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contribution level that may reflect both honesty propensity and concern about 
the cost of a debt reduction. However, average contributions fell steadily during 
each of the four sessions as a consequence of the rise in the free-riding behaviour 
that had the direct consequence of feeding the public debt uprising dynamics. 
To examine whether this behaviour had an impact on the subjects’ choices, I 
implemented the first treatment with the fiscal audits mechanism explained in 
Section 3.5. The details about the two sessions are reported above, in the last 
two rows of Table 4.3. 
The results of the first session with tax controls are shown in Figure 4.16 and 
Figure 4.17. They are in line with the previous discussion and, in particular, 
with the results of the second session of T1 (Figure 4.5): the general after-shock 
response of consumption and tax compliance is positive, while the response of 
savings is positive except for the second debt shock, when participants 
increased their consumption level permanently while they kept the level of 
savings low. Therefore, the second debt-reduction shock coincided with a break: 
between the first and the second shock, subjects constantly increased their 
savings, giving rise to an upward trend that was reversed after the second shock 
(Figure 4.17). This aggregate behaviour is the closest to the intuitive optimal 
strategy for consumption and savings, even though the CtE ratio decreased 
after the time break and the StE ratio was on a slightly upward trend. Also the 
average forecast variables followed the path already recognised in the previous 
sessions: looking at Figure 4.18, the perceived sustainability (Forecast2) 
decreased constantly with the only exception of a temporary increase after the 
second debt-reduction shock, while the average perceived probability of a debt 
reduction (Forecast1) is less informative in this case but, as usual, it increased 
after the first and the second shock and it decreased after the third one, 
probably reflecting the approaching of the end of the experiment. The second 
session with tax controls confirms these results. Starting from Figure 4.21, the 
dynamics of the average Forecast1 does not show relevant differences with 
respect to the previous analysis, while the dynamics of Forecast2 is more shock-
dependent. At the same time, Figure 4.20 depicts a situation that is in contrast 
with the one depicted in Figure 4.17: the StE ratio steadily increased, but it 
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became greater than the CtE ratio in the second part of the experiment, while 
at the beginning it was much lower. However, though the dynamics of savings 
did not seem to be affected by fiscal audits, what emerges from both Figure 4.17 
and Figure 4.20 is the fact that the StE ratio seems translated downwards with 
respect to the no-tax-controls sessions. In fact, by looking at the first two 
columns of Table 4.4, the average level of savings in the two sessions with tax 
controls is not only lower than in the sessions without tax controls, but also 
lower than the average consumption, which remained comparable with the 
previous average values. 
Recapitulating, both sessions contributed to show three outstanding results: 
a) tax evasion was not totally eradicated, but it was curbed and the decreasing 
trend observed for paid taxes disappeared; b) on the whole, the results are 
comparable with the four sessions without tax controls; c) the level of the CtE 
ratio does not seem to be strongly affected by tax controls, but the level of the 
StE ratio appears to be lower, as if the burden of the higher contribution level 
were mainly borne by savings. 
 
Figure 4.16. Average consumption, savings, and tax compliance dynamics with boxplots 
without outliers. Treatment 1 with tax controls, Session 1. 
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Figure 4.17. Aggregate consumptions-to-endowment (CtE) and savings-to-endowment (StE) 
ratios. Treatment 1 with tax controls, Session 1. 
 
Figure 4.18. Aggregate expectations, fraction of "Debt will be reduced in the next round" 
(Forecast1), and average sustainability perception (Forecast2). 
Treatment 1 with tax controls, Session 1. 
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Figure 4.19. Average consumptions-to-endowment (CtE) and savings-to-endowment (StE) 
ratios. Treatment 1 with tax controls, Session 2. 
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Figure 4.20. Aggregate consumptions-to-endowment (CtE) and savings-to-endowment (StE) 
ratios. Treatment 1 with tax controls, Session 2. 
 
Figure 4.21. Aggregate expectations, fraction of "Debt will be reduced in the next round" 
(Forecast1), and average sustainability perception (Forecast2). 
Treatment 1 with tax controls, Session 2. 
 
 
4.6. Research question 3 
To study the influence of the average higher amount of taxes paid by the 
participants as a consequence of the controls on tax evasion, I constructed a 
dataset formed by the four sessions without tax controls and the two sessions 
with tax controls. To compare the experimental sessions, I excluded the forecast 
variables and I included, beyond the growth rate of the dTtEit ratio, an 
interaction term meant to capture the impact of the tax-control: dTtE*D, where 
D is a dummy variable equals to 1 for the two sessions with tax controls and 
equals to 0 for the experimental sessions without tax controls. Results are 
shown in Table 4.11. 
As it can be observed, the interaction term on which I focus is not statistically 
significant for the dCtE regression (model CM2b), but it is slightly significant 
and negative for the dStE regression (model CM3b). Beyond statistical 
significance, the negative sign reflects the conclusions of the qualitative analysis. 
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Table 4.11. RQ3, panel estimation for dCtE and dStE. 
Specification CM2b CM3b 
Dependent Var. dCtE dStE 
dCtE(-1) -0.1064 -0.2251** 
 (0.1168) (0.1139) 
dStE(-1) -0.4894*** -0.1870 
 (0.1343)*** (0.1429) 
dDtG -1.2719 0.6951*** 
 (0.2827) (0.1835) 
DR -0.2797*** -0.3386*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0436) 
dTtE(-1) 0.0916 0.0926 
 (0.1248) (0.1104) 
dTtE(-1)*D 0.0706 -0.3143* 
 (0.2062) (0.1735) 
Const. 0.3470*** 0.0261 
 (0.0620) (0.0442) 
   
#Obs. 78 78 
Adj. R2 0.7481 0.5173 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
All robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
On the whole, subjects compensated for the higher contributions due to the 
fiscal audits by reducing savings. This result sheds light on a possible 
dangerous condition, represented by a situation in which people, given their 
endowment, sacrifice savings in order to pay relatively higher taxes and to 
maintain a certain level of consumption. In such a case, however, subjects’ 
endowment grows slower and they are more exposed to unexpected shocks, 
beyond hampering future consumption. This fact is also confirmed by the values 
shown in Table 4.4 ― it is evident that the average savings in the two sessions 
with tax controls are lower than in the other sessions ― and from Figure 4.22: 
whereas the two linear interpolation functions for dCtEit overlap (panel B), the 
interpolation functions referring to dStE go in opposite directions (panel A): the 
line that refers to the experimental sessions with tax controls has slightly 
negative slope, while the line that refers to the to the experimental sessions 
without tax controls has positive and statistical significant slope. 
This finding is also in line with the common impact of taxation on the savings 
rate, according to which an increase in income taxes negatively affects the 
savings rate (see for instance Zee and Tanzi, 1998). Accordingly, the adopted 
experimental design seems to be empirically robust as it can capture this 
phenomenon even in a quite complex framework. 
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In conclusion, the level of the StE ratio of the two sessions in which subjects 
faced a tax control mechanism are relatively lower than the level of the StE 
ratio registered without such a mechanism, thus making subjects relatively 
poorer in the long-run and more exposed to the shocks. 
 
Figure 4.22. Linear relationships between dStE and dTtE (panel a) and dCtE and dTtE (panel 
b). Sessions without tax controls (black) and sessions with tax controls (red).  
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
4.7. Questionnaire and risk aversion, results 
Subjects’ knowledge about the topic was assessed at the end of the experiment 
through a number of questions (Table 4.1). All in all, the knowledge of the 
Italian financial situation looks poor, as the right 2017 Italian debt-to-GDP 
ratio slot (120-140% ) was selected by only 41.54 %  of the participants. This 
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should be seen as an advantage that confirms that the participants could not be 
considered as "experts". Moreover, to check whether this fact had an impact on 
the aggregate results discussed in the previous sections, I included in 
specifications CM1 and CM2 two explanatory variables19: the percentage of 
students from economic sciences ("Economics") and the percentage of right 
answers to the Italian actual debt-to-GDP question ("Right Italian DtG"). 
Results in Table 4.12 confirm that neither of these variables is significant. 
Nevertheless, the awareness of a relatively problematic Italian situation 
emerges from other two questions: 63.85%  of the participants believes that the 
Italian debt-to-GDP ratio will increase in the near future, while only 18.46 %  
believes that it is sustainable. Noteworthy, 73.08 %  of the participants reckons 
that the public debt level somehow affects the private consumption level, but 
this result might depend on the experiment itself and would deserve further 
research. 
For what concern the degree of risk aversion, the Holt and Laury task has 
always led to an average degree of risk aversion included between 0.61 and 0.75, 
thus confirming that subjects were, on average, mid risk averse, a result that is 
in line with the savings and consumption behaviour observed in the experiment. 
The results for each session and the distribution of the degree of risk aversion 
are shown in Figure 4.23. 
 
Table 4.12. Panel estimation for dCtE and dStE, further controls. 
Model CM2c CM3c CM2d CM3d 
Dep. Variable dCtE dStE dCtE dStE 
Explanatory 
variables 
[...] [...] [...] [...] 
Economics 0.0404 -0.0657 - - 
 (0.1529) (0.1872) - - 
Right Italian DtG - - -0.6084 -0.1397 
 - - (0.3890) (0.5679) 
     
#Obs. 52 52 52 52 
Adj. R2 0.8071 0.4993 0.8260 0.5001 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Because of collinearity, the two variables were included separately. 
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Figure 4.23. Halt and Laury task, average degree of risk aversion, standard deviations, and 
overall distribution. 
 
Session T1, 1 T1, 2 T2, 1 T2, 2 TC, 1 TC, 2 
Mean 0.6167 0.6722 0.6500 0.7000 0.6889 0.7444 
Std. Dev. 0.2771 0.1965 0.1948 0.2401 0.1906 0.1854 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter studied the relationship between public debt and the consumption 
side of economic growth from an experimental macroeconomics point of view, 
by analysing whether consumers’ expectations about public debt and the 
uncertainty about the fiscal behaviour of the government affect their decisions 
in terms of consumption and savings choices.  
I implemented a laboratory experiment in which the participants earned an 
income to be allocated between consumption, savings, and voluntary taxation 
for an unknown number of rounds. The core of the experiment was represented 
by a public-good game with threshold: taxation was used to cover a given level 
of public expenditure, equally distributed to the participants at the beginning 
of each round. If the collected amount of taxes was lower than what was 
required, the government had to ask for an amount of exogenous debt in order 
to sustain its public expenditure. Then, at the beginning of each round the 
outstanding amount of public debt could have been reduced by accessing 
subjects’ savings. Within this framework, I elicited subjects’ expectations about 
their perceived debt sustainability and future debt reduction. 
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Conscious of the limits of this experimental design, I do not want to overstate 
its external validity, that is limited though the design is, in my opinion, 
empirically robust. In fact, the dynamics of public debt is determined by tax 
evasion which simply implies, as in reality, that the equality between 
government revenues and government spending does not hold. Nonetheless, 
results shed light on the existence of a confidence channel between public debt, 
fiscal policies, and consumptions, broader than the expectations channel of 
Sutherland (1997). As a matter of fact, findings have showed that subjects’ 
consumption and savings decisions seem to be affected by their debt 
expectations and by the uncertainty about the political intervention and its cost. 
As the public debt and the debt-to-GDP ratio increase, subjects reduce their 
consumption and increase savings with respect to their endowment, fearing the 
burden that they would bear if the government intervened to reduce the soaring 
public debt. This behaviour is not only explained by their expectations on a debt 
reduction, but also by their perceived debt sustainability: econometric 
estimations show that both forecast variables are significant and coherent with 
this conclusion. On a short-term perspective, instead, what we commonly 
observed is an increase in consumption and a decrease in savings after a debt-
reduction shock, in line with the experimental bomb crater effect. 
Summarising, a soaring public debt within an uncertain political framework 
triggered a combination of increasing savings and decreasing (or at least 
constant) consumption levels, influenced also by expectations that were found 
to be related to subjects’ decisions and that affected the experimental economic 
growth. The introduction of a tax evasion control did not alter the conclusions 
and showed that the participants sacrificed savings rather than consumption 
in order to bear a higher level of taxes, ending up being more exposed to the 
exogenous shocks. 
All these elements shed light on the existence of a confidence channel that, in 
uncertain periods like during the Sovereign Debt Crisis, might have negatively 
affected economic growth.  
 186 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Screenshots 
 
Figure A4.1. Counting task. The screen provided the number of tables counted correctly.
 
 
Figure A4.2. Allocation screen. The screen provided the suggested amount of taxes, the 
history of the past allocations, and the level of the public debt at the beginning of the round. 
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Figure A4.3. Allocation results and forecasts. Subjects could check their personal allocation 
and how public expenditure was subdivided between taxes and debt. Moreover, they were 
provided with the public-debt trajectory. 
 
 
Figure A4.4. Debt reduction. The screen shows the dynamics of the public debt and of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, together with information on debt interventions. 
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Laboratory instructions 
General instructions 
Good morning and thank you for having accepted to join this experiment. 
Please, do not talk with the other participants, remove your personal things 
from the desk and turn off your mobile phone. Pay attention to the experimental 
instructions and, should you have any question, raise your hand and ask the 
experimenters. 
You are about to join a study about decisions and expectations in an economic 
framework. Your answers will be anonymous, and the experimenters will not 
be able to associate them to your name.  
During the experiment you could gain an amount of money that will depend on 
your decisions and on the decisions of the other participants. Your gains will be 
expressed in tokens and then converted in Euro. 
You will also gain euro 3 for the participation.  
At the end of the experiment you are required to fill a questionnaire. 
 
Your decision 
The experiment consists of many rounds, between 10 and 20. This implies that 
it could finish at any time between round 10 and round 20, and it could not go 
further than round 20. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will join a task that determines the 
constant number of tokens that you will receive in each round. This amount is 
your income. 
Your total endowment is formed by your income and a governmental transfer 
which is computed as described below. You task is to allocate your total 
endowment between three choices: consumptions, taxation, and savings. 
 
- Round 1. 
1) Publix expenditure and taxation: 
The total amount of public expenditure (E) is constant and equal to 150 tokens 
per round. Taxation is required to cover it. The individual amount that you 
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should pay is shown on the computer screen, but you are free to decide how 
much to disburse.  
 
WITHOUT FISCAL AUDITS: 
The government will not check the paid amount and you cannot be sanctioned. 
 
WITH FISCAL AUDITS: 
The government will randomly check the paid amount and, if the taxes you paid 
are lower than the required amount, you will be sanctioned by a reduction of 
5% of your final payment. 
 
If the collected amount is lower than E=150, let’s say F<150, the government 
must finance the remaining amount of public spending (E-F) by asking for a 
loan with an interest rate of 15% for each round. Therefore, if the collected 
amount in round 1 is, for instance, F=50 tokens, the borrowed amount in round 
1 is D = (150-50) = 100 tokens. Interests are accrued in the next round and are 
equal to 100*0.15=15 tokens.  
The amount E+D=150 tokens will then be multiplied by 1.2 (120%) and will be 
equally distributed to all the participants. Therefore, each participant will 
receive (150*1.2)/20=9 tokens. If the collected amount is higher than 150 
tokens, that is F>150, F will be multiplied by 1.2 and distributed among all the 
participants at the beginning of the next round.  
Period 1 public expenditure is financed with debt only; thus, D1=E=150 tokens.  
In summary: 
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 + 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
 
Example: Let’s consider a total contribution of 80 tokens. The amount of debt 
is (150-80)=70 tokens. At the beginning of the next round, each participant will 
receive (150·1.2)/20=9 tokens, independently from the individual amount of 
paid taxes.  
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2) Consumption and savings: 
You can also spend your total endowment to buy a dummy basket of goods or 
you can save it to increase your endowment in the next rounds. 
Your consumption expenditure will determine your final payment as explained 
below (see "Final payment"). On your savings, instead, you will gain interests 
according to a fixed interest rate (10% per round). In this manner, if you save 
10 tokens, you will get 10*1.1=11 tokens in the next round.  
All your financial results are shown and described on the screen. 
 
- From round 2 to the end of the experiment. 
From round 2 to the end of the experiment you are again required to allocate 
you total endowment between consumption, taxation, and savings. The 
experiment will finish between round 10 and round 20. 
 
Government debt reduction 
The amount that the government must borrow to sustain public expenditure 
feeds public debt. The government can decide to reduce the total amount of debt 
at any time after round 1 according to a given probability p. This could never 
occur or occur at every round.  
To reduce its debt, the government uniformly withdraws the required amount 
from the total amount of savings. Two consequences are possible: 
 
• If your total amount of saved tokens is higher than the required amount, 
your savings will be reduced by this amount. 
 
• If your total amount of saved tokens is lower than the required amount, 
your savings will go to 0 and your final payment will be reduced by 15% 
(15 tokens for 100 tokens). In this case, government debt will be reduced 
by a lower than expected amount.  
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Example: If the individual number of tokens required to reduce government 
debt is 20 tokens and your total saving is 30 tokens, it will be reduced to (30-
20)=10 tokens. If the individual number of tokens required to reduce 
government debt is 20 tokens and your total saving is 15 tokens, it will be 
reduced to 0 tokens and your final payment will be reduced by 15%. Thus, if, for 
instance, you have accumulated 100 tokens, you will lose just 15 tokens, in this 
case less than the 20 tokens required for the debt reduction. 
 
Forecasts 
At the end of each round you are requested to answer to a couple of questions:  
 
Do you believe that public debt will be reduced by the government in 
the next round? 
 
If you believe that government debt will be reduced, you must insert 1; if you 
believe that public debt will NOT be reduced, you must insert 0.  
 
How many participants do you believe that think that the actual level 
of government debt is sustainable? 
 
where sustainability means the future ability of the government to repay its 
debt or, in other words, the ability of current and future earnings to cover the 
current level of public debt. You will gain 2 tokens at the end of the experiment 
for each correct answer. You will gain 0 tokens for each wrong answer. Should 
you have any question, please rise your hand and ask the experimenters. 
 
Example: If you believe that none of the participants (you excluded) believes 
that public debt is going to be reduced, you must insert 0. If you believe that 5 
participants (you excluded) believes that public debt is going to be reduced, you 
must insert 5.  
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Final payment 
Your final payment is determined by the sum of your consumptions 
expenditures whenever that amount is higher than 6 tokens per round 
(subsistence level of consumption). If the consumption expenditure of one period 
is lower than 6 tokens, it will not be considered for the final payment and it will 
reduced by 15% as explained above. This amount is then adjusted according to: 
• The number of penalties. 
• The number of right forecasts. 
Savings and public expenditure do not contribute to the final payment, which 
is, however, increased by 2 tokens for each correct answer to the two questions 
shown above. Then, the total amount of tokens is converted in Euro according 
to the conversion rate (25 tokens=1 Euro). The formula for the final payment 
can thus be summarised as: 
𝑃 = 𝑓(1 − 𝑘1)
𝑚(1 − 𝑘2)
𝑛 ∑(0.8𝑤𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
Where P is the final payment expressed in Euro, f = 1/25 = 0.04 is the conversion 
rate, k1=15% is the penalty for a level of consumption lower than 6 tokens or 
because the total amount of savings is lower than the amount required for the 
debt reduction, k2=5% is the penalty for tax evasion, and m and n are the 
numbers of the two penalties respectively, T is the number of rounds, wt is the 
consumption expenditure of round t, and gt is a binary variable that indicates 
the amount received for each correct forecast (0 or 2 tokens).  
 
Example: If the experiment ends after 10 rounds and your consumption 
expenditure has been constant and equal to 10 tokens, the number of tokens 
that contributes to the final payment is 0.8*10*10=80 tokens. If, however, you 
have accumulated two 15% penalties, the final payment is reduced to 80*(1-
0.15)2 = 68 tokens. 
 
Final task 
As soon as everyone has finished the experiment and before the final 
questionnaire, you will join one last task. For this task, you have a screen 
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showing ten rows. Each row is a paired choice between Option A and Option B. 
You will need to think about your preference between these two options for each 
row of the table, but only one of the rows will be used to determine your 
earnings. 
After you have entered your decision, the computer will randomly determine 
which of the ten rows will count toward your earnings. The computer will then 
randomly determine your earnings according to the choice that you made, either 
Option A or Option B, for the row that it selected. This amount will be added to 
your earnings from the first part of the experiment and paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment. 
You will need to think about your preference between Option A and Option B 
in all ten rows. Only one of the rows will end up affecting your earnings, but 
you will not know in advance which one that will be. Each row has an equal 
chance of being used. 
 
Example: Option A presents a 10% probability of winning 20 tokens and a 90% 
probability of winning 16 tokens. At the same time, Option B presents a 10% 
probability of winning 38.5 tokens and a 90% probability of winning 1 token. 
 
Should you have any question, please rise your hand and wait for the 
experimenters. 
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Strategic analysis 
 
Figure A4.5. Strategic analysis, subject i’s outcomes, two rounds, (t,t + 1). 
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